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ABSTRACT
Peter Boulding
State policies and industrial change:
Reindustrialization programmes
in British steel closure areas
Ph.D Thesis submitted February 1989.
Efforts to establish replacement industrial employment in
British steel closure areas have, at best, met with only partial
success. Instead of industrial monoculture a new more vulnerable
dependence has been created. 	 Small firms, typified by poor
wages, conditions and security of employment now predominate.
The total employment provided by these firms is insufficient to
absorb the demand generated following steel closure and
increasing participation of women and school leavers in the
labour market.	 This thesis attempts to examine how state
policies have developed over time in three different steel
closure areas: Hartlepool, Corby and Ebbw Vale. It attempts to
rationalise the palliative aspects of recent state interventions
and suggests that central government has been deliberately
deconcentrating responsibility for	 job	 generation whilst
retaining control of the financial means to achieve it.
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PREFACE
The principal	 aim of this thesis is to investigat€
reindustrialization programmes in British steel closure areas.
The programmes selected for comparative study were in Hartlepool,
Corby and Blaenau Gwent. This raised the conceptual difficulty
of how to interpret the various strands of state intervention
that make up these programmes. The approach adopted followed the
work of Of fe by considering state behaviour, not in terms of a
neutral arbiter, but as bound by specific sets of interests. 	 It
might have been possible to adopt a liberalistic interpretation
of state intervention and draw somewhat different conclusions.
Given that the overt intention of reindustrialization
programmes is that of employment generation, it is impossible to
identify an official data source that adequately monitors the
situation. As mentioned on several occasions in the text, the
1984 (Annual) Census of Employment (known as ACE) was not
available over three years after it was taken (and even then with
substantial inaccuracies- personal communication, NOMIS staff)
Even if the 1984 ACE data had been made available sooner it would
still have been out of date and would have provided only the
baldest summary of conditions (breakdown of employment by gender
and whether full- or part- time), with no qualitative element.
Despite the validity of unemployment data becoming a minor
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political issue in the 1987 General Election, the fact remains
that it is impossible to produce a reliable time series for a
recent ten year period, for consistent small areas.
The inadequacy of published sources prompted the decision to
generate primary
	
material	 consisting	 principally	 of
questionnaires and interviews. This allowed for more up-to-date
analysis of local variations in: the agencies undertaking
reindustrialization,	 the	 characteristics of the associated
employment (including levels of pay, types of work and working
conditions), and the degree to which firms had actually altered
their employment or locational practices as a result of the
incentives.	 Thus the approach finally adopted was a combination
of the intensive and extensive; see chapter 7 (2) for further
references.
Problems of accessibility from Durham are evident from the
interview (see appendix 2) but not questionnaire coverage that
Elaenau Gwent received. It is hoped that this does not detract
from the inclusion of Blaenau Gwent for comparative purposes.
All responsibility for the word processing, grammar and
spelling rests with the author.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION:SETTING THE SCENE
"Enterprise Zones? They're nothing but spivs' havens"
Michael Kay, Hartlepool, 1985)
1.1	 ANALYTICAL POSITION
It is thought preferable to introduce the analytical
position to be adopted throughout this thesis from the
outset.	 Essentially my analysis assumes the primacy of
production in the economic system. 	 In particular the
qualitative aspects of production are thought worthy of
examination. Whilst not adopting an overtly Marxist stance,
many of the ideas incorporated in this work are decidedly
Socialist in origin. The reason such an approach has been
used is that it appears to me to provide a sound theoretical
backdrop to the analysis of steel closure areas, including a
particularly profound analysis of the state.
	
I remain
personally committed to the idea of collective provision and
ownership of services, utilities and key industries by the
state and the acknowledgement of full responsiblity by the
state for remedial action in times of crisis. I would
preferred to have had more time to develop my interest in
socially useful- rather than market oriented- production.
The socially useful (reevaluation of the work ethic) approach
accords with my personal political preferences; which also
include a far more sympathetic treatment of the plight of the
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victims of these closures than either of the two traditional
alternatives: monetarism or Keynesianism. The theoretical
approach adopted is developed more fully in chapters 2 and 7.
My rejection of the monetarist approach should be
unsurprising given that it has been responsible for the
majority of steel closures since the mid- 1970's (under
Labour and Conservative administrations). The prime aim of
monetarism has been the reduction of inflation (in the UK
this has been unsuccessful relative to the achievements of
most other industrial countires) . Recession has deliberately
been engineered with mass unemployment being used to
discipline workers into moderating wage demands or accepting
low paid jobs. In the public sector the monetarist sanctions
have been cuts in jobs and services, privatisations and
attacks on local authority powers. Anti- Trade Union and
Wage Council legislation affects many workers whilst the
burdn of taxation has fallen most heavily on those least
able to pay.	 The economy has been internationalised to an
unprecedented degree with the relaxation of exchange controls
and the encouragement of foreign owned multinational firms to
establish bases here. The effects of monetarism have been to
polarize the nation regionally and also in terms of social
class. Nowhere is this more apparent than in central London
where the abject poverty of the underclass of the homeless is
seen side by side with the extravagance of the hyper-wealthy.
The monetarist view of the state dictates a minimalist "hands
off" approach.	 Monetarism demands that the enterprising
individual should better himself unsupported by the "nanny"
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state.	 Monetarism offers little sympathy for those made
unemployed due to circumstances beyond their control with the
admonition to relocate by bicycle. 	 Above all monetarism
states that the market should be allowed to operate freely
and uninhibitedly.
Keynesianism, the motive force of the post war consensus
in Britain, is less fundamentally flawed than monetarism but
is unable to deal with current economic conditions.
Keynesianism endorses the view that corrective intervention
is sometimes required to ensure that markets work well.
However the principal limitation of the Keynesian view is
that market intervention should be limited to the demand side
of the equation. Existing, maybe inefficient, institutions
may be supported and sustained instead of being restructured.
Productive issues are not addressed; there is little emphasis
on supply. Keynesianism also offers no riposte to the rise
of multinational corporations.
1.2 AREA SELECTION
As there is no such thing as a typical steel closure area
(interview with senior BSC(I) staff) it was decided to adopt
a comparative approach to the study of steel closure area
reindustrialization. The selection of a manageable number of
areas to study is beset with subjective difficulties. The
principal constraints were time and finances. I was limited
to an eighteen month data collection period and the financial
support of an ESRC award.
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At the time of the study there were 18 designated steel
closure areas ±n Britain (the closure of the historic Dowlais
Works in Merthyr Tydfil added another in 1987) .	 I had to
select a number of areas that were both representative of the
group as a whole and yet represented some of the variety of
local experiences.	 By drawing up a schedule of available
research time it became apparent that a maximum of three
areas could be accommodated allowing approximately four
months data- gathering from each and writing up time at the
end.	 The overriding criterion for the selection of study
areas was the nature of the social structure.The prime aim
wasas to select as broad a range of social conditions as
possible.
A range of readily available statistical and other
material was used to assist in this process. 	 Firstly the
annual census of employment (ACE) from NOMIS was used in
order to determine the relative importance of steel
employment to the various local economies. 	 Due to the
restrictions of the Statistics of Trade Act I am not a
liberty to disclose the exact figures for steel and steel
tubes production for each area but have presented the 1971
and 1981 percentage of the workforce employed in metal
manufacture in the appendix 3 to give an impression of the
relative impact of steel redundancies in each of the areas.
Male unemployment rates for October 1981 and 1984 were also
added to bring the exercise more up to date (it was carried
out early in 1985) . Male rates were used because males were
most affected by the steel closures. Storey's 1983 report
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(provided by the European Community) on the job creation
efforts of BSC(I) gave some further information on the number
of assisted jobs created, projected new new jobs to March
1986, BSC(I) loans to March 1983 and cost per 1983 job.
These figures were all derived from BSC (I), but it is unclear
how BSC(I) collated them. The eight steel closure areas with
enterprise zones were identified: West Cuxthria, Hartlepool,
Teesside, South Huitherside, Rotherham, Corby, Dudley, Deeside
and West Glamorgan. A qualitative grading (possible range
0-10) of responses to a written request for infornation and
promotional material was also included in an attempt to
determine the most helpful participants.
There were also empirical reasons for the areas selected.
Those selected were reasonably discrete ie not part of large
conurbations with other conflicting activities which might
distort the effect of steel closures. It was felt sensible
to select one area close to Durham in order to "dry run" the
research methodology. Hartlepool was selected on the grounds
that Consett had already received so much academic and media
attention at and after the time of closure that local
resentment might inhibit the research. Another significant
point in Hartlepool's favour was that Eddie Morley, the
Borough's Industrial Development Officer had built up close
links with the University Geography Department over field
trip visits. The inclusion of Corby was merited because it
claimed the highest number of jobs created, it is situated
outside the regions normally associated with heavy industry
and was thus one of the closest assisted areas to London.
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Blaenau Gwent was chosen because it caine under the aegis of
the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), its Labourist social
conditions were not English- based and its steel works had
already been resurrected by state intervention in the 1930's.
Had the resources been available it would have been
interesting to have included a Scottish area in order to
compare the influence of the Scottish Office with that of the
Welsh Office and the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) with
the WDA. As it was I opted for an established English
industrial area, Hartlepool; an English New Town designated
for steel production, Corby; and a traditional Welsh coal and
steel valley community, Blaenau Gwent (Ebbw Vale).
1.3 WHAT IS REINDUSTRIALIZATION ?
Pedantically it must be defined as the process of
industrializing again, to give back industrial character to
an area previously so characterized. It is an attempt to
generate new industry in the place of old. 	 "New jobs for
old" has already been used as a title in the context of steel
closure (Taylor, 1982). For the purposes of this study it is
place-specific,	 with reference to particular sets of
conditions pertaining to places where iron and steel
production has ceased.	 The debate in the United States
(epitomised by the "Business Week" June 1980 edition) uses
the same terminology but with reference to the maintenance of
national competitiveness (against Japan and West Germany)
through a generalised change of social contract, and the
initiation of state intervention.	 In Britain and certain
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other parts of Europe the state has been intervening for over
50 years.	 Inextricably associated with regional policy,
reindustrialization has, in the past, been linked with the
notion of national economic development but more recently,
and particularly with the advent of Thatcherism, has come to
be seen as a social policy with little economic
justification.	 Reindustrialization	 can,	 in	 some
circumstances, occur unprompted, as certain forms of capital
may seek to take advantage of labour market conditions in
peripheral areas, as well as a degree of new business
formation that could be expected to happen anyway- the
deadweight effect.
Reindustrialization suggests much more than the physical
erection of new factory units and their occupancy (or not) by
various forms of capital, it has considerable cultural and
social implications for the localities involved. It would
appear that many of the problems, particularly for labour,
associated with the first (l8th-l9th Century) phase of
industrialization are currently being Today, the smaller size
of plants, their diffuse locations, altered working practices
and greater company instability tend to impede the
organisation of labour and the attainment of comparable wages
and conditions to the steelworks. This work has, perforce,
to take the closure of steelworks as a "fait accompli"
(following on from the work of D.Sadler on the implications
of the anti-closure campaigns). It is not within the remit
of this work to dwell on the quantifiable social costs of
closure (eg unemployment benefit, redundancy and other social
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security payments) which mean that it may be more economic
for the state to keep units open, but, the considerable costs
of reindustrialization should be added to the equation.
1.4 WHAT ARE REINDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAMMES?
A programme, by implication, suggests the notion of
planned action to be taken, "things to be done" for specific
effect.	 The empirical reality of reindustrialization might
suggest otherwise, a less-than-strategic, goal achieving
approach.	 It is only at the most local (and often most
impotent) levels that terms such as "programme", "strategy"
or even perhaps "policy" have some meaning. The conflicts,
contradictions and complacency within central government and
nationalised industry institutions make their integrity a
matter of some doubt.
Three main interrelated elements of reindustrialization
programmes have been delineated (Boulding, 1985) in Britain
as :1) regeneration of the conventional economic system, 2)
training and retraining, 3)"Third sector" or community
ventures.	 The principal concern of this study is with the
first of these elements but there will be reference to the
other two.
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1.4.1 Conventional economic regeneration
The efforts for conventional economic regeneration have
three main features : incentives and areal promotion to
attract mobile industry, measures to support and develop
existing industry and the encouragement of indigenous or
local entrepreneurs. There is a plethora of indust rial
incentives available to British indu5try ,as emphasised by
the 160 page "comprehensive" guide published by Arthur Young
(1985), where steel closure areas exhibit the widest range of
entries. Some are specific to areas affected by reductions
in iron and steel employment (ECSC, Business Improvement
Services and BSC(I)), some apply to areas experiencing high
unemployment	 (regional development,	 regional selective
assistance and enterprise zone related) and others apply
anywhere	 (national selective assistance, loan guarantee
scheme, business expansion scheme) . Local Authority measures
vary depending on political will, the imagination of officers
and the means available. Financial assistance is the most
high profile incentive, alongside site preparation, factory
construction and "special deal" measures	 (including
enterprise zone allowances and other more covert activity)
The state in its various institutional and industrial forms
has been responsible for reindustrialization but recent
administrations have promoted the privatisation of some
efforts through the development of enterprise agencies
sponsored by private capital, but despite this, 	 local
authorities remain the principal supporters of these new
bodies.
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1.4.2 Training and retraining
Privatisation is also a recent feature of the training and
retraining scene with MSC Skillcentres (ex traditional
government training centres) now being required to compete on
a commercial basis with specialist commercial firms often
attracted to steel closure areas by European grant aid (eg
P.B.	 Whitford to Hartlepool).	 Information technology
centres (ITEC's) are the current MSC and local authority
"flavour of the month" for youth training. 	 Certain
skillcentres threatened with closure have been taken over by
local authorities as demonstrations of a willingness to
assist prospective employers and provide some facilities for
local people (e.g. Blaenau Gwent) . The training incentives
are as numerous as those for employment creation and business
development. YTS and Community Programmes often form the
lifeline (albeit for a short time) for large numbers of
people in steel closure areas. It is not proposed to dwell
on the many criticisms of these schemes except for their
impact on the local labour markets and the problems of
finding suitable placements for trainees, let alone jobs.
Training and community work maybe of value in providing
temporary respite for the beleaguered unemployed, but their
social (in terms of raised expectations and dented hopes) and
economic (training for what ?) rationales are questionable.
A political rationale, namely the removal of numbers from the
unemployed register, is also discernable. Most companies
prefer to undertake their own specific training; there are
grants of up to 80% of training costs from the ECSC to
- 10 -
facilitate this.
1.4.3 Third sector or Community involvement
Third sector or community efforts (often closely allied to
the work of the MSC)	 are the concern of various
common-interest	 groups	 such as Churches, cooperatives,
community or housing associations and credit unions
(Murgatroyd and Smith, 1984) .	 Cooperative development is
seen by some authorities as a legitimate form of job creation
(e.g.	 Cleveland County) but marginalised by others (e.g.
Corby and Northamptonshire) .
	
Community Enterprise Trusts
have been established for the furtherance of the ideals of
community business ventures-	 aiming	 for	 economic
sustainability rather than viability, and often incorporating
the "socially useful" concept. Such ventures are viewed very
much as fringe activities or temporary measures and as such
do not always receive the support that their idealism might
merit.	 In the steel closure areas investigated, only the
largest, Hartlepool, showed any real signs of nascent third
sector development (but Corby had the only industrial
workers' cooperative) . The impact of Community Programme
(CP) work cannot be over-stressed- men have been known to
turn down relatively well paid short-term contracts at the 44
inch Pipe mill (Hartlepool) so as to qualify (by duration of
unemployment) for the CP.	 The MSC is often the major
employer in steel closure areas (overwhelmingly so in Consett
and also in Hartlepool where 1,800 people relied on it in
1986)
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1 .5 HOW ARE THE PROGRAMMES IMPLEMENTED ?
The state remains the prime mover at all levels of
reindustrializing activity,	 as it has done since the
initiation of regional policy over 50 years ago. 	 The state
uses a variety of institutions and modus operandi in this
field. Administrative confusion is evident from the frequent
calls (especially from small business organisations, see
Business in the Community, 1985) for "one stop shops" where
all the agencies may be represented together. An average of
15 different bodies offer advice and incentives	 for
businesses operating in steel closure areas.
Central responsibility for the programmes is divided
between three government economic departments: Trade and
Industry, Environment and Employment.
	 The respective
concerns principally, regional development aid; enterprise
zones/urban programme/planning/urban development corporations
and small business development/MSC. The three departments
may not always act in harness. Paradoxically, some European
aid is made available through the clearing banks or the Welsh
or Scottish Development Agencies; this aid would be more
significant if the severe loan security impediments were
removed. The local authorities (some are empowered to manage
enterprise	 zones)	 attempt to coordinate the various
incentives into financial packages, in order to make most
impact on the place market that has developed out of the
competition to attract a diminished amount of mobile industry
(Robinson and Sadler, 1985) . For much of the recent history
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of these places strenuous efforts have been made to attract
industry through an increasingly complex set of marketing
strategies including advertising, displays, exhibtions and
hard-line telephone selling. Annual budgets of 1/4 million
pounds are involved - partly derived from Section 137 of the
Local Government Act 1972 (2p rate) revenue.
	 Responsibility
for economic regeneration has, to some degree, been
deconcentrated to the localities involved as central
government reduces its role, but increases its control of the
purse strings. District or Borough level programmes are
usually under the control of some form of industrial
development committee. 	 Such committees (with associated
"teams", "task forces" etc.) have varying constituencies and
include not only members of district and county councils but
also non-elected chief executives, civil servants, local
government officers and appointees (such as "Directors of
Industry", enterprise agency executives, etc.) . Such is the
desire to avoid accountability that these committees are
often paranoically sensitive to criticism, real or implied,
which might be said to damage the image of their place in the
eyes of the public, prospective industrialists or competing
places.
A major and recurring political irony of the support for
capitalism that reindustrialization represents is that it is
accepted and undertaken so readily by Labour administrations
who might be expected to, but cannot afford to, adopt a more
socialist approach.	 It is becoming increasingly apparent
(see Financial Times 17.8.87) that central government is
- 13 -
making strenuous efforts to denude local authorities of
nearly all remaining independent power (eg the poll tax
legislation and educational "opting out" policies breach
fundamental areas of local government influence) . It is, as
yet, uncertain how the abolition of rates will influence the
S. 137 (rate product) money but the decision to fix a central
business rate has caused consternation amongst industrialists
particularly in the south of England (this may result in
centrifugal forces more powerful than ever achieved by
regional policy) . Local politicians and chief executives are
on record as being prepared to give "carte blanche" to
industrial employers, even to the extent of being prepared to
"sell their grandmothers" (Blaenau Gwent) . There is little
tolerance of opposition from within council ranks, which has
resulted in some fairly crude attempts to quash dissent (the
case of a Corby councillor's nine month suspension from the
Labour Party being notorious)
The current implementation of these programmes has to be
seen as the product of changing social, economic and
political circumstances for the state and capital. The
perception of the need for the development of replacement
industries changes over time. The recent emphasis on local
solutions to unemployment, illustrated by the calls for the
development of an enterprise culture, enterprise agencies and
other bodies, is by no means a modern approach to the
problem.	 The interwar years saw the establishment, in the
North East and elsewhere, of local industrial development
boards	 (with local authority and chamber of commerce
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representation) which later (1938) formed a regional alliance
(the North Ea'st Development Board then the Northern
Industrial Group) (Carney and Hudson, 1978) . The 1930's are
a useful starting point for other similarities including:
unemployment levels, economic conditions in very similar
areas and particularly for the initiation of policies for the
relocation of industry (e.g. Special Areas Act 1934) . The
reopening of the Ebbw Vale steelworks in 1935 can be seen as
a deliberate regional policy measure for the impoverished
South Wales coalfield. Hartlepool was also the recipient of
regional aid in the 1930's, one factory remains operational
as a result. In contrast, the Corby Works were only just
being constructed at this time, as a result of a relocation
decision in favour of iron ore availability. 	 The twenty
years following the Barlow Report (1944), saw the flowering
of national regional development measures. The collapse of
the post-war boom began to be felt in the peripheral regions
from the late 1950's and resulted in the reformation of
locally based efforts- exemplified by the Hartlepools' 1964
appointment of an industrial development officer.	 British
Steel Corporation (Industry) was formed in 1975 specifically
to attract industry to steel closure areas as a mark of the
corporation's "social conscience". The working relationship
between BSC(I) and the local authorities can be described as
cordial with a hint of competitiveness- there is certainly
the retention of distinct corporate identity for each of
them.
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Policy implementation has always focussed attention upon
business attraction and development.	 Very little emphasis
has been placed upon attending to the basic needs of the
unemployed involved.
	 The consensus has been that the
facilitation of capitalist industrial development will result
in the benefits filtering down to those most in need.
Reindustrialization programmes have tended to fail, as
evidenced by their minimal impact on unemployment figures and
also on account of the type of employment provided.
Post-closure reindustrialization has been marked by the
desire to erase the memory of steel production through the
demolition of the steelworks as rapidly as possible. Despite
this, use of ex-steel sites has, so far, been minimal because
they were not immediately available at the time of closure.
The rush to build advance factories has resulted in the
utilisaton of certain physically sub-optimal 	 sites
(particularly in Blaenau Gwent) .
	 Another example of the
rapidity of reindustrialization is the more general one of
the introduction of the second round of enterprise zones two
years after the first but before any significant analysis of
their impacts could be made (National Audit Office, 1986;
Public Accounts Committee, 1986): further evidence of the
political nature of the programmes. 	 Implementation and
policy formation are not always the measured responses of
popular expectation- one local administrator has recounted
the "grant for anything you can think of" approach adopted on
a change of political control.
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1.6 HOW HAS CAPITAL RESPONDED?
The most pertinent reply is that capital has responded
negatively: there has not been a mass movement to, or
spontaneous development of manufacturing in, steel closure
areas.	 Manufacturing (where it has survived its national
decline) shows a distinct preference for more prestigous,
southerly locations such as the "M4 corridor" or "Spa towns
crescent" or other such notional units which give credibility
to commercial environment and communications arguments. Most
steel closure area administrations have as a horizon a return
to national levels of unemployment, but the programmes have
not, so far, brought this about. The number unemployed has
fallen in some cases, but job losses in other local non-steel
industries have tended to increase.	 Unemployment remains
high; 13- 21% (July, 1987) for these travel to work areas, in
the context of a nationally reported decline that has more to
do with creative accounting than increased employment. The
fall can be attributed to MSC schemes, the deregistration of
older workers and, to the as yet unquantified implications of
"Restart" interviews (from late 1986) .	 Not only	 does
capitals' response appear to be quantitatively inadequate, it
appears to be qualitatively lacking too. 	 Pay, security of
employment and working conditions in the new firms are often
worse than the, albeit paternalistic, steelworks. There can
be little doubt that exploitative capitals tend to view steel
closure areas as pools of cheap labour with financial aid
thrown in.	 The return to Victorian conditions and working
practices can be overstressed. 	 Some of the employers do
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offer wages near the national average and some have even
recognised trade unions (though where this happens there is a
prevalence of no strike agreements and/or very restrictive
single union arrangements, eg FT, 11.8.87)
A significant proportion of new firms claim that they
would have established in steel closure areas anyway,
regardless of the incentives offered. This is known as the
deadweight effect. 	 These firms tend to have personal,
historical or established market reasons for their locations.
Some may actually prefer to locate elsewhere but are impeded
by behavioural constraints. These are often the smallest
businesses who may also not have the time or resources to
obtain their financial assistance entitlements.
The remnants of the steel industry- various finishing
plants (such as tinplatirig, tube and pipe making)- have
responded to the failure of reiridustrialization in a number
of ways. Until 1984 (the end of non job creating grant aid
for capital projects), the BSC was the major recipient of
regional aid in two out of the three study areas. There has
been privatisation of some of the more profitable areas (eg
Seamless Tubes Ltd. and Cold Drawn Tubes Ltd.) and the
widespread introduction of more "flexible" work practices
(particularly multi-skilling) . 	 Elsewhere	 the	 increased
flexibility has been extended to the development of contract
labour: working for short periods on a weekly basis as the
contract demands, with only a small core labour force
permanently employed (eg Hartlepool 44 inch pipemill)
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1.7	 WHY REINDUSTRIALIZE ?
This quintessential question should be preceeded by a
perfunctory examination of the conditions that gave rise to
steel closures. The range of factors involved has been well
documented (e.g. D.Sadler, 1985) and includes: the world
recession	 of the mid-1970's,	 more competitive steel
production	 from	 newly	 industrializing	 countries,
nationalization (making closures easier to organize), coupled
with EC membership and the associated implications for quotas
and capacity reductions. There may well have been a case for
arguing that the social costs of closure outweighed the
economic ones. Certain anti-closure campaigns were fought on
grounds of profitability whilst the salient issue of national
capacity was not properly addressed (particularly in Consett-
Hudson and Sadler 1983) . However damaging the results and
optimistic the alternative speculation, steel closures have
happened. They are likely to occur again, particularly
vulnerable is Ravenscraig, especially following the Gartcosh
mill closure (1986) . They have resulted in concentrations of
particularly high levels of unemployment in regions of very
high long term unemployment (Corby's region being the
exception).	 Because of the many changes in definition, area
and other methods of accounting (including the introduction
of Restart in late 1986) the unemployment totals provide a
dubious measure of the problem.
The attraction of new industry to areas of high
unemployment has been seen as a major policy response since
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the inter-war years.	 Early central government attempts
sought to harness assisted areas policy to enhanced labour
mobility (transferance) but the contradictory implications of
the two policies, particularly for incoming capital, were
soon acknowledged and the latter dropped (only to be revived
by N.Tebbit's	 infamous	 "on your bike" remark). 	 The
formulation of overt state concern for the plight of the
unemployed was derived from the increased participation of
the Labour movement in national politics coupled with
Conservative concern for domestic law and order aroused by
the General Strike of 1926. Between the wars, as the light
industrial economy of London's outer metropolitan area
(coincident with suburban	 sprawl)	 boomed,	 it became
increasingly apparent that the peripheral, traditional
industrial regions were declining- a pattern that has
reemerged, with a slight change of growth-emphasis towards
smaller towns in the outer South East.	 The post-war
consensus on full employment- including regional policy to
redistribute industry was an attempt on the part of the
Labour Party to bolster its support from traditional centres,
whilst it provided the Tories with the opportunity to display
a degreee of social concern for and retain a modicum of
support in the periphery. In fact, during the Conservatives'
social democratic phase (1951-1974), a need to be seen to
develop the economy on a national basis was felt; rather than
concentrating on regions of the Party's traditional support-
the Shire counties. DTI officials now emphasise the social
rather than economic aims of regional policy. Redistribution
of industry away from London and the South East appears no
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longer to have any economic rationale; it is referred to as
"pinching" (interview Aug 1987) of jobs from places that also
have problems.	 More recently, the	 campaign to
	
save
Ravenscraig has focussed not only on the need to placate the
minority of Scottish voters who remain Tory, but also on the
potential damage to home support if whole regions are just
"written off", (the notion of "caring capitalsm" would not
survive intact)
A most pertinent question is whether the efforts to
attract new industry to steel closure, and other, declining
areas can be regarded as serious attempts to restore full
employment or whether they are mere palliatives to appease
local constituents- things seen to be done? Where stated,
the expressed aims and intentions of the programmes profess a
lofty idealism that their actual resourcing and achievements
belittle.	 A more prosaic suggestion would be that concern
for the unemployed is derived from the drain upon resources
that their continued high numbers represents- however if a
closed system exists (as monetarism indicates) this drain
means that less is available to remedy the situation.
Monetarist resource allocation arguments (the fiscal limits
to state intervention) for example, "the cake is just so big"
have been of major importance in recent attempts to reduce
levels of government spending.
Another related but more structural question is the states
involvement in reindustrialization for the purposes of
reproducing and generalising the conditions for capitalist
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accumulation. This is part of a wider encouragement of the
spread of the' capitalist condition by promoting, among other
measures, more widespread share and home ownership. 	 The
ideals of the enterprise culture are forming an increasing
element in reindustrialization. The more new entrepreneurial
businesses there are, the more capitalists are produced to
maintain the system. Despite the high failure rate of new
entrepreneurs, the capitalist consensus will be upheld- and
even extended. Legitimation through the profit motive will
be maintained, with the balance in capital's favour. The
problem that steel closure areas pose is that too few
entrepreneurs seem able to come forward from these
localities,	 previously	 dominated	 by	 paternalistic
natiorialised industries, typically in large units where
individualism was not fostered. Deindustrialization followed
by reindustrialization allows for another essential tenet of
the New Right philosophy- the demolition of trade union
power.	 This occurs through the loss of local credibilty and
cohesiveness by steel unions over the failure to successfully
contest steel closure and the promotion of smaller, more
diffuse, confrontational and therefore more difficult to
organise plants.	 There can be no doubt that the programmes
receive full Tory party support over the levels of pay
offered by the new employers. The Thatcher administration
has long expounded the idea that British workers have been
overpaid relative to productivity and that much unemployment
has been a direct result of workers "pricing themselves out
of the market". Steel closure areas can be described as low
pay sinks for the new industries, with female workers being
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particularly exploited (wage levels of 50-60 pounds per week
for shift work •have been encountered in 1985-1986)
The poverty of	 real	 policy	 alternatives	 to
reindustrialization (masked by the myriad variations upon the
twin themes of developing new industry and training) is
compounded by the political damage of admitting the enduring
inevitability of current high levels of real unemployment in
Britain, if the present value system is allowed to persist.
The continued dominance of the waged labour economy, where
social status is confirmed by nature of occupation and
material wealth, means that it is politically suicidal for
governments to exclude certain areas ("redundant spaces") by
determining that there is no further hope for them from
capitalism.	 The illusion of survival by an upturn must be
maintained. Reindustrialization can be described as a "knee
jerk" response by the state because the system allows, in
Thatcher's words, "no alternative".	 Measures which would
challenge the work ethic (such as a universal minimum
liveable payment, real amelioration of conditions for the
unemployed and socially sustainable rather than economically
viable production) are regarded as subversive by both
political parties.	 The Labour Party, by its gradual
incorporation into the governing system, has long ceased to
promote as central any radical socialist views. Labour is
now as reliant as the Conservatives upon the maintenance of
capitalism, though it pays lip service to notions of reform.
Perhaps the only really effective motive	 force	 for
reindustrialization (only in the past for temporarily halting
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deindustrialization) in steel closure areas would be a
prolonged conventional war. Much of the current "success" of
Southern Britain is military related. For a war to profit
peripheral Britain it would have to remain non-nuclear for a
considerable amount of time.
Although reindustrialization is necessary for the
maintenance of state hegemony, its relationship to the actual
reproduction of capital is more problematic. 	 If the
intention is to reproduce the conditions for capitalist
accumulation, the results have not been friutful. 	 Some,
particularly labour exploitative or financially vulnerable
("lameduck"), forms of capital have established in steel
closure areas but this tendency has not been followed by the
more advanced (higher wage, better conditions, more secure
with greater work satisfaction and skill requirements) types
of capital.	 There appears to be environmental, image,
prejudice and international linkage reasons why certain
"leading edge" types of capital avoid steel closure areas.
Much of the small capital to be found in steel closure areas
remains for a range of behaviouralistic reasons- not the
capital logic beloved of industrial location determinists.
Steel closure areas tend to become, economic but not social,
"ghost towns" with or without reindustrialization programmes.
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Judging by the Institute of Personnel Managers report "The
Human Face of €hange" (T.K. Jones 1974) BSC has a model
record for social responsibility. Its measures continue to
be copied by other nationalised industries when rationalising
(NCB Enterprise, now British Coal Enterprise, and British
Shipbuilders Enterprise) . The grounds for this emulation are
not immediately apparent when individual steel closure areas
are examined. Since 1975 BSC(I) claims to have created well
over 30000 jobs in its "opportunity areas" (BSC Annual
Reports, 1986) . Any claims for "job creation" should be
treated with a high degree of caution because they can be
spurious on a number of counts: they may be transfers from
elsewhere (potentially involving rationalisation and net job
loss), be in no way related to any BSC(I) activity (regional
development grants are still the most influential financial
factor), not include jobs lost through closures of new firms.
and have already been claimed by a competing agency in the
same place (e.g. the local authority) . In the job creation
game the team effort is always emphasised until it comes to
taking any credit for success. The BSC(I) initiative grew
out of the Corporation's new jobs teams of the early 1970's,
and started with rather vague efforts to facilitate
industrial development.	 Its golden (literally) age was
1978-1984 when extensive grants and loans were made available
to firms (one official described it as "giving money away").
A change of chief executive (for BSC(I) Ltd.) resulted in
tighter financial control,	 self-financing and a role
restriction to the provision of funding gap loans at slightly
below commercial rates. Perhaps the most enduring element of
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SC(I) in their "Opportunity Areas" has been the provision of
managed workshop units or nurseries for new entrepreneurs.
Eight (the ninth is nearing completion in Coatbridge in late
1987) such complexes exist	 (often	 utilising	 ex-steel
buildings) and have had some success in encouraging start-ups
with "easy in/easy out" lease arrangements.	 To the great
disappointment of BSC(I), but little surprise to local
workers, very few ex-steelworkers have established their own
businesses through the scheme.
The Corporation's social conscience, as expressed by
ESC(I), does, despite a new (1987) regional structure, appear.
to have run out of steam. It may not be coincidental that
the Corporation has been pulling out of job creation (leaving
it to the much more precarious enterprise agencies) during a
period when ECSC finances are threatened at source. In late
1985 there was a moratorium on ECSC loans for job creation
suitable for ex-steelworkers because of budgetary constraints
within the European Community as a whole.
1.8	 CONCLUSION
The ensuing chapters will attempt to develop the issues
raised in the introduction, firstly into a theorisation of
the changing historical role of the state and capital in the
legitimising of reindustrialization to the point where it is
now accepted by Labour organisations but is increasingly
rejected by the "self help" economists of the New Right. In
the subsequent three chapters the actual reindustrialization
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experiences of three different steel closure areas will be
analysed with' special reference to the last ten years. The
sixth chapter will highlight the comparisons and contrasts
between the three study areas.	 The final chapter will
assimilate the previous material and attempt to tease out
some conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
STATE THEORY
2.1	 INTRODUCTION
The development of theory has to be seen in terms of the
development of explanation. Theory should not obfuscate but
clarify or enhance. 	 There is no	 readily available
theoretical	 "package"	 to adopt in order to explain
reindustrialization in steel closure areas. In constructing
an adequate theorisation of this subject matter, elements
have to be drawn from the existing body of social, economic
and state theories. The intention of this thesis is to build
upon and develop the existing stock of theory rather than
engineer anything more dramatic.
At the most abstract level, the intention is to examine
the relevance of state theory (theories as to the character,
form and functions of, 	 and limitations to,
	
state
interventions	 in capitalist societies) for the partial
explanation of the phenomenon of steel closure area
reindustrialization.	 The salient questions are: why should
the state see fit to reiridustrialize these areas? 	 And how
did the present set of circumstances arise? The work of
Claus Offe provided the theoretical framework for the
empirical observations. In particular Of fe's examination of
the relationship between the state and capital (exclusion,
maintenance and dependency) and his work on the form and
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function of the state, intervention and policy formation, has
proved importaat. The high degree of abstraction encountered
in much, particularly Marxian literature, means that other
sources such as local government and European Community
theories have to be utilised in a supplementary role.
Geography has developed by incorporating theoretical
concepts from elsewhere. Increasing interaction with other
branches of the social sciences (particularly sociology) has
resulted in an eclecticism that is not entirely one way. An
example of the reverse flow is Giddens' use of elements of
Hagerstrand's time geography in the development of
structuration theories.	 The broad spatially	 based
perspectives offered by geographers have the potential to
make significant contributions to other social science
debates in ways hitherto ignored by other disciplines. But
geographers still have much to learn in terms of methodology
and theorisation.	 The problem remains, with any such
synthesis, to discern the relevance of the "borrowed" theory;
precisely how much to retain, modify or to discard.
The eclectic method suggests the use of a range of
theoretical points of view from the hyper-abstract to the
almost-empirical. These will be delt with by decreasing
magnitude of abstraction: beginning with state theories.
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2.2 THEORIES AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THE STATE
It may be inappropriate to dwell overlong upon the
historical evolution of state theory because it has been done
so capably elsewhere (for example, Jessop, 1977, Held, 1983,
Mohan, 1983, Sadler, 1985) . It is, however, misleading to
consider that concern for the issues at stake is entirely
modern. The linguistics of contemporary political philosophy
are rightly derived from the classical worlds: "democracy",
"politics" and "republic", for example (Held, 1983). Plato,
Aristotle and Cicero were amongst the first philosophers to
write on questions of government, rule and law, as the Greek
city state system was transformed firstly to the Republic
then the Empire of ancient Rome. It was only at the very end
of the Renaissance period, 	 as	 feudalism began to
disintegrate,	 that concern for theories of the state
re-emerged. The initial effort was directed towards the
preservation of the existing order.	 Nicolo Machievelli
(1496-1527) advocated political expediency to justify any
means, however immoral. Jean Bodin (1530-96) paved the way
for an era of absolutism in Europe by suggesting that the
royal right to govern was divinely inspired.
It must be stressed at the outset that many of the
theoretical positions considered below evolved in relation
and in opposition to each other and still continue to do so.
It has been observed that there has been a recent tendency
towards a polarization of political opinion with ideas from
both extremes of the political spectrum being ventilated.
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One example was a recent Channel 4 series which attempted to
present the ideas of liberalistic British and American
governments as the "New Enlightenment". The disparate
support for the Left has been less well orchestrated, but
shows little sign of diminishing.
It is proposed to use Held's (1983) fourfold dissection of
state theory: liberalism, liberal democracy, Marxism and
political sociology.
2.3	 LIBERALISM
The liberalist tradition was born from the conflicts
between the interest groups of the absolute monarch and the
remaining bourgeoisie in Parliament. The English civil war
(from 1640) and the subsequent constitutional crisis of 1689
provided the context for the first modern analyses of the
state by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and later John Locke
(1632-1704) . Hobbes produced a definition of the modern
state that is still accepted by many, though not those who
accept a Marxian analysis, as: "a form of public power
separate from both the ruler and the ruled, and constituting
the supreme political authority within a certain defined
boundary."	 It is interesting, from the present perspective
of the rightward shift of the Labour Party, to note that few
of the more radical egalitarian ideas, expressed by such
groups as the "Levellers" and the "Diggers" in Cromwell's
army, gained much credence at the time due to the bourgeois
nature of the Engish "revolutionaries"
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Held defined liberalism as "The freeing of civil society
-personal,	 family and business	 life- from political
interference and the simultaneous delimitation of the state's
authority."	 Hobbes (1651) put forward the idea that the
great "Leviathan" (the imagery of a huge sea monster remains
particularly apt!) of the sovereign state was required to
curb the destructive self interest of individuals (most
vilely expressed by the civil war) . Locke contested the
Hobbesian vision of an all powerful state, preferring to
emphasise the necessary consent of the governed and their
god-given rights (to "life, liberty and estate") . 	 Locke
upheld the separation of powers whereby the constitutional
monarchy controlled the executive power (including the
judiciary) and Parliament the legislative power, through the
operation of a social contract. Held's summary of Locke's
conceptualisation is, again, appropriate: "the state exists
to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens who are
ultimately the best judges of their own interests; and that
accordingly the state must be restricted in scope and
restrained in practice in order to ensure the maximum
possible freedom of every citizen." 	 The rigid electoral
property qualification remained unchallenged.
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2.4	 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
The earliest exponents of the liberal democratic tradition
were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and James Mill (1773-183 6)
They championed the case for democratic accountability
through the vote- in particular the secret ballot. Using a
minimalist construction of human action "humans (with the
emphasis on the male) act to satisfy desire and avoid pain",
the Utilitarians, as they became known generically, concluded
that the government's objective should be to achieve the
greatest happiness for the greatest number. The role of the
state was to be merely confined to that of an "umpire" or
"referee", whilst individuals were to be allowed to indulge,
unconstrained, in the competition and exchange of the free
market. John Stuart Mill (1806-73) endorsed the views of his
father, James, but stressed the need for representative
government for the maintenance of liberty and democracy thus
enhancing the potential for "human excellence." As well as
being an advocate of the free market exchange of goods Mill
proposed a system of plural voting with more votes for the
most kriowledgable and able and fewer for the ignorant and
less gifted- in effect retaining • the iniquities of the
property qualification (Held, 1983)
Held provides a workable summary of the preoccupations of
the liberal democratic tradition: "Individuals; individuals
in competition with one another; freedom of choice; politics
as an arena for the maintenance of individual interests; the
protection of 'life, liberty and estate'; the democratic
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state as the institutional mechanism for the articulation of
the general or .pthlic interest (as opposed to simple private
desires) ."
2.5 MARXISM
The actual contributions of Marx (1818-83) and Engels
(1820-95) to the theoretical analysis of the state are far
less cogent than their analysis of capital (Jessop, 1977).
It is the subsequent attempts to generalise theories of the
state from Marxist principles which have contributed most.
Held identifies two important stances from the work of Marx:
position 1 stresses the "relative autonomy" of the various
bureaucratic manifestations of state institutions from the
interests of the dominant class over the short term when
non-economic considerations may take precedence. This is a
useful concept which may go some way towards explaining some
of the more paradoxical aspects of state activity.	 Position
2 is a less complex idea that the state is a parasitic
instrument of class domination, particularly over the long
term.	 This particular idea was employed by Lenin with
spectacular success in 1917. 	 Positions 1 and 2 present
ambiguities that neither Marx nor any of the other classical
Marxists properly resolved.
The Miliband/Poulantzas debate of the early 1970's was
reflective of the reawakening of interest in Marxism in
general and the political autonomy of the state versus
instrument of class domination conundrum, in particular.
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Miliband sought to re-evaluate the Marxian expression of the
relations between state and class at the same time as
refuting the liberal democratic view of the state as a
"neutral arbiter." He identified the capitalist class as
dominant in western societies, as having close links with a
range of the dominant institutions and as having a
"disproportionate representation" at the highest levels of
the state apparatus (Held, 1983). Miliband reaffirmed Marx's
position 1 by suggesting that the state needs the capacity to
separate itself from the imperatives of the capitalist or
ruling class to meet the needs of political expediency (i.e.
the requirement to maintain the hegemony of the state, see
below); this separation being most acute in times of national
crisis or war. This, in fact, provides a partial explanation
of the phenomenon of reindustrialization, the state acts in
accordance with the needs of political expediency to
encourage the generation of industry in places it might be
expected to avoid.
Poulantzas attacked Miliband's rationalisation of the
state on the grounds of subjectivity because of its emphasis
upon "interpersonal relations" (between bureaucrats	 and
institutions through the network of common personal
backgrounds).	 The state acts to unify the fragmentary
(divided by competition and variation of interests) ruling
classes and works to disorganise the potentially damaging
political organisation of the working classes. With his
phrase "the condensation of class forces" Poulantzas puts
forward the idea that the state is itself a locus of division
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(i.e. conflict within the state) and its degree of "relative
autonomy" is related to the nature and extent of class
struggle evident in a society.
The views of other contemporary Marxists critical of both
these positions, for example, Claus Offe, will be discussed
later.
2.6 POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
Weber (1864-1920), an important critic of Marx, was
particularly critical of the assertion that the state
organisation was "parasitic." His special concern was for
the internal workings of the state administration, the
bureaucracy or "special, perennial structure for ... the
exercise of rule." For Weber the bureaucracy was "completely
indispensible't and could be applied to all	 forms of
large-scale organisation, not necessarily the state. His
analysis was, however, asocietal (Sadler 1985); it bore
little relation to the developing interplay between the
central state and modern capitalist society.
Weberian ideas have been instrumental in the evolution of
a number of other state-related theoretical standpoints.
Pluralism sees power distributed amongst a number of
common-interest based pressure groups bargaining and
competing for the attention of the government. "Fairness" is
assured through the democratic process; 	 inequality
unaccounted for.	 Corporatism, whilst not providing an
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adequate model of the state- it too "reduces democracy to an
economistic bargaining process" (Sadler, 1985)- may provide a
partial explanation to the problem (for the Left) of
rationalising Labour involvement
	
in,	 very capitalist,
reindustrialization.	 In essence corporatism is concerned
with the concept of collective bargaining between employers
representatives, the trades unions and the government, plus
the coimnon interests that arise from this.	 Such joint
sessions were especially a feature of the 1960's and 1970's,
in the UK, (the "tea and sandwiches at Number 10" era), when
Labour groups particpated far more and were incorporated into
the	 capitalist establishment, 	 than before.	 Routine
association and involvement with such a power structure could
lead to a tacit acceptance of the status quo, including an
acceptance of the policies of reindustrialization, policies
to reproduce capitalism.
2.7 CLAUS OFFE: THE PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR
Probably the most sophisticated analysis of state theory
to emerge in recent years has been from Claus Of fe (e.g.
Offe, 1975, Offe and Ronge, 1975 and Offe, 1984) .	 His work
is associated with the German state-derivationist concern to
"elucidate the intimate relationship between the form and
function of the state and the characteristics of capitalism
as a mode of production" (Mohan, 1983).
	
Offe does not,
however, fall into the reductionist trap as do members of the
"capital logic" school (e.g. Altvater, Blanke at al. 1978)
by bringing everything that occurs in capitalist society back
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to the needs of capital (i.e. seeing the state as an "ideal
collective	 capitalist") .	 Offe	 comes	 close to	 an
understanding of "both continuity and change of the functions
of the capitalist state as well as the contradictions of its
mode of operation" (1975) .	 Offe's view of the state is
functionalist rather than structuralist.	 In his seminal
"Theory of the capitalist state and the problems of policy
formation" (1975) the main characteristics of th? state are
identified as:	 exclusion, maintenance, dependancy, and
legitimation.
2.7.1 exclusion
The state is said to be excluded from the accumulation
process.	 "The	 state	 is no
	 capitalist itself, and
accumulation takes place only in private accumulating units"
(Offe, 1975) .	 Property is private; free enterprises exempt
from state control. "The state has rio authority to order
production or control it." The drive for the production of
surplus value, profit, can only take place in private
accumulating units. These assertions appear more tenable in
the light of recent events in Britain but offer little
assistance in comprehension of nationalisation. 	 Recent
privatisation of state assets illustrates the forces of
exclusion at work within the state (particularly when such
assets can be made to appear profitable). Many redundancies
have come about as the state has striven for profitability in
the industries under its direct control.
	
The equation of
nationalisation with rationalisation is apt.
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2.7.2 Maintenance
"Every occupant of state power is basically interesed in
promoting those political decisions most conducive to private
accumulation" (Offe, 1984). The state has more than just the
authority, it has the mandate, to create and maintain the
conditions of accumulation.
	
Offe does not see this as
resulting from any particular class/state alliance but more
an "institutional self interest" in the retention of existing
power. He goes on to stress that there are various levels of
specificity in this involvement: from the single accumulating
unit to capital as a whole.	 There are also a range of
threats to the orderly pursuit of profit- especially from the
working class and criminal or deviant elements. Control over
these threats is the necessary corollary to the sustenance of
the conditions of capitalist accumulation. The implication
is that the reproduction of accumulation depends upon the
protection of an "external being" (Offe, 1975) -the state.
2.7.3 Dependency
The fact that the state is dependent upon the continued
presence of the accumulation process as an enabling factor in
its power relations assists in the explanation of its efforts
to maintain the conditions of capitalist accumulation.	 The
advanced capitalist state's resources are derived from the
taxation of wages and profits.	 If, as Offe suggests,
accumulation were to cease, "everything and especially the
power of the state, tends to disintegrate," because budgetary
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obligations become impossible to manage. "Those who occupy
positions of power in a capitalist state are, in fact,
powerless unless the volume of the accumulation process
allows them to derive (through taxation) the material
resources necessary to promote any political ends," (Offe,
1984).	 Offe also emphasises that the need to ensure the
stability of accumulation acts as a constraining rather than
a determining influence on the policy-making process. The
state "would be threatened if it engaged in policies
inconsistent with its protective	 functions".	 It is
interesting, paradoxically, to note that the notion of
budgetary constraints is now being used by the British
government as motivation for a reduction in state
intervention rather than investment intervention to maintain
revenue.
2.7.4 Legitimation
Legitmation is the cement that allows the above-mentioned
building blocks to hold together. 	 In parliamentary
"democracies" the control over institutional power by the
ruling party is dependent on the degree of electoral support
it receives whenever there happens to be a general election.
This tends to mask the second element of the "dual
determination" of state power- its dependency upon finance
from accumulation.	 Offe	 (1984) defined this as the
separation of form and content: "the institutional form of
the state is determined through the rules of democratic and
representative government, while the material content of
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state power is conditioned by the continuous requirements of
the accumulatien process" (see below).
Offe sees legitimation as a symbolic or image building
exercise that promotes the idea of fairplay- the capitalist
state, "pursues common or general interests" for all of
society, with equality of access to power. There is, he
states, a systematic need to conceal and deny its true nature
as a capitalist state. Reindustrialization strategies could
be said to represent efforts by the state to legitmate
closure decisions both in terms of appeasing the electorate
and encouraging the generalisation of the conditions of
accumulation.	 See below for an interpretation of Gramsci's
concept of hegemony- an alternative to legitimation.
2.7.5 State intervention: allocation and production
Reindustrialization programmes embrace both of Of fe's
modes of state intervention- the productive and the
allocative. To jump ahead, reindustrialization could be said
to be allocative with regard to the provision of industrial
infrastructure in particular areas; whilst productive with
regard to the vetting of projects and the provision of
capital and training grants. If it is not stretching the
analogy too far, reindustrialization can be considered as
being allocative but post-productive in character arising as
a result of previous state productive involvement.
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The allocative mode of state intervention, to "create and
maintain" the conditions of accumulation, depends on the
state's intrinsic authority over certain resources and powers
that are already state property. Offe uses certain examples
of the allocative mode: protective industrial tariffs, money
and rules of exchange, the repressive apparatus, education
and transport infrastructure. The state allocates resources
already under under its control in an undifferentiated
manner, i.e.	 "policies are congruent with politics" (Of fe,
1975) . A feature of the allocative mode of state action is
that its elements do not have to be produced themselves,
merely allocated (e.g. land, taxes, repressive force)
The productive mode of state activity has come into
operation as the allocative	 "framework"	 is proved
insufficient and accumulation can only be maintained by some
physical input into production. Under normal circumstances
in the capitalist mode, the physical inputs of labour, raw
materials or fixed investment in machinery would be provided
by the relevant commodity market. 	 If the production of
certain input commodities has failed (or is about to fail)
because it may no longer have been considered profitable to
maintain, the production (and profit) of other dependent
captitals is jeopardized. Three factors for this failure are
identified- the input commodities are too costly for the
users,	 there are unreasonable risks and uncertainties
associated with their purchase and technical externalities
impinging on the use value of the input commodity. These
situations are said to arise when the "protective mechanisms
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of the dynamic of accumulation have been exhausted".
"Productive state activity is initiated by the actual or
anticipated, sectoral or general, absence of accumulation"
(Offe, 1975) .	 This applies, not only to nationalisation to
avert closure but to post-plant-closure policy.
2.7.6 Form v. Content: the rules for policy formation
Offe argues that it is insufficient to analyse productive
state activity merely in terms of the content of such
policies; i.e. the analysis of the expansion of the political
agenda through problem identification, determinant interests
and policy results.	 The formal, functioning procedures
adopted by the state merit equal consideration. 	 In
particular, the duality of the problem solving process has to
be noted.	 The state recognises a problem; responds to the
problem in its environment, and in itself, by adopting
certain,	 maybe new,	 organisational procedures.	 These
linkages are not merely linear but circular- "social and
economic problems, as items on the state agenda, may trigger
off changes in the formal stategies according to which the
state operates, and conversely these formal strategies may
substantially determine both the ability of the state to
perceive problems and the nature of the ensuing policies,"
(Offe, 1975) . This symmetry of form and content strategy
rules can be identified in the formation and subsequent
activities of new state agencies created to deal with the
creation of new employment or the alleviation of unemployment
(e.g.	 B.S.C. (I) or M.S.C.)
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Offe's three rules of policy formation are bureaucracy,
purposive-action, and consensus. Each has proved deficient
for the productive mode of state operation. Bureaucracy, the
classical Weberian "neutral" hierachical notion that is well
suited to the allocative mode, is unable to formulate the
operational aims and intentions of the productive mode. The
rules of purposive-action or the technocratic mode are
inapproppriate because the state is not an accumulating unit
(see above)- it, unlike a firm, cannot operate with the
single goal of producing surplus value as determined by
market forces.	 Highly decentralised consensus, 	 "the
simultaneous determination of inputs and outputs by the
clients of state administration or the recipients of its
benefits" (a "bottom up" rather than "top down" policy
system) is problematic because of the difficulties of long
term planning and the stresses of satisfying the increased
demands of the clientele. The inadequacy of these rules of
policy formation leads Sadler (1985) to suggest that they are
used by the state in a number of ways according to the needs
of the moment.	 The implication is that society is
perpetually in a crisis-avoidance mode as new problems arise
from the failed attempts to solve the previous ones.
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2.8 THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND HEGEMONY: URRY AND GRANSCI
Use of the concept of civil society (as developed by Urry,
1981) provides a more sophisticated notion of the relations
between the state and capital than the more simplistic idea
of a triangular relationship between the state, capital and
labour. According to Urry, the social relations of civil
society transcend the economistic reductionism of class-based
analysis (though by no means denying the overall importance
of the relations of production) and consist of more diverse
groupings,	 "based on	 gender,	 generational,	 racial,
residential, and national differences; the importance of
'private' social relations within the family and with
voluntary associations of many kinds." Gramsci advanced the
consideration of civil society as an intermediary between the
state and the economic structure.	 The three interacting
"spheres" of civil society (circulation, reproduction and
struggle) act with reference to the other structural social
formations, the sphere of capitalist production (through the
circulation of money), and the state (which responds to
struggle through the law to impact on the sphere of
reproduction,	 and has	 its function specified by the
economy)-see Urry,1981 page 116.
The ideological concept of "hegemony" (first used in this
context by Antonio Graxnsci d.1937), i.e. political control by
"direction" rather than physical coercion, has best been
described by Boggs, 1976, as follows:
"by hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil
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society- including a whole range of structures and activities
like trade unions, schools, the churches and the family- of
an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality etc.
that is in one way or another supportive of the established
order and the class interests that dominate it."
In the context of this work hegemony appears to have far more
explanatory power than the narrower concept of "legitimation"
from the German school with its	 rather mechanistic
over-emphasis on the electoral requirements of the state.
The bourgeois hegemony (including the intellectual, cultural
and moral leadership), of the state, but worked through in
civil society, acts as an	 "unchallengeable	 orgariising
principle, world view or general conception of life" for the
mass of the population (Boggs, 1976) .	 Hegemony acts to
balance the countervailing forces of the state, civil society
and the economy. The state needs to sustain hegemony (i.e.
that there is no workable alternative to the capitalist
system and representative democracy) at all costs.	 It is
possible that the particular conjunction of problems raised
by large scale nationalised industry closures in identifiable
units provided a threat to the continuance of hegemony and
resulted	 in	 an	 extraordinary	 policy	 formation:
reindustrialization.
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2.9 THE LOCAL STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 7
Universal theories of the local state have not been fully
advanced, probably because of the considerable degree of
variation that exists between the	 form,	 nature and
responsibilities of local government and even whether the
notion of the local state can be said to exist at all, in
capitalist	 societies	 (see below) .	 For example, local
government in Denmark has far more sweeping powers over a
whole range of reproductive activity than its equivalent in
Britain, but far less involvement in productive activity or
industrial promotion. Apart from typological differences the
local "state" is far more prone to areal and temporal
variation than nation states (though naturally it would be
wrong to assume their fixed nature) . For example, in Britain
the 1974 local government reorganisation involved significant
boundary changes and the creation of the metropolitan county
tier which has since been removed. It is important that the
parochially consensual rather than the national party
political nature of the local "state" be stressed. In the
context of declining single industry areas the heritage of
corporatism shines through. 	 Steel producing areas, where
particular trades unions dominate (notably the I.S.T.C.),
have tended to evolve as localities of "conservative"
Labourism, involving unswerving loyalty to traditional value
and economic systems.	 The most actively radical Labour
authorities are rarely found in steel 	 closure areas
(Sheffield is an exception) but in areas where the support is
less secure or even "hung"- for example Reading or Ealing.
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Local councillors tend to be tied to the interests of
particular wards.	 Members of Parliament are often absent
from their constituencies and may not even live there! 	 The
local government representative can be said to reflect the
social traditions of a locality far more than an M.P.,
selected as a candidate by a local party organisation but
requiring central ratification.
The intention here is not to idealise the local authority;
far from it.	 There is considerable room for reform if
democratic notions are to be upheld. Most pressing, in this
instance, would be the reform or abolition of the "place
market" and the attendant paranoia associated with any
implied criticism of local industrial development activity.
Serious question marks remain as to the precise nature of the
independence of local authorities	 from the central
administration, exemplified by the cases of Sheffield and the
G.L.C., whose economic initiatives for third sector and small
firm foundation have been stymied by a national government of
an opposite political persuasion (Hudson and Plum, 1984).
Recent transformations in local state power have been likened
to "deconcentration" rather than decentralisation by Hudson
and Plum (1984) because the devolution of some functions is
in the interests of better management, and particularly
financial and political control, by the central state.
The fundamental problem of local "state" theories is
primarily one of identification.	 Can the local state
actually be said to exist? If it does exist (as a social
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relation) the implication is that it exists in relation to
the complete range of class structures constituted at a local
level.	 Such neat constructions as a distinctly local
bourgeoisie and a local proletariat are patently absurd,
given the arbitrary nature of local authority boundaries, the
mobility	 of	 capital	 (increasingly international), the
mobility of the middle classes and the actual retention and
extension of central control by governments and trades
unions. It is preferrable to use the term local "government"
rather than local "state". Such a substitution would have
been very appropriate in Cooke's (1983), otherwise apt,
summarisation: "the very uneveness of the development process
under capitalism gives rise to class variations in space, and
that the local state, as a representation of variations in
class relations in space takes on the character of those
class relations as revealed in localities."
It is important to consider local government as a
synthesis of class relations and civil society in a locality
without upgrading it to a condition of statehood. 	 However,
many of the aspects of central state theory are reproduced at
the local level, particularly the dominance of the
bureaucracy	 (the	 "Officers")	 and other non-elected
representatives who are to be found on most industrial
development	 committees.	 Duncan and Goodwins' (1982)
"councillor calibre problem" is exacerbated by the control
maintained by local civil servants, especially Chief
Executives. Hudson and Plum (1984) have demonstrated that,
despite a nominal deconcentration of power, local government
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is increasingly coming under the control of the central state
(predominantly .through financial restrictions). Of all the
areas of local government activity the one with greatest
scope for variation (through the application of section 137
funds) is industrial development/economic initiatves but the
scale of variation is diminishing (not only through budgetary
constraints but also through competing resource demands).
The proliferaton of urban development corporations (following
a history of new town development and enterprise zone status)
is recent proof of the desire of central government to take
direct charge of local affairs.
2.10 A StiPRA-NATIONAL STATE: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Of the many supra-national organisations (e.g. the United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the Commonwealth,
the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, etc...), the European Community
(E.C.) most closely resembles that of a state. "It has its
own institutional form, has a limited degree of autonomy from
nation-states and can even impose itself over and above some
member states under certain circumstances" (Sadler, 1985).
The inertia of its bureaucratic processes is well renowned.
The E.C. grew out of the European Coal and Steel Community
(somewhat surprising considering its current overriding
concern for matters argricultural) . The E.C.S.C. was charged
with rnodernisation. cooperation and investment in the coal
and steel sectors (primarily in France , Germany and Belgium)
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following the devastation of the 1939-45 war. 	 Many of the
Offerian contradictions	 of	 state	 congruency for the
conditions of accumulation apply to the E.C., as do many of
his policy formation solutions.
The	 directly	 relevant	 role	 of	 the	 E.C.	 for
reindustrialization is enshrined in the original treaty
establishing the E.C.S.C.. Article 56 of the Treaty of Paris
(1956) provided, for workers in steel or coal industries made
redundant as a result of "technical process or new equipment"
changes, "the financing of such programmes as it may approve
for the creation. . . . of new and economically sound activities
capable of assuring productive employment." Article 56 also
provided compensation, resettlement allowances and technical
retraining	 for	 the	 workers thus affected.	 The 1960
amendments (in the light of massive coal job losses with
changing energy sources) to the Treaty moved the emphasis
from technical change to changes in market conditions.
Article 56.2 (a) now includes "the conversion of existing
undertakings capable of re-absorbing the redundant workers."
Administrative problems with access to, distribution of, and
temporary suspension of, these loan funds (due to budgetary
complications in other E.C. areas) wil be examined in due
course. Article 56.2 (b) added the concept of make-up pay to
the other compensatory provisions of the original Article 56.
Further examples of bilateral arrangements between the
E.C.S.C. and member states include the funding of early
retirement and lump sum redundancy payments.
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To conclude this section, the E.C.S.C. acts very much in
accordance with Offe's concept of a state: in seeking to
resolve problems of its own environment (in this case related
to its own determination to cut steel production capacity),
it develops solution mechanisms 	 leading to further
commitments and the generation of new sets of problems. It
is somewhat different in the way its hegemony is achieved
because its subject matter is not the civil society and
economy of a single capitalist society but of a number of
nation states.	 The power to act is derived from the joint
recognition that the problems (initially of the steel and
coal industries) would be better solved on a mutual, European
wide basis. E.C.S.C. reconversion measures have evolved as a
response to the production crisis and demonstrate the
Communities' perceived need to perpetuate its hegemony and,
by implication the hegemony of the capitalist system it
represents at the agglomerate level.
2.11	 CONCLUSIONS
A theorisation of the state has been attempted in order to
suggest its character as a social relation- a precondition
and result of the complex network of relations between
capital and civil society (Urry, 1981). The form of the
state is not static in time or space or entirely shaped by
the nature of its institutions, but has to be seen in the
context of social reproduction- ever changing and modifying
itself in the ordering of routine activity. The state
displays a tendency towards supporting the needs of capital
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by promoting the conditions of accumulation.	 However, this
is not its sole concern.	 Other, political, factors can
override the capitalist priority in the
	 short term.
"Wage-labourers of all sorts are literally forced to defend
their interests, to struggle to sustain their material
conditions of life.	 The development of the state, its
institutional and policy-making elaboration,
	 is thus
significantly the outcome not directly of the capitalist
interest but that of wage-labourers" (tirry, 1981) . The forms
of reindustrialization could be said to reflect the nature of
the anti-closure struggle that preceeded them. 	 The limited
struggle (in both extent and duration) and the limited effect
of subsequent reindustrialization would seem to indicate that
the hegemony of the state had not been threatened
sufficiently to warrant purposive action but enough for a
token effort.
Two pertinent examples of the Thatcher goverrunent acting
against the interests of capital are: the continuance of
steel-making at Ravenscraig to appease Scottish voters (only
until 1988) and the designation of Pembroke Dock as a second
round enterprise zone to bolster the Secretary of State for
Wales' position in his own constituency when cases of far
greater need could be made for the Valley localities.
State theories really only provides a structural framework
for an explanation of reindustrialization. It is a useful
starting point but can only account for some of the elemental
relations of policy, polity, and party, but not the vagaries
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of capital, class and place, which when combined, should give
a more adequate impression of the situation actually
experienced in what have now become known as the steel
closure areas.
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CHAPTER THREE
HARTLEPOOL- LIVERPOOL OF THE EAST?
"There are also Promenades and other Pleasant Walks which
have a much fuller Command than any other Part of the Coast
of those delightful Land and Sea Prospects for which the
Neighbourhood of Hartlepool has ever been so much and justly
admired." A. Goalbraith, 1796, a Seatori Carew landlord.
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3.1	 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Hartlepool's history dates from the 	 Saxon monastic
settlement of St. Hilda which lasted from 640 AD to 800 AD
on the Headland before being destroyed by the Danes.
Hartlepool first gained prominence as the mediaeval port of
the Palatinate of Durham. The town charter was granted by
King John in 1201.	 Robert de Erus, Scots victor of
Bannockburn, was descended from the family of the Lords of
the Manor of Hart. Centuries before the discovery of deep
rock salt at Greatham, Seaton Carew was important for salt
production	 using	 salt pans (14th to 16th centuries).
Hartlepool declined as a port in the 16th and 17th centuries
as Stockton was preferred as an outlet for the bishops' wool,
corn and lead. In the eighteenth century the ancient borough
and nearby village of Seaton Carew became renowned as
fashionable seaside resorts for the gentry (see quotation
above and below).	 "The ladies and gentlemen often visit
Hartlepool at low tide, and the Hartlepool company as
frequently pay Seaton the like compliment. 	 It is very
pleasant to behold numerous parties on the sands, some in
carriages, others on horseback, passing and repassing between
the two places." William Tate- Stranton Parish Clerk, 1812.
The industrial history of Hartlepool came, like that of
much of the rest of Teesside, comparatively late for the
North East. The development of the town for industry hinged
on the exploitation of the southern, and particularly
eastern,	 end of the Durham coalfield and the almost
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simultaneous expansion of railways (often likened to a
mania), in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.
During the 1830's the ancient fishing port prospered from the
revival brought about by the coal export trade of Christopher
Tennant's Hartlepool Dock and Railway Company. This, the
first railway link to Hartlepool, connected the improved dock
(it had nearly silted up) to Haswell, Littletown, Thornley
and Wingate. By 1841 this railway was carrying more coal
than any other in the north of England (27% of the total
shipments for northern ports went through Hartlepool).
The success of the revitalised Hartlepool harbour alarmed
the coal shippers of Stockton whose trade (hampered by the
poor navigational characteristics of the Tees) was already in
decline as the Stockton-Darlington Company (dominated by
Darling-ton interests) preferred Middlesbrough as a port. An
earlier attempt to revive Stockton's fortunes through the
formation of the Clarence Railway (to Port Clarence, near
Billingham) for west Durham coal, proved less viable as the
east Durham coalfield was opened up. 	 As a result the
Stockton and Hartlepool Railway Company linked the Clarence
Railway to Hartlepool (but sufered from having to share some
facilities with the original Hartlepool Dock and Railway
Co.).	 A dominant figure n the Stockton and Hartlepool
Railway Co., from 1839, was Ralph Ward Jackson, a Stockton
solicitor, who was to become the driving force behind the new
town of West Hartlepool. Jackson had already mooted the idea
of a west dock and harbour to compete with old Hartlepool in
1838, but parliamentary consent was not granted until 1844.
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The Hartlepool West Harbour and Dock Co. 	 (eventually
incorporating • the Stockton and Hartlepool, and Clarence
Railways into the West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Company
in 1853) opened its first dock (the Coal Dock) on June 1st
1847. Its initial success was due, in no small part, to the
dynamism of Jackson- including the illegal (under the
Company's act of incorporation of
	
1844)	 purchase	 of
collieries and ships to ensure trade on behalf of the
Company. Jackson's intentions are tellingly revealed in his
response to questioning at the inquiry for the first
application for incorporation of West I-iartlepool:
Chairman: "I believe your idea originally was that West
Hartlepool would ultimately become a port of Liverpool on the
East Coast ?"
Ralph Ward Jackson: "I always thought so, and that is my
opinion still."
Jackson's ambition has been realised in the twentieth century
in terms of the similar levels of deindustrialization. Table
3.1, below, indicates the immediate success of the new docks,
due to the physical advantages such as dispensing with
inclined plane charges (levied at old Hartlepool) and the
quick turnaround for ships allowed for by the tidewater
location.
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Table 3.1.
West Hartlepool The First Five Years
Year No. of Vessels shipped Tons of Coal/Coke exported
1847	 640	 54,202
1848	 1,248	 169,621
1849	 2,753	 388,954
1850	 3,883	 589,990
1851	 3,782	 574,742
Source: Wood, 1967.
In 1852, a rail link to the Leeds Northern (including access
to Liverpool, Manchester and Preston) was completed but West
Hartlepool never fully capitalised on one of its earliest
aspirations: to become the fish port of Leeds. However, the
local paper, notwithstanding a certain bias, must have had
some grounds for reporting the following:
"West Hartlepool- a town which a few years ago had not begun
to exist; which is now a busy and populous commercial
emporium bidding fair to outrival the largest ports of the
United Kingdom.. . . the docks and harbour, the shipping with
which they are crowded, the bustling quays, the populous
streets, and its railway, and steamboats and a host of
adjuncts which ever distinguish a rising commercial port."
Stockton and Hartlepool Mercury, 24th October 1855 (in Wood,
1967)
By 1860 West Hartlepool had become overwhelmingly the most
important port in the north of England: the declared value of
merchandise was 4,214,783 pounds whilst the combined total
value from the ports of Sunderland, Shields, Newcastle and
Stockton for the same year was only 1,354,646 pounds.
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The basis of West Hartlepool's success was the export of
coal (primarily to London) and the import of timber products
(principally from Canada and the Baltic for pit props). 	 The
energy and enthusiasm of Jackson as Chairman of the
Improvement Commissioners (West Hartlepool's first local
governing body) and the Company, was instrumental in securing
coal (by purchasing collieries), ships as carriers, and
encouraging other industry to diversify and develop the town.
In 1860 he personally part-owned 13 ships "pour encourager
les autres" and on behalf of the Company had diversified both
up- and down- stream from its Harbour and Railway basis.
Ship owning and building were encouraged from the start.
Thomas Richardson moved from old Hartlepool to Middleton in
1838- to establish the Richardson-Westgarth (much later
Clark-Hawthorn) engine building business. The main shipyards
were those of William Gray (formerly J.P.Denton & Co.), Pile
Spence and Co. (1854-1866) and Irving's (1850-1924).
	
By
1860 there were 194 ships registered in Hartlepool with
regular cargo and passenger services to St.
	
Petersburg,
Stettin, Hamburg and Rotterdam. Table 3.2 shows a breakdown
of the Hartlepools' trade for 1861 (before the real major
development of the timber trade)
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Table 3.2.
Hartlepool and est Hartlepool 1861 Tonnage Combined.
Goods	 Tons
Exports	 Coal/Coke	 2,042,128
General Goods
	 61,496
Grain	 204,724
Imports	 General Goods	 35,529
Timber	 59,250
Source: Wood, 1967.
The first flush of new town growth (and all real potential of
matching Liverpool's importance) was curtailed when Jackson's
illegal, but	 commercially	 justifiable,	 dealings	 were
uncovered by one of his brother's creditors, Benjamin Coleman
(see Waggott, 1980). It seems most likely that Coleman was
in the pay of "King t' Hudson of the North Eastern Railway
Company (who already controlled the Hartlepool Dock and
Railway Company and had the virtual monopoly of the region's
rail system) . Whoever was behind the move the North Eastern
Railway gained most by the collapse of the West Hartlepool
Company and went on to build three 	 more docks,	 more
warehouses and timber ponds, and improved the entrance to a
single, unified harbour.
The social divisions between, particularly the commercial
classes amongst the Hartlepudlians and the West Dockers could
not be so easily healed. 	 The rivalry between the two
elements of the same contiguous urban area	 was
institutionalised in 1901 by the granting of County Borough
status to the increasingly prosperous West Hartlepool.
	
The
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ancient Borough of Hartlepool remained part of County Durham
(a number of Headland residents still wish to susede to
Durham!) . The high degree of parochiality within the town
has, even today, to be experienced to be believed. The
legend that Hartlepool fishermen hung a monkey in mistake for
a Napoleonic sailor has fuelled the divisions in a manner
mysterious to most outsiders. Even Robert Wood's otherwise
staid 1967	 history of West Hartlepool refers to the
continuence of this feud: "what began as a fight for survival
between two desperate railway companies has ended up as a
time-honoured quarrel which is revived by every petty
polititian who fears the loss of what small authority he
possesses."
The "golden age" for both Hartlepools was the last quarter
of the nineteenth century and the first few years of the
twentieth.	 Shipowning provided the largest profits- the
greatest exponent being Christopher Furness, who came to
integrate ship and engine building with a range of other
interests including coal, steel and engineering. By 1911 he
controlled the Furness Withy shipping line, the Cargo Fleet
iron works, Irvine's shipyards(Hartlepool), Smith's Dock
(Northumberland Shipbuilding Co.), Richardson Westgarth and
Palmer's Yard Jarrow. Other smaller local ventures owing
their existence to Furness are the Expanded Metal Co. and the
Greatham Salt Co. (now part of RHM Foods, previously the
Cerebos Salt Co.).
	
There are reputed to have been 9
millionaires resident in the Hartlepools in 1913. 	 In that
year the Hartlepools' fleet consisted of 328 ships (totalling
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939,867 tons) controlled by 43 shipowners. A combination of
depression and 'extensive war damage was responsible for the
1938 situation of only 9 local firms shipping 56 vessels
(269,527 tons).
	
The iriterwar	 years	 were	 nearly	 as
disasterous as elsewhere in the North East; in 1924 Irvine's
Yard built its last ship, Gray's got into desperate trouble
(in 1931 and 1933 nothing was built and in 1934 only 126 tons
were produced) and an unemployment rate of 56% was recorded
in 1934. The second world war saved Gray's yard which built
90 ships (408,030 tons). Gray's repaired 1,750 (3 million
tons) at an average of one ship per day to record the fourth
highest wartime return in the U.K. 	 During the war 3,545
people, mostly men, were employed at Gray's and a further
1,400 in the engine works, levels never subsequently matched.
By 1962, Gray's went into voluntary liquidation and the
town's 125 year shipbuilding tradition was over.
The iron and steel industry grew up as an adjunct to the
Victorian shipbuilding industry. In 1847 Thomas Richardson,
engine builder and iron founder, constructed the Hartlepool
Iron Works. In 1867, his son, also Thomas, bought the West
Hartlepool Rolling Mills (dating from 1855) of the liquidated
shipbuilders, Pile, Spence and Co. He extended the works in
1874 and constructed the infamous "Wagga Wagga" area to house
his workers, just in time to get elected as M.P. for the
Hartlepools in the election of the same year. The close knit
alliances of local capital are illustrated by the way that
the West Hartlepool Steel and Iron Co. (as Richardson's
company had now become) passed firstly to the Gray family
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(1875) and then to Christopher Furriess's South Durham Iron
and Steel Co.	 (1898) .	 The South Durham company also
included the Moor Iron and Steel works and the Stockton
Maleable works (a link which remains intact today through the
44' pipemill) . In 1928 South Durham finally acciuired the
Seaton Carew Iron Co. which had taken control of the
Hartlepool blast furnaces in 1881. In the immediate post war
period the steel industry remained secondary in employment
terms to shipbuilding, with a workforce of 2,500 in 1948.
However, the completion of the 48 million pound South Works
complex by the Company in 1961, for plate and heavy duty pipe
production, meant that over 6,000 people were employed
between the two sites. The new works incorporated built-in
obsolescence as they relied upon open hearth rather than
basic oxygen steelmaking processes	 (the	 last	 such
installation in this country).
3.2 THE FIRST PHASE OF REINDtJSTRIALIZATION
The Hartlepools were designated as Development Areas under
the 1944 Distribution of Industry Act, and became part of the
second wave of locations to be selected for trading estates
by the Board of Trade. The civil servant charged with
defining the boundaries of the estate must have been aware of
the traditional rivalry between the two Hartlepools because
two thirds of its area was in West Hartlepool and the
remainder in Hartlepool. At its height (during the 1950's),
the Oakesway Estate provided employment for in excess of
9,000 people. The bulk of the jobs were for women on the
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assembly lines of the Siemens (later GEC) telecommunications
factory. This estate today is more famous as the training
ground for Hartlepool's fourth division football team than
for industry! As elsewhere in the north east (and in other
peripheral regions) the post war regional policy measures
provided branch plants whose employment generation and
vulnerability to centralised decisions proved unable to match
the continuing closures in the traditional sectors.
It was the voluntary liquidation of William Gray and Co.
in 1962 that stung both councils into a hitherto unthought of
degree of cooperation- the appointment of a joint industrial
development officer (Brian Belshaw). 	 This was one of the
first of many such appointments across the country. The
Hartlepools' move was a measure of the seriousness of the
situation. Five years later (1st April 1967), much against
the wishes of many of old Hartlepool's residents, the two
neighbouring boroughs united to form the County Borough of
Hartlepool, and included a southerly extension to the
Teesmouth area. In 1974 the Borough of Hartlepool became
part of the newly formed County of Cleveland.
At an unemployment seminar (Hartlepool Borough Council,
November 1984), the 1964-75 period was described as a "boom"
time by the industrial development officer; comparatively, it
was. The total jobs created suggest that some success was
achieved in offsetting the 6,000 jobs lost in the town
between 1962 and 1964 (at Grays, C.M.E.W., Durham Paper Mills
and the partial closure of Richardson-Westgarth). Table 3.3
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indicates the companies and employment as listed by the
borough- it must be noted that the power station employment
included a high proportion of temporary Construction workers
(approximately 1,000 of the total) and that the Laing
Offshore establishment proved to be of an extremely short
duration.	 Also of note is the fact that for much of this
period regional develpoment grants stood at 45% and that the
regional employment premium of 21 pounds per week per
employee was paid to manufacturing companies.
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Table 3.3.
Major Companies attracted to Hartlepool 1964-1975.
Company	 Jobs
Alladin	 400
Reeds	 500
BTP Tioxide	 400
Foster Wheeler	 700
Marbourn	 200
Automotive Products 	 200
Polypac	 200
Linkf low
	 50
Laing Offshore	 2,600
CEGB-Nuclear power station 	 1,600
TOTAL	 6,850
Source Hartlepool Borough Council (1984)
The early 1970's recession halted the inflow of new firms. A
series of major cutbacks and closures proceeded to devastate the
town.	 The major firms involved (some of which can be discerned
from table 3.4) included: Laing Offshore, Buxted Chickens,
Fashion Industries, GKN Shardlow, Alladin, Weir Polypac, GEC
Telecomminications (initiated by GPO cuts and increasingly
outdated exchange technology), RHM Foods and British Rail. The
Borough Council estimated that over 11,000 non-steel jobs were
lost from the town between 1974 and 1984.
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Table 3.4.
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE 1975-81
(top 5 and bottom 6 mlh's)
MALE EMPLOYMENT
1 .Electricity
2 Steeltubes
3.Dealing (coal,oil,builders materials etc) +1,537
4.Motor Vehicle manufacture
5.Gas
6.Telegraph and telephone apparatus
5.Local Government Service
4.Metal Industries nes
	 -4,448
3 .Construction
2.Industrial Plant and steelwork
1.Iron and Steel (general) 	
-2,761
Totals 25,875 - 19,066 = -6,809
FEMALE EMPLOYMENT
1.Other Services
2.Medical and dental services
3.Educational Services	 +880
4.Bacon curing, meat and fish products
5.Packaging products of paper,board etc
6.Iron and Steel (general) 	 -140
5.Other retail distribution
4.Womens and girls tailored outerwear
3.Dresses, lingerie, infants wear etc 	 -2,049
2.Fruit and Vegetable products
1.Telegraph and telephone apparatus etc
Totals 15,508 - 13,915 = -1,593
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Table 3.4. Continued:
ALL EMPLOYMENT
1 . Electricity
2.Other services
3.Medical and dental services	 +1,855
4 . Steeltubes
5.Packaging products of paper,board, etc
6.Metal industries nes
5.Fruit and vegetable products
4.Construction	 -5,812
3.Telegraph and telephone apparatus etc
2.Industrial plant and steelwork
1.Iron and steel (general) 	
)	
2,901
TOTALS 41,383 - 32,981 = -8,402 (-20%)
Source: NOMIS
3.2.1 The Steel Closure
As mentioned above, BSC Flartlepool came to consist of two
works- North (the traditional location near to the town
centre) and South (completed on the airfield site in 1961).
At the time of nationalisation (1967) the two works shared
coke ovens, raw material supply and other site services, and
were connected by a private rail link. 	 The North Works
(claimed locally as the first closure of an integrated steel
plant) were closed in the early 1970's with approximately
1000 job losses but were not contested due to other local
opportunities both in and outside BSC. The planned closure
of iron and steelmaking at the South Works was announced soon
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afterwards (1st February 1973) and confirmed in Cmnd 5226 in
the same month . There was some reprieve (under the Beswick
Review) from the original date of 1975-1976; the closure
became gradual and to include the plate mill from 1978-85.
There is little evidence that the anti-closure campaign in
Hartlepool gained much support either within or outside the
Works.	 Hartlepool has been regarded as a bastion of steel
union conservatism- exemplified by the ultra-moderate Bill
Sirs, the ISTC general secretary, who came from the town.
Some of the ex-steelworkers interviewed suggested that the
BSC considered Hartlepool an "easy" area politically, for
closure, compared with Ravenscraig or Port Talbot (with
similar plate mill capacity) . 	 The lump sum and "make up"
redundancy payments appear to have outweighed considerations
of obtaining alternative employment.
Table 3.5 shows the breakdown of employment at the BSC
South Works(1974); the plate mill has finally been closed
(1985) but part of its employment total (approximately 400
people) remain at the 20 and 44 inch pipemills.
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Table 3.5.
1974 Employment BSO South Works Hartlepool
Sinter plant	 240
Coke ovens	 470
Blast furnaces	 490
Open Hearth	 1,180
Slab miii	 240
Services etc	 210
Steel closure total 2,830
Plate Mill	 1,660
Employees total	 4,490
Clerical	 310
TOTAL	 4,800
Source Hatlepool Borough Council (1984b)
David Smith's 1978 study of employee mobility at the Hartiepool
works indicated that 60% of the workforce would be unwilling to
take a job (if offered) at BSC on South Teesside "because
commuting south of the river would make the working day too long
or due to the fact that they had strong ties with the local area
and were reluctant to move nearer to the South Teesside complex."
He admits that the 40% who indicated that they would be prepared
to commute or move was a considerable over-estimate. 23% of the
total said that they would commute (12% would move house to
Langbaugh) but assumed that transport would be arranged (a 55
minute bus journey) or that Langbaugh would make council houses
available.	 Several ex-steelworkers interviewed refused to
transfer because it would have involved going to the bottom of
the promotion ladder. The renowned insularity that this lack of
interest
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in commuting "over the water" represents is difficult to
quantify but can be exemplified by an anecdote recounted by
an ex-BSC(I) official: "when a local lad announces his
intention to marry the first question put to him by his
parents is 'what part of Hartlepool does she come from?'"
3.3 THE EXPERIENCE OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION
3.3.1 Trends in Employment and Unemployment
The NOMIS data presented in table 3.6 (below) demonstrates
the minimal impact of reindustrialization measures in
Hartlepool, especially when the validity of the figures is so
questionable (see Employment Gazette March- April 1986,
pplO7-108, and October- December 1988, pp 660-663) .	 In the
context of a nationally reported decline in unemployment
Hartlepool's small improvement is hardly impressive. 	 The
figures on employment (subject to the Statistics of Trade Act
restrictions) show a continuing fall in the total workforce
of the Hartlepool travel-to-work area to 1984. The delays in
the production of the census of employment figures (the 1984
data took 4 years to come out> do little to enhance their
value to the researcher.
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3.3.2 The Agencies
There are, and have been, several agencies operating in
Hartlepool for the purpose of generating and encouraging
industry.	 Chief amongst them are: the Borough Council,
BSC(I)- Hartlepool Enterprise Agency, English Estates and
Cleveland County Council.
The Labour dominated Borough Council (May 1987 Labour 32,
Conservative 11, Liberal 2, Independant 2) has, as previously
mentioned, a 25 year history of formal industrial support
through the industrial development officer. Initially (when
the job was entitled "Industrial Publicity Officer") Brian
Belshaw (editor of the Northern Daily Mail) concentrated,
with some success upon the public relations aspects of
attracting industry. A promotional tour was even arranged to
the USA. The 1981 Coopers and Lybrand South Hartlepool Study
suggested that the Borough Council was content to let BSC(I)
take the most prominent role in the post 1973 period. 	 This
study also indicated the Council's recurrent, and to a degree
largely unresolved, problem of policy .
 aims:
"Hartlepool Borough Council has no clear objectives against
which to assess its job-creating activities, and this is a
serious impediment to assessing performance and reviewing
targets .....The District Plan report of Survey for S.E.
Hartlepool is a useful factual document but is essentially
related to physical development and does not constitute a
framework for economic development against which performance
can be appraised," S.4.21.
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The only objectives mentioned by the current industrial
development off.icer (Eddie Morley, MEE) in a recent interview
were the rather nebulous intentions of employment creation
and industrial diversification to avoid the pre-existing
concentrations of employment in four or five major industrial
concerns.
The Borough Council has developed its promotional
activities in a nwnber of ways within a budget (only a part
of its total industrial expenditure) of 78,500 pounds
(1985-86) and 76,000 (1986-87), (Hartlepool Borough Council,
Industrial Development sub-committee, Minutes) these totals
do not include the S.137 (Local Goverment Act 1972) product
of a 2p rate (totals not available) that can be paid directly
to firms.	 The largest item in the promotional budget is
taken up by local and national advertising (25,000 pounds in
1985-86, 35,000 in 1986-87).	 The exhibitions budget was
reduced from 20 to 15 thousand pounds following poor
responses to representation at the Electronics Display, CBI
and Machine Intelligence 	 shows.	 The	 1986-87 budget
concentrates on the Automan and Offshore exhibitions (at
Aberdeen and Stavanger, Norway) . The council has recently
combined with the other Cleveland Districts in promoting the
area as the Tees Offshore Centre. This avenue would not seem
to offer much hope given the current state of contraction of
the North Sea (and world) oil industry.	 The other obvious
thrust of the advertising campaign is aimed at the
electronics industry- as exeplified by the promotional
literature with its "Hi- tech grid" emphasis. The press
- 77 -
release accompanying the opening of Isocom, an optoelectronic
coupler producer, (Hartlepool B.C., 1984a) has proved to be
excessively optimistic;
"HI-TECH HARTLEPOOL'
Hartlepool is a town well used to adapting to the changing
face of industry, and is welcoming the arrival of the
micro-chip with open arms. 	 Sir Charles Villiers, former
Chairman of British Steel and now Chairman of BSC (Industry)
Ltd. has compared Hartlepool to California's "Silicon Valley"
saying that the town is on the way to becoming Britain's
"Silicon Port".
	
In the past few years no less than seven
high technology companies have set up in Hartlepool,
providing a thriving nucleus for an even bigger hi-tech
"colony" in the future." (Hartlepool Borough Council)
In fact the future (at July 1987) has no more "hi-tech type"
firms coming to the town and some leaving. There is here, as
elsewhere, no accurate definition of high technology industry
(see Hall et al 1987 for another recent attempt), merely a
vague association with the silicon chip. To have no real
certainty as to what one is dealing with is not the most
sound basis for devising an industrial strategy.
The rest of the promotional budget consists of much
smaller items (apart from the 15,000 pounds allocated for
promotional literature- brochures- in 1985-86) such as
industrial receptions (held on the restored HMS Warrior), the
annual town show and the small business week.	 An unusual
experiment was carried out in 1984-85 using the high pressure
techniques of "Programmes" a telephone sales company
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(interview with Hartlepool industrial development officer,
1985) .	 In two periods over 4000 firms from the south and
midlands were contacted but the response in terms of actual
relocations (ie none!) did not merit the 16000 pounds costs
shared by the Borough, English Estates and the Enterprise
Agency.
There are two collaborative associations which. include the
Borough Council; the Task Force (similar to Consett and
Shildon) and the "H-Team" (or local development team) . 	 The
Task Force is an official body, meeting monthly, chaired by
the Industrial Development Officer, 	 that	 includes
representatives from the Enterprise Agency, the County
Council, English Estates, the North of England Development
Council, MSC and Departments of Trade and Industry and
Environment. Its task is to attempt to coordinate (or at
least inform) the various disperate bodies and to devise
programmes for image building, marketing,	 environmental
improvements as well as industrial development. 	 The
militaristic vocabulary stretches to use of the term "high
strike rate" to assess Hartlepool's performance in attracting
inward investment (DTI representative on Hartlepool Task
Force, 1987). If Hartlepool can be considered to have a high
strike rate then other parts of the North East must be in
dire straights indeed.
The "H-Team" as it appears on the promotional literature
consists of the Industrial Development Officer, the
Enterprise Agency Director and the Chair and Deputy Chair of
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the Industrial Development and Enterprise Zone sub-committee
(a veritable • "gang of four") . The "H-Team" is the nearest
that the town is ever likely to get to the fabled notion of a
"one stop shop" for industrial development that is one of the
aims of the enterprise agency movement (Business in the
Community, 1985) . As in other areas, the Borough Council has
been reluctant to devolve its industrial promotion role
entirely to the enterprise agency; what results is a degree
of duplication between the two bodies. 	 A rather tersely
reported minute from the sub-committee (27th March 1985)
illustrates the problematic nature of this relationship (and
also highlights the difficulties of accounting in 'job
creation')
"The Industrial Development Officer reported that now that
the Enterprise Agency and the Council were not proceeding
with the "One Stop Shop", the Agency felt that it must press
ahead with creating a separate identity and that consequently
it was essential for them to raise more funds through
sponsors. The Agency wished to make it clear that it would
continue the close cooperation with the Council, but to
enable it to raise additional funds it must in some way
obtain better publicity, and it did not wish the Council to
take offence if it claimed credit for job creation in which
the Council itself had obviously played a major role."
The council has little direct property involvement in
local industry- it manages the Newburn Bridge small units and
has partipated in the recent renovation of the Old Municipal
Buildings as deluxe office suites (it has been suggested, by
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the local Labour Campaign Group, that the shared costs, with
Cleveland Counby and English Estates can never be recouped
through rental revenue) . 	 The industrial development
sub-committee minutes record that rent free preiods, grants
and mortgages for various amounts (up to 25,000 pounds) have
been paid to Hartlepool firms in the past two years. 	 There
are some concessions to the unemployed- as exemplified by the
rejection of a company's request for key worker accommodation
for a toolmaker because of the number of toolmakers already
unemployed in the town. Also revealed is the possibility of
engaging a consultant for a "California Connection" to
attract companies to the town (in 1985). 	 It proved
impossible to negotiate a mutually acceptible deal.
Elsewhere the minutes record that the Council has maintained
its membership of the Norwegian Chamber of Commerce- to
promote offshore development.	 There is also evidence of
ventures further afield particularly a visit to Hong Kong,
Singapore and Indonesia, at the invitation of Tolarain, a
recent Hartlepool arrival from Singapore. 	 The Council
presented Tolaram with the gift of a silver salver worth 500
pounds "to mark the occasion of the visit and the company's
development in Hartlepool" in January 1986. 	 To date (mid-
1987) there have been no further Aseari companies locating in
Hartlepool, though some business delegations have been
entertained.
The Isocom press release (H.B.C. 1984a) also states: "the
biggest single factor in creating new jobs in the town in
recent years was the creation of the enterprise zone in
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October 1981." The Borough Council is the managing agent
(for the Department of the Environment) for the zone for the
designated 10 year period (from 23rd October 1981) with the
well publicised tax and rates concessions. In Hartlepool
with its depressed industrial property market (the 1984
R.Tyms report noted the town had the "lowest level of
demand") the 100% corporation or income tax allowances have
not generated much private sector investment in the zone.
Rates exemptions have been partially negated by adjustments
in levels of rentals charged.	 In a recent review of the
first five years of the enterprise zone the Borough Council
identified probably the most important aspect of the
designation: "a significant additional factor is that
Enterprise	 Zone status has given Hartlepol a powerful
marketing tool which is used with advantage in the continuing
effort to bring new jobs to the town" (Director of Technical
Services, Oct. 1986)
The latest (Oct. 1986) figures available suggest that the
enterprise zone is responsible for the existence of an
additional 2,000 jobs in Hartlepool but that this has
resulted in little overall reduction in the unemployment
figures because of continuing job losses (both on and off the
zone)- see table 3.7 below. It should be noted that the "job
gains elsewhere" figure comprises almost entirely the THC oil
module construction company in the docks area which has
currently contracted to 70 (and has been completely shut down
in recent months due to the vagaries of North Sea oil
production and the world oil prices) . The three principal
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constituent elements of the job losses figure are BSC (1981
-838 coke ovens, 1982 -548 pipes 1984 -700 plates, 1985 -200
plates and pipes), GEC Telecommunications (gradual loss of
2,300 jobs) and the gradual decline of construction work at
the power station (over 1, 000 jobs)
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2,000 (est)
500 (est)
2,000 (est)
1,300
5,800
Table 3.7.
THE ENTERPRISE ZONE EFFECT
(Source: Hartlepool Borough Council, 1986)
Total Unemployment Oct 1981
Job Losses 1981-86 (estimated)
8,680
6,000
14, 680
LESS,
Job gains in Enterprise Zone
Job Gains elsewhere
Increase in NSC placements
No longer officially counted
as unemployed
Total unemployment 1986 (Aug) 8, 880
14, 680
This, obviously crude, analysis (including so many estimates and
taking no account of the average annual out-migration figure of
approximately 1,000 inhabitants) shows the exceptional degree of
dependence upon the enterprise zone in Hartlepool. Much of the
recent industrialization activity has taken place on the zone
(although there have been attempts to resurrect the Oakesway
Estate with very mixed results) . The prospective termination of
the enterprise zone in 1991 (there is little likelihood of an
extension)	 has	 caused little consternation amongst local
politians. It may have serious implications for the "strike
rate".
Monitoring of enterprise zones has come under well publicised
attack from a number of sources- for example, the
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National Audit Office: "the absence of essential information
and analysis, and doubts on the reliability of some of the
available data, make it impossible to draw firm conclusions
about the merits of the enterprise zone concept, the true
costs involved and the effectiveness of enterprise zones in
securing the results achieved" (NAO, Feb. 1986) . There was a
gain of 1,000 jobs between the last two official (DoE) sets
of figures (1984-85 and 1985-86) which gave Hartlepool the
largest rise, albeit from a low base, in the country. 	 This
has been attributed to the in situ growth of established
companies (particularly the cake manufacturer) and the
opening of a number of smaller (under 30 workers) firms,
rather than any major new relocations.
Alongside the creation of a "Task Force" of civil servants
and local authority officers (see above), in 1973, BSC
decided to establish a new jobs team in Hartlepool as a
result of its decision to cease steelmaking at the South
Works. Chairman of the BSC new jobs team was George Chetwynd
(a member of the main BSC board, ex- M.P. for Stockton and
chairman of the North of England Development Council). The
new jobs team was instrumental in bringing Smart and Brown
(refrigerators) and Polypac to the town; with a combined
predicted employment of 1,800. Neither of these firms have
achieved these totals or even remain in Hartlepool at all.
In 1975 the new jobs team was incorporated into BSC's new
national "job creation" agency: BSC(Industry). The first
nine years of BSC(I)'s existence concentrated upon four key
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areas of expenditure (drawn directly from the Corporation's
finances)	 advertising	 the	 steel	 closure	 (later
"Opportunity") areas nationally, making finance available for
companies in these areas (through soft leasing deals, eg 1 in
a 1,000 pounds interest, loans and grants), the provision of
workshop space for small businesses (concentrating upon
simple short term "easy-in easy-out" licensing and on-site
management) and local consultancies to provide professional
business advice and planning. A change of top management at
BSC(I) (Naylor replacing Dunbar as Chief Executive) resulted
in the beginning of the dilution of activities from 1984. In
Hartlepool this was anticipated and resulted in the formation
of the 1-lartlepool Enterprise Agency (HEA) in 1982. 	 Its
initial role was seen as the continuation of the consultancy
and to act as a more broadly based local vehicle for BSC(I)'s
reduced financial commitment to loans rather than open-ended
grants and leasing deals (H.E.A. Annual Report, 1983).
ESC(I) donated 100,000 pounds to the HEA and paid for the
services of its chief executive and secretary for the first
four operating years. The stated prime objective of the HEA
(as specified in the annual reports 1983-86) is "that of
attracting new job opportunities • to Hartlepool through
supporting the development of viable new and existing
business (and of supporting those with problems) ." The chief
executive, Alan Humble, is more of a realist than many others
who extol the virtues of the enterprise culture: "I fervently
believe that the problems of Hartlepool will not be totally
solved by local entrepreneurs setting up new businesses"
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(speech to an international conference on job creation,
Ravenna 1985). The HEA concentrates upon relocations (the
attraction of firms from elsewhere) and as5isting existing
businesses "because jobs saved are equally as important as
jobs attracted" (A. Humble, 1985) . The agency view is that
it will help local entrepreneurs but sees such activity as a
long term effort with little immediate job generation
benefit. H.A.N.D.S. (Hartlepool New Development Support) is
a small (two man) agency assisted by the Borough, the County
and the HEA, that concentrates upon micro-business start up
and support.
The only remaining visible vestiges 	 of BSC(I)	 in
Hartlepool are the two sets of workshop units at Sandgate (12
units) and Usworth Road (27 units) .	 A range of sizes is
available at the two sites between 350 and 7,000 square feet.
Employment at the workshops varies but stood at 262 in late
1985.	 Job creation is not really the main role of these
workshops: "a great advantage of developing these workshop
complexes is that they can have a relatively quick impact on
the local situation; things can physically be seen to be
achieved, and a psychological boost can thus be quickly given
to the area," A.	 Humble, 1985.	 As elsewhere, very few
ex-steelworkers have used the units to set up their own
businesses, according to the manager, Barbara Elsdon.
	
She
assumes that people starting up their own businesses create a
knock-on effect that may eventually release jobs for people
further down a chain. Work by people such as Storey (1982)
would suggest otherwise, that often it is the imminence of
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redundancy that provides the "push" into entrepreneurism. In
Hartlepool small starter units have been copied by the
Borough (at Newburn Bridge) and by English Estates (at
Longhill when a private developer failed) . This has led to a
plentiful supply of options for the small businessman. 	 In
turn, this, coupled with BSC(I)'s increasing demands for
rental profits, has resulted in a change of emphasis away
from job creation in labour intensive activities to attempts
to fill the units by any means, including relocations from
within Hart lepool.
As a postscript to BSC(I)'s contribution to Hartlepool, a
recent development by the Corporation has been the
reintroduction of regional managers to the BSC(I) structure
(Steel News supplement, 1987) . It is difficult to envisage a
role for these new middle managers because the BSC(I)
involvement has diminished to the extent that the various
enterprise agencies spawned by BSC now undertake a much wider
range of activities (under the "Business in the Community"
umbrella) . Hartlepool is included in the northern region
(with Teesside, Derwentside and West Cumbria) but the new
manager has a difficult role trying to assist the
"opportunity areas" when his budget is being dramatically
reduced. This particularly when the interest rates available
on BSC(I)	 "soft"	 loans	 are	 no longer commercially
competitive. It may come as something of a surprise, given
Hartlepool's industrial problems, to discover that the HEA
has managed to obtain financial support, thus independence
from BSC(I), with donations from over forty companies.
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English Estates,	 the trading name of the English
Industrial Estates Corporation, has been the only significant
post-war industrial property developer in the town. It is
wholly funded by the Department of Trade arid Industry and
tends to operate in the assisted areas. 	 Its principal
statutory function (derived from the English Industrial
Estates Corporation Act, 1981) is "to provide, facilitate the
provision of, and manage industrial and commercial sites and
premises in England" (1986, annual report).	 It is not
proposed to dwell on the industrial property situation in
Hartlepool.	 Certain points, however, should be stressed.
Due to Hartlepool's rather diverse industrial background
large land holdings have been divided amongst a number of
major owners. The largest tracts, to the south of the town
are owned by BSC, Phillips Petroleum, BTP Tioxide, Laings and
the CEGB.	 Despite the relative attractiveness of the
enterprise zone, demand for advance factory units has
undergone considerable fluctuation. In 1985, English Estates
were gloomy about the prospects for the town and had many
empty units (especially at Parkview) see fig.2.	 Two years
later there appears to have been something of an upsurge in
demand for advance units (particularly the small ones) arid a
new building programme has been undertaken. An additional
ten workshop units have been constructed at Longhill and a
further six larger (5,000-12,000 square feet) units are under
construction at Parkview. There remains plenty of enterprise
zone land to be developed. Lettings on the Oakesway Estate
(Hartlepool's original estate) have continued to prove
problematic because of the preponderance	 of large
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old-fashioned factories without enterprise zone status. It
should be r?membered that the numbers of new factories,
whilst appearing extensive in property terms (square feet of
floorspace developed), have yet to make serious contributions
in employment terms.
The only major private sector commercial developement in
the town since steel closure is the embryonic Tees Bay Retail
Park being undertaken by Humberside Properties Ltd.
Construction work on phase one of this massive "L-shaped"
shopping complex began early in 1987 on the Parkview East
section of the	 enterprise zone.	 There is a strong
possibility that retailing has been allowed because it is the
only viable landuse for this extensive slag bank area which
was not considered stable enough to sustain industrial usage.
The glossy promotional brochure anticipates 49 retail units
(from 1,500 to 100,000 square feet) around car parking for
nearly 3,000 vehicles. 	 It claim5 that seven units are
already let (mainly to DIY, autocentres and furniture
warehouses).-
"In addition the Retail Park will contain a high Leisure
content, with a Multi-plex Cinema, Motel, Public House/Diner,
Fast Food Outlets plus leisure related retail outlets which
will include Camping and Caravanning, Boats and a Prestige
Car Showroom.	 These facilities will be complemented by
Picnic and Childrens' Play Areas and Sporting/Recreational
facilities. The Retail Park will be encompassed by a New
Landscape, designed and created to give a striking and
attractive environment in which to 	 stop"	 (Huniberside
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Properties, 1986)
Maybe the provision of a cinema was the deciding factor for
the planning department because Hartlepool no longer has one;
though in 1947 it boasted eleven (Max Lock Group, 1948)
Until the demise of the Tory administration in 1981,
Cleveland County planning department tended to take a passive
role when it caine to economic intervention. 	 The incoming
Labour administration built on a few of its predecessors
schemes (ie the small business grants) but launched a range
of nearly 30 new policies under the banner of economic
initiatives. The intention was to create and save jobs in
the county with the highest unemployment rate for mainland
Britain.	 It is difficult to disaggregate figures	 for
Hartlepool from those for the county as a whole (the Boroughs
of Middlesborough, Stockton and Langbaugh). Not every one of
the County schemes applies to Hartlepool but reference can be
made to the changing nature of the budget strategies and its
objectives (see table 3.8 below) . The annual expenditure on
economic initiatives by Cleveland is approximatley 1 million
pounds.	 There are four main policy headings for economic
initiatives	 which have been developed since 	 1981:
restructuring of the local economy, job creation/retention,
skill development and provision for the unemployed.
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TABLE 3.8.
ECONOMIC INITIATIVES
Cleveland County Council- Recent Budget Changes
Objectives	 1985-86	 1986-87	 Change
Restructuring Local Economy 	 7.2%	 6.5%	
-0.7%
Job Creation/Retention	 49.5%	 42.0%	 -75%
Skill Development	 25.9%	 29.8%
Unemployed Provision	 6.4%	 11.3%	 +4.9%
New Initiatives	 11.0%	 10.4%	 -0.6%
The major Cleveland job creation initiative is the flexible
assistance scheme which is intended to provide a range of
financial measures to meet the needs not met by other
institutions.	 The county also supports the Hartlepool
Enterprise Agency with a grant of 2,500- 3,000 pounds per
year. Support for the Cleveland Cooperative Agency amounts
to about 130,000 pounds per annum.	 The extension of
community employment development measures is another aim of
the job creation budget. The CADCAM centre (not Hartlepool)
is the main element of the restructuring budget, amongst
proposals to support new technology, examine industrial
sectors and target grants and loans. The skill development
Section of the budget supports a number of training
initiatives- including information technology centres (ITECs-
Hartlepool has the most recent) and CADCAM training. Perhaps
the provision for the unemployed is the most novel element of
all the economic initiatives. 	 It supports community
enterprise centres and provides grants for unemployment
projects to community groups, trade unions and voluntary
bodies. The scale of the provision for the unemployed is
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still limited, despite the increases noted in table 3.7 it
amounts to 194,.000 pounds in 1986/87.
3.3.3 The Impacts of Reindustrialization
Most of the information is derived from a questionnaire
survey of 77 firms using manufacturing sites (out of 117
firms approached) giving a completion rate of 65%. Ta.ble
3.9, below, gives an employment breakdown of the responding
firms. The firms are divided by the date of establishment In
Hartlepool (on present sites) using the beginning of BSC(I)
involvement in 1975 as the cut off.
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Table 3.9.
Survey Employment Breakdown
All Firms (77)	 Pre-1975(27) Post-l975(50)
Total Employment	 7,425	 5,761	 1,664
Full Time M	 5,255	 4,147	 1,108
Full time F	 1,740	 1,314	 426
Part Time M	 15	 4	 11
Part Time F	 155	 124	 31
Temp M
	
102	 53	 49
Temp F
	
87	 79	 8
rising the last available census of employment data (1981) as
a guide (and taking known redundancies into account) the
total employment of 7,425 gives an approximate coverage of
70% of Hartlepool's manufacturing employment- w.hich accords
with the numerical percentage coverage of the questionnaire.
Immediately striking is the dominance of the longer
established firms- mean size 213 compared with the newer
firms- mean size 33 employees. The distribution of the dates
of establishment can be interpreted as a reflection of
Hartlepool's economic history. Robert Lauder's family timber
business was established when Ward Jackson was prominent in
1853. Colonel Cameron's brewery (1868) also dates from West
Hartlepool's first phase. A second clustering (1890-1913) is
of Expanded Metal, Metal Workers Ltd, Vulcan Materials and
RHM Foods, corresponding to a late nineteenth century period
of affluence.	 Before the 1960's branch plants become
apparent (two more firms date from that decade than the
1970's) there is also a small cluster of firms from the
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1930's and 1940's (including Davey Forge, John Collier
Tailoring, Steetley Refractories and C. Herring-scrap metal
processing) who beriefitted from the earliest stages of
regional policy. Forty one of the firms date from the 1980's
(eleven from 1982 the first full year of the enterprise
zone) .
	
More data from the questionnaire survey is presented
in table 3.10 (TABLE C, below) and in Appendix 4.
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39
24
13
30
37
28
19
18
31
26
12
11
10
10
5
7
7
14
7
4
10
7
2
3
29
14
8
23
30
14
12
14
21
19
10
8
TABLE B	 Ffl	 FIRMS
}IAR'I'LEE'OOL	 ALL	 TABLISHE]) ESTABLISD
	
FIR .S	 BEFORE	 PFrER
CLOSURE	 CLOSURE
1. Legal Status plc	 9	 7	 2
private caipany	 48	 7	 41
subsidiary	 17	 12	 5
other	 3	 1	 2
2. Slxucture of multinational	 17	 9	 8
Organisaticn UK multiplant 	 14	 8	 6
single plant	 44	 10	 34
other	 2	 0	 2
3. Functicxs heacuaxters
r&d
branch office
services (office)
sales/marketing
raw materials processing
caionent production
cariponent assthly
final product assembly
warelx)using
retailing
other
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TABLE B	 Ffl	 Ffl
}EP0OL	 ML	 ABLISHED EI7BLISHED
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 AFrI
JRE
4. rk,vers fran	 yes	 31	 10	 21
Another	 no	 40	 14	 26
Location	 other	 4	 2	 2
5. Suppliers by Haxtlepool	 22	 6	 16
Location	 North East	 85	 18	 67
UK	 137	 64	 73
EC	 15	 9
	 6
rest of wr1d	 27	 17	 10
6.Main Markets Hartlepool	 24	 5	 19
by location Cleveland	 29	 B
	
21
neighbouring counties	 33	 11
	 22
Northern England	 23	 10	 13
UK	 28	 13
	 15
EC	 17	 8
	 9
rest of rld	 20	 11
	 9
7.Distribution direct to custcmer 	 32
	 11
	 2].
Netrk	 direct to retailer 	 26	 7	 19
to ware1uses	 8
	 6	 2
other manufacturers 	 20	 10
	 10
another division of finn 	 9
	 6
	 3
elsewhere	 23	 18
	 5
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TABLE B
HARTLEPOOL
8. Elo'pit	 rained stable
thange in	 increased
past year	 decreased
	
FIRMS	 Ffl
	
AlL	 TABLI	 TABLISD
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 _____
CLOSURE
	33 	 13	 20
	
27	 6	 21
	
10	 6	 4
9. Financial Aid banks
and Advice by BSC(I)
Agcy	 Borough of Hartlepool
C1iamber of Cannerce
Cleveland County
EC
EIB
ESF
Dept. of 1oyxnent
Dept. of Envirorinent
Dept. of Trade & Industiy
Hartlepool E
IcFc
MSC
NEDC
Small Firms Service
other
aid adv
29 10
10 12
	
9	 6
	
O	 6
	
9	 4
	
7	 1
	
1	 0
	
2	 3
	
2	 4
	
1	 3
	
32	 7
	
3	 8
	
2	 1
	
5	 5
	
0	 3
	
0	 3
	
1	 1
aid adv
	
8	 2
	
2	 0
	
2	 2
	
0	 3
	
O	 1
	
3	 1
O 0
	
o	 1
O 2
	
O	 2
	
15	 3
	
1	 1
	
0	 0
	
0	 2
	
0	 2
	
0	 0
	
0	 1
aid ads,
	21 	 8
8 12
	
7	 4
0 3
	
9	 3
4 0
	
1	 0
	
2	 2
	
2	 2
	
1	 1
	
17	 4
	
2	 6
	
2	 1
	
5	 3
	
O	 1
	
0	 3
	
1	 0
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TABLE B
HARrLEPOOL
Ffl	 Ffl
ALL	 ErABLIsHE) ErABLISD
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 _____
CLOSURE	 CLOSURE
10. Financial Aid Cash Grants:
trfTyp	 PDG
	 47
	 20
	
27
RSA	 11
	 1
	 10
NSA -sectoral
	 1
	 1
	 0
-support for inrvation	 3
	 1
	 2
-ni-sectoral
	 1
	 0
	 1
enterprise allowance	 3
	
0
	
3
local authDrity	 9
	 2
	
7
Low Interest Loans:
EC	 6
	 2	 4
EIE
	 4
	 2	 2
local authDrity	 3
	 0	 3
snail firms guarantee	 2
	 0
	 2
BSC( I)	 8	 0	 8
Eiterprise Zczie
	 13
	 0
	
13
Advance factory units:
1ish Estates	 13
	 1
	 12
Local auttrity	 2
	 0
	 2
other
	 0
	 0
	 0
Business Expansion Schsi	 1
	 0
	 1
Venture Capital
	 1
	 0
	 1
other
	 8
	 3
	 5
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TABLE B
BARILEPOOL
11. Advice Location:
UK
Region
local area
site
Financial package
Firm:
creation
grcith
survival
other
FI	 FI
AlL	 EBLISHED EBLISHED
FI1	 BEFORE	 AF]]ER
CLOSURE	 CIA)SURE
6	 3	 3
3	 0	 3
6	 1	 5
2	 1	 1
3	 1	 2
2	 0	 2
4	 2	 2
1	 0	 1
4	 1	 3
12.Would yon have	 yes	 41	 11	 30
established here	 18	 5	 13
witIut inctives? other	 10	 7	 3
13. Have the inctives yes	 13	 3	 10
increased	 38	 14	 24
loymt?	 other	 17	 7	 10
14.Have the incitives yes	 20	 4	 16
beei crucial f or	 ro	 38	 14	 24
business survival ? other	 9	 4	 5
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The median firm size of the whole survey- 26- is perhaps
more indicative of the situation than the mean. No single
firm employs more than 700 (this does not include the MSC who
have approximately 1800 persons on various schemes in the
town, or service, or public sector employers) . The largest
employer to respond was the nuclear power station with 664
CEGB workers and 112 NNC (construction contract staff).
Three of the longest established firms are amongst the
largest remaining employers with over 400 working- Ca.meroiYs
Brewery (formed 1868), Expanded Metal Co. (formed 1890) and
RHM Foods (1906) . The largest new firm (THC Fabricators)
recorded employment of 270 (late 1985) but this has since
fluctuated between 500 and 20 (currently amounting tb 70) as
North Sea construction work has declined. PMA Textiles (in
1987 became part of the Coates Viyella group and has since
halved employment) with 185 and CDL 44 Foods with 180
employees are the only new companies with workforces over 100
(though Stadium Plastics a very recent arrival may well come
into this category) . The remaining new firms employ fewer
than 70 people each (36 of them employ fewer than 30 and 18
fewer than 10)
It is noticeable that the male domination of manufacturing
does not appear to be unduly threatened by the new firms in
total but it must be remembered that with so many of them
being small ones a rather biased picture emerges (the smaller
businesses tending to be male dominated). Three of the newer
firms (CDL44, PMA and Isocom) are amongst the top six
employers of females in Hartlepool, thus competing with the
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more established 1960's companies. Female employment can be
said to be an important feature of the more substantial newer
firms, but not of the tiny workshop occupants.
Only 2% (170 workers) of the employment identified by the
survey was part-time, a result which runs counter to the
commonly held emphasis on such activity (e.g.
	
Townsend
1986) .	 This could reflect a number Qf things- backward
management in Hartlepool, higher levels of mechanisation
(equating with increased need for training) demanding the use
of longer shifts (eg 12 hours) or low rates of pay
(dispelling employers' concern about national insurance
contributions).	 Part time male work seems to be at
particularly low level. In a similar way temporary workers
do not seem to be popular amongst these Hartlepool employers.
The previous occupations section was not as thoroughly
completed as some of the others, mainly for data collection
difficulties- many firms professed to be unaware of their
employees previous occupations. Despite the values being so
low, it is still surprising to find so few ex-steelworkers,
school leavers, housewives, people from MSC schemes and the
unemployed working in manufacturing. Two of the newer firms
(CDL44 and PMA Textiles) have employed higher concentrations
of people from the unemployed register than the total of
other firms.	 This is surprising considering the PMA
personnel manager's ethos that "the best people are already
in work" (interview, 1985).
	
The strong concentration of
under twenty five year olds in the older firms can be
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accounted for by the local tradition of friends and relatives
"speaking up" or young people in order to find them a place
in the firm.	 The newer firms, especially those with fewer
local contacts, tend to use the jobcentre for recruitment
before developing local networks.
The legal status section shows that the newer single plant
firms are most likely to be private companies. Subsidiaries
are most numerous amongst the older firms.	 Predictably
single plant firms dominate with multi-nationals second but
considerably less numerous. The newer firms (predominantly
single plant) tend to exhibit more higher order functions.
The most noted function amongst the older firms was raw
material processing, an oblique reference to the basic nature
of Hartlépool's industrial tradition. 	 Most firms declared
that they had not moved from elsewhere (ie that they had
established that process initially on that site) . Of the 21
newer firms indicating that they had moved, 18 were local to
Cleveland (a very high proportion from within Hartlepool
itself), 1 from Pickering (Yorks.), 1 from Tyne and Wear and
only 1 other from further than 50 miles- Melton Mowbray.
This experience somewhat belittles the aspirations of the
Borough Council and the HEA in terms of attracting firms from
outside the regions.	 Establishments (similar to branch
plants) of completely new manufacturing processes seem to be
more normal.	 Other non-movers consist of the indigenous
small entrepreneurs.
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The location of markets and suppliers, and the variety of
distribution networks of the Hartlepoàl respondents indicates
that the more recent firms have much more local supply and
marketing networks than their predecessors. This could well
be a function of their weakness as newly formed businesses.
It is slightly surprising to observe that the newer single
plant firms account for nearly all those supplied from
abroad. This is a result of specialisations derived from the
segmentation of larger firms (through liquidations etc when
smaller breakaway groups are able to deal in the more
profitable parts of the original business) . The higher order
companies organisationally (ie the multiples) tend to have
more distant internalised supply networks (with some EC
element) .	 The larger, more complex organisations also tend
to have more distant international markets. 	 The newly
established firms tend to have their vulnerability compounded
through contacts with the local and regional economy. 	 The
older "branch plant" type firms tend to send part finished
goods to other manufacturers or other divisions of their own
companies.
The regional aid (RDG and P.SA) totals for 1975-1985 show
that the largest amount, 11.5 million pounds (41% of the RDG
total), went to one firm- BTP Tioxide (415 employees) for the
construction of a titanium dioxide paint whitener plant to
the south of the town. Typically most money has gone to the
larger firms with the administrative capacity to process
applications. Some of the biggest beneficiaries of regional
aid have been the firms laying off the most people: BSC, NCB
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(no coal exports from Hartlepool now) and GEC. 	 Laing
Offshore's meteoric labour market experience is regarded by
many employers as a major source of disruption to the heavy
engineering sector because wages were so high (but short
lived)	 that	 top	 workers	 (e.g.• welders, fitters and
pipeworkers) were "creamed off" as older firms could not
compete.	 Only 12 of the post-1975 firms feature in the
published regional aid figures, the remainder must have
received grants too small to be included (RDG's less than
25000 and RSA's less than 5000 pounds) in the published
figures.
The newer firms appear to have a greater reliance upon
banks than the pre-1975 firms- an indication of the liquidity
difficulties faced by nascent businesses. 	 Cleveland County
Council seems to have targeted all its grants towards the
newer firms (at least in Hartlepool) . 	 Relatively few EC
sources have been used, an indication of the high degree of
difficulty experienced by firms in trying to obtain ECSC
loans (even the PMA director found it impossible!) . MSC
training grants have all gone to the newer firms- these can
amount to 80% of the training bill.
BSC(I), at the managed workshops, was the principal named
source of advice but many firms were reluctant to complete
these sections of the questionnaire probably for typically
British reasons of management reticence. The sections on aid
and advice by type rather than source confirm many of the
conclusions reached above.	 National selective assistance
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recipients are scarce. These schemes are designed to promote
innovation, technological advance and major projects but the
lack of them tends to confirm Hartlepool's peripheral
economic status.
The more qualitative questions examined the impacts of the
packages of advice and incentives available in terms of
locational decision choices and the effects upon initial
establishment, increased employment and company survival. 59%
of the firms said they would have established anyway, without
the package of incentives (the "deadweight effect") . 54% of
all firms said that the incentives had not increased
employment. 58% of companies said that the incentives were
not crucial to company survival. The general tone of these
responses is negative to the incentives package, but such
opinions should be tempered by taking account of the value of
the amounts involved (RDG was at 22% until November 1984 and
had been double that previously).
The locational reasons information given indicates that
personal reasons are the highest first order locational
determinent. This is for both old and new firms, but does
not include the often forgotten locational preferences of the
Victorians (in the "other" section) . Single plant firms gave
a wide range of reasons for locating in Hartlepool whilst the
multiples concentrated upon the traditional business
necessities of site, labour and finance. The vulnerability
of eight of the single plant firms is exposed because they
cite local markets as being of prime locational importance.
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3.4	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is evident from this work that 1-lartlepool has not made
a success of reindustrialization. The Coopers and Lybrand
report (1981) criticised the Borough Council 	 for	 not
establishing regenerational goals for industrial development.
This was confirmed at my interview with the industrial
development officer. Without specific aims and intentions no
performance evaluation can be attempted or effort focused
where most effective.	 A general notion of attempting to
reduce unemployment is not sufficient to tackle a problem on
the scale of Hartlepool's.
Unemployment remains obstinately high despite the national
trend for sharp reductions.	 The last (1984) figures for
employment show that there are approximately 25% fewer people
working in 1-lartlepool than in the mid- 1970's. 	 It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the town has been in
decline since the beginning of this century (with only minor
wartime rallies) . The gradual closure of the steelworks in
Hartlepool was overtly on the grounds of obscolete
manufacturing plant but has also to be seen as a response to
the massive local investment and capacity increases on the
southern shores of the Tees estuary. Steel closure was only
one of a long series of similar closures that had earnt the
town Development Area status since the 1944 Act. In fact the
rather muted, docile acceptance by local workers of such
closures can only have encouraged other employers to regard
Hartlepool as a suitable area for rationalizations and job
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reductions.	 In this the employers were assisted by the
social traditions, particularly the insularity, of the towns
inhabitants. Such traditions are evidenced by the reluctance
of redundant Hartlepool steel workers to take jobs "over the
water" at Redcar or Lackenby.	 Local allegiances favour
County Durham to Cleveland or Middlesborough.
Hartlepool suffers from being indistinguishable from a
host of other areas in the North East in terms of its
unemployment problem and the measures available to deal with
it. The Enterprise Zone may have had some value as a vehicle
for publicity but has little value as a job generator. Some
new firms have been attracted to Hartlepool but generally
they have created few jobs, lacked durability and offered
poor terms and conditions.
The main problems are that the new firms are too small and
too few even to address the rate of recent redundancies,
never mind the residual level of unemployment. There is also
a qualitative break with tradition, exemplified by the terms
and conditions of employment offered by the new firms. The
long hours, poor safety record and low remuneration of small
businesses are probably not emphasised enough. Amongst the
more substantial firms (in Hartlepool this means firms
employing over 50 people) to establish recently, none have
recognised trade unions and most are extremely hostile
towards them. In all cases wages are well below the national
average for basic manufacturing grades and some, particularly
for women, go below what might be regarded as the subsistence
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level (eg 1.30 per hour 1986 shift work contract at CDL44).
These new labeur relations norms have (along with more
stringent demands for profitability) prompted major changes
at what remains of BSC Hartlepool. A core workforce of 70 at
the 44 inch pipemill is supplemented with up to 150 short
term contract workers, who are called up on a week to week
basis for specific orders.	 This was achieved by shutting
down the plant entirely in 1983 and reopening under the new
arrangemnets a few months later- with the acjuiescence of the
unions (BSC 44 inch pipemill contract agreement, 1984) . 	 The
ready availability of large numbers of skilled, trained
pipeworkers with few alternative options (though some have
refused contracts in order to take Community Programme
places) has facilitated these regressive conditions.
Finally,	 Hartlepool's	 level	 of	 industrial and
environmental degredation has been recognised as equating
with that of Liverpool (though not quite as Jackson intended)
with the designation of parts of the town to be included in
the Teesside Urban Development Corporation (1987).
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CHAPTER FOUR
CORBY
"When I caine doon from Aberdeen,
I landed right upon the scene,
I got a job doon in the works- I manage fine,
Five 12 hours and a Sunday double time."
Chorus:
"Five 12 hours and a Sunday double time
I work all day and I work all night
To hell with you Jack I'm alright.
Five 12 hours and a Sunday double time"
Verse:
Now the fella that lives doon the street where I abide
He's what you call one of the unemployed
He says its all because of me that he
Hasn't got a job and I've got three"
Chorus:
"The wife caine doon to work the other day
To tell me there was a wee one on the way
I says its alright for you to laugh
But I havri't been to bed for a year and a half!"
Chorus:
"If I'm not on the taxis on Saturday night
you will always find me gay and bright
you will find me doon in the Old White Horse
I'm a week end barman there of course"
Chorus:
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"Now most people like to go to heaven when they die
To lay their head on that Dunlopillow in the sky
But me I'm going to the other place
For a life of peace I could not face.. .
Chorus, End.
Contemporary folksong (anon.).
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4.1	 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"Many things are wanting to this manor which in King
Edwards time belonged to it in woods and ironworks and other
matters" -the reference to the manor of Corbeit in Domesday
Book. It is generally considered that Corby's industrial
history began in 1934 with the Stewarts and Lloyds expansion
but there were significant events before then. The Domesday
quotation above refers to a much earlier period of ironmaking
in the area which dated back to the Roman times. It appears
that the Plantagenet "ferarria" (ironworks) were abandoned
after the Black Death when Corby reverted to a peripheral
role as part of the royal hunting forest of Rockingham (under
the control of the nearby castle of the same name) . The name
"Corby" is derived from the Danish, meaning "place of Kori's
people" (Sharman, M., 1982)
The royal and aristocratic linkages are probably
responsible for the continued non-exploitation and later
collective amnesia about the Northamptonshire ores, in marked
contrast to the Forest of Dean. Whatever the reasons, the
cutting of the Midland Railway in the late 1870's, between
Kettering and Nottingham, amounted to an exciting rediscovery
of the depth and extent of the Northamptonshire ores (the
largest, if not the purest, deposits in the country) .	 In
1881, Samuel Lloyd (not to be confused with the later steel
firm), a Birmingham industrialist, obtained the ironstone
extraction rights for the area and initiated quarrying.
Until 1910 the only other local non-agricultural employment,
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after the collapse of the handloom weaving in the
mid-nineteenth • century, was provided by the brickworks of
James Pain. In 1910 the Lloyd's Ironstone Company lit its
first blast furnace in Corby to refine ore for forges and
foundries in the West Midlands and the South East. 	 This
early adjustment to industrialization was not achieved
smoothly- principally because of Lloyd's introduction of a
particularly harsh working regime.
	
Eleven hour day and
thirteen hour night shifts at rates of 43/4d per hour (ie 4/9
for 12 hours) compared very unfavourably with the pay and
conditions for similar work in Durham, South Wales and.
Cleveland- approximately 6/- per eight hour shift. The
strike which followed the establishment of the Corby branch
of the National Blast Furnacemen's Federation and Kindred
Trades in 1911 was responded to with a company lock-out. Mr.
Lloyd called upon the services of a number of "blacklegs" to
break the strike using intimidatory tactics- evictions,
assaults and collusion with local farmers not to employ
strikers on a casual basis (Alexander, 1969) . Events seem to
have borne out the strikers claims of police bias- violence
and selective protection from mobs went uninvestigated whilst
harsh sentencing awaited those strikers convicted of assault.
It was not surprising that, after the "outers had been outed"
by the Lloyds' men, there was no subsequent enquiry into the
"extreme partiality of the police towards the Lloyds and
their non-union men" (Alexander, 1969)
The Corby ironworks (by 1917 consisting of 3 blast
furnaces) came into the possession of Stewarts and Lloyds
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Ltd. in 1920 when the Bilston based parent company (Hickman's
had only controlled Lloyds Ironstone for a year) was absorbed
by the expanding tubemaking company. Stewarts and Lloyds (a
distinctly separate entity from Lloyds Ironstone) had been
formed by the merger, in 1903, of A. and J. Stewart (a
dominant firm in the Scottish tube industry) and Lloyd and
Lloyd of Halesowen (a similar power on the English scene).
By 1914 Stewarts and Lloyds were responsible for half the
British output of steeltubes (in volume terms). The company
ethos (according to Boswell, 1983) was very definitely that
of tube- rather than steel- makers.
The background to the decision to erect a large integrated
steel and tube works at Corby owes much to two individuals-
Alan Macdiarmid, the Chairman of the company, and H.A.
Brassert the German consultant engineer whose report
identified Corby as the "fulcrum . . . of a project of historic
proportions".	 The financial justification for the move was
the bouyant condition of the construction market in the South
East of England at the time.	 The decision to establish
steelmaking in Corby followed a survey by the company of
Northamptonshire ore reserves in 1928 and the subsecuent
securing of 500 million tons of ore by 1932. The funding for
the project (to cost 6 million pounds) was only achieved in
September 1932 after the introduction of 33 1/3% import
tariffs on steel (at a period of world trade slump,
overcapacity and emerging protectionism) .	 Construction
proceded in 1933 and 1934. The 3.3 million pound external
financial package, although superficially a private venture:
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1.5 million from the United Bank of Scotland, 1 million from
Lloyds Bank and 250,000 pounds from the Prudential Assurance
Co., was coordinated by the Bankers' Industrial Development
Co. an offshoot of the Bank of England (who contributed
550,000 pounds). Thus the state enabled the development of
the Corby Works to take place by providing the necessary
conditions for accumulation- the import tariffs and the
stimulus for the funding.
Despite the assurances from Stewarts and Lloyds that
"there is no intention of abandoning tube manufacture in
Scotland" there were very significant capacity and employment
reductions there. Perhaps the Corby decision was condoned on
the grounds that it allowed for the principal plank of
government policy for the derelict areas at that time- labour
transfer- but it also contributed directly to Scottish
dereliction. The Ministry of Labour played an important role
in facilitating the transference of workers from, among
others, the Clydesdale steel works, the Universal Plate mill
and the Phoenix works in towns such as Belishill, Motherwell
and Rutherglen. The choice offered to the workforce was very
clear: either work in Corby or go on the dole. It is claimed
in Corby that many men actually walked all the way to the
Northamptonshire town. In the early 1930's four out of the
Stewarts and Lloyds' eight Scottish works were shut down.
Only the staff received the minimal redundancy payments
offered (even then only one or two months salary depending on
length of service)- employees got nothing.	 There is no
evidence of any compensation being offered to workers who
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refused to leave Scotland (Boswell, 1983) . The essential
"Scottishness" of Corby was evident from the 55% of the
resident population from that country in 1945 (Pocock, 1959).
This national flavour remains intact to this day, partly
because it became self-fulfilling as immigrants to Corby from
other parts of Britain tended to seek better remuneration and
less demanding shift patterns in the West Midlands.
Stewarts and Lloyds massively improved profitability in
the mid-1930's (see table 4.1) was mainly due to the
economies of scale achieved at Corby (where tubemaking began
on January 7th 1935) and savings due to closures elsewhere.
By the 18th May 1936 the Chairman, Macdiarmid, proclaimed in
The Times, "Corby has proved an unqualified success".
Table 4.1.
Stewarts and Lloyds Profits 1930's
(thousands of pounds)
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
591 317 272 616 1,005 801 1,192 2,303 2,440 1,753
from Boswell 1983, p131.
The town remained "an industrial cuckoo in a rural nest" a
reference to the degree of alienation felt by the Scots from
the Northamptonshire locals despite the employment preference
given them by the Company (conversations with T. McIntosh,
1986)
The most spectacular contribution made by the Stewarts and
Lloyds Corby works to 1939-45 war effort was the Construction
of P.L.U.T.O.	 (pipeline under the ocean); a Churchillian
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project for a rapidly laid oil pipe to supply the Allied
forces iirmediately following the Normandy landings. A more
tangible reminder of the war is provided by the peeling
camoflage paint still visible on the tubeworks sheds (a
testiment to a lack of subsequent investment) . The Scottish
dominance of the rapidly growing town was little altered by
the war but there were some changes in terms of Scottish
source areas and other dilutions. A contingent of "displaced
persons", mostly from Latvia, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine, Poland
and Lithuania, added an unlikely dimension to the demography.
In the post-war years the areas of origin of the Scottish
workers became more diverse; away from the Lanarkshire
Company bases to include central Glasgow, the Forth of Clyde
and increasingly, north east Scotland where the herring
fishing industry was in trouble. There were smaller numbers
of immigrants from the depressed areas of England and Wales,
including Hartlepool and Ebbw Vale, as well as larger
contingents from Ireland.
Corby came to represent the architypal "company town". In
1930 its population stood at 1,500 engaged at the ironworks,
quarrying limestone or iron ore, but principally, in
agriculture. By 1936 the Stewarts and Lloyds transformation
had created an additional 3,000 jobs with much further
expansion to come. At first the works came under the local
authority of Kettering Rural District Council which the
Company had hoped would provide the housing resources for the
expansion of the town. This proved not to be the case and
the Company initiated its own house building programme
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completing 785 houses by 1935 (Coopers and Lybrand, 1979,
p3). Eventuall.y the Company construction accounted for 2,220
houses, several shops, a works club, youth club and a cinema-
some houses being within 200 yards of the blast furnaces.
The Corby Urban DIstrict Council caine into being in 1939.
Its first house building programme was curtailed by political
events elsewhere, but when recommenced in 1945 could not cope
with the expansive demands of the Company. In 1945 the
Company employed 7,000 men- 4,000 of whom were housed in 6
work camps or hostels. The "wild frontier" boom-town analogy
has been widely, and, from all accounts accurately, used to
describe the first twenty or so years of Corby's development.
The Rev. W. Hume was in evocative mood when he described
Corby as a "town of broken bottles and ragged weans" (1956,
quoted by Shaman, 1983). The Company's Industrial Welfare
Commitee was responsible for the selection and screening of
the films shown at its own cinema- evidence of the Company's
all pervading paternalism.
According to Duncan Hall, the Chief Executive of the
District Council, Corby's history has to be understood in
terms of successive and cumulative waves of paternalism
(interview, 1985).	 These being under the Company, the
Development Corporation, and the Steel Corporation.
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4.2	 CORBY- THE NEW TOWN 1950-1980
Corby was the last of the first generation of new towns to
be designated by the post-war Labour government under the
1946 New Towns Act.	 Most of the other new towns were
designed with the environmental exigencies of slum clearance
and overspill in mind. Corby' concern was to provide for the
expansion of a single industry: steel- in a similar fashion
to Peterlee's association with coal in County Durham. The
Corby New Town Development corporation was charged:
"i) to plan and build a town for some 40,000 persons;
ii) to carry Out part of the necesary development,
principally the construction of a town centre, a number of
large housing schemes, and the provision of additional
industry, mainly for women;
iii) to co-ordinate the work of other developers, local
authorities and utility undertakers, whose efforts were
necessary to make Corby a complete town."
(Commision for New Towns, 1983)
The government overruled initial opposition from the Urban
District Council to the new town designation which came into
effect on April 1st 1950.
The early years of the Development Corporation went very
much as planned, primarily being concerned with housing and
town centre developments. 	 The potential dangers of
over-reliance upon a single industry had been recognised, but
the conflict of interest between Company and Corporation (the
Company wanting a recruitment monopoly; the Corporation
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diversification) was resolved through the attraction of
companies emp1oying mainly females. For much of the 1950's
Stewarts and Lloyds exerted considerable influence through
its representation on the board of the Development
Corporation. "There was clearly some reluctance on the part
of Stewarts and Lloyds to allow major competitors in the town
for the labour it was actively recruiting and bringing into
Corby" (Coopers and Lybrand, 1979). 	 Indicative of the
under-provision of female employment was the fact that in
1951 600 women per day travelled out of Corby for work
(mainly to Kettering' s shoe making industry). 	 The "light"
St.	 James industrial estate was developed from 1952,
initially with boot and corset factories.
The stark "before and after" statistics of the employment
census of the Development Corporation hide certain important
peaks and troughs but are nonetheless of some value. On
designation, (April 1950), Corby's population was estimated
at 15,000, with 6,950 men and 550 women employed by Stewarts
and Lloyds (total 7,500).
	
The first employment census
undertaken by the development corporation in 1956 (see table
4.2 below) showed a working population of 14,423 consisting
of 9,609 at the steelworks, a manufacturing sector of 1,174
and a service sector of 3,640. 	 The position in September
1980, after the demise of the Development Corporation and
steel production, had a working population of 17,611 out of a
total population of 51,200, with 5,640 employed by BSC, 4,398
in other manufacturing industries and 7,573 in services.
Labour demand peaked in 1974 with a total of 26,714 when the
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population reached 52,500. In 1974 the manufacturing sector
(defined by the Development Corporation as those employed on
the industrial estates) reached its highest point before the
1980's: 5,880 (2,325 male and 3,555 female workers), BSC
employment stood at 12,761, though it had peaked in 1970 at
13,292 (see table 4.2).
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Table 4.2.
Employment at tubeworks and industrial estates
(annually at September 30th)
TUBEWORKS	 INDUSTRIAL ESTATES
Year	 Total Male Female
1956 9,609	 1,174	 470	 704
1957 10,294	 1,336	 390	 946
1958 10,387	 1,454	 449	 1,005
1959 11,031	 1,829	 558	 1,271
1960 11,738	 2,182	 805	 1,377
1961 12,164	 2,461	 865	 1,596
1962 12,405	 2,865 1,123	 1,742
1963 12,558	 3,159 1,307	 1,852
1964 12,906	 4,074 1,584	 2,490
1965 12,942	 4,035 1,566	 2,469
1966 12, 982	 4,284 1,623	 2,661
1967 12,719	 3,972 1,407	 2,565
1968 12,652	 4,188 1,496	 2,692
1969 12,798	 4,983 1,674	 3,309
1970 13,292	 4,736 1,691	 3,045
1971 12,476	 4,231 1,500	 2,731
1972 13,176	 4,868 1,694	 3,174
1973 12,937	 5,558 2,082	 3,476
1974 12,761	 5,880 2,325	 3,555
1975 12,706	 5,022 2,098	 2,924
1976 12,512	 4,240 1,801	 2,439
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TUBEWORKS	 INDUSTRIAL ESTATES
Year	 •	 Total Male Female
1977 12,227	 4,463 1,994	 2,469
1978 11,369	 4,486 2,207	 2,279
1979 10,494	 5,064 2,315	 2,749
1980 5,640	 4,398 2,124	 2,274
1981 4,509	 4,242 2,088	 2,154
1982 4,170	 5,954 3,048	 2,906
1983 3,363	 7,152 4,353	 2,799
1984 3,044	 8,903 4,864	 4,039
1985 3,002	 8,852 4,942	 3,910
1986 2,792	 10,273 5,889	 4,384
(NB 1986 figures compiled by Corby District Council, 	 all
preceeding ones by the New Town Development Corporation and the
Commission for New Towns).
The Development Corporation's response to the Company's
proposed increase of 2,500 jobs in the early 1960's was to
increase housebuilding, to revise the population target to 55,000
and to persuade the Board of Trade to grant an Industrial
Development Certificate for the Golden Wonder factory (200,000
square feet); the first on the Earlstrees Industrial estate.
Golden Wonder began production in 1964 and came to employ 850
workers (300 men and 550 women, Coopers and Lybrand, 1979). 	 The
revised Development Corporation master plan of 1960 was never
sustained by the promised increase in Stewarts and Lloyds
employment because of improved productivity, increasingly adverse
market conditions and increasing availability of cheaper but
richer
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foreign ores which made Corby appear a less and less
attractrive site for steelmaking (note the Benson Report,
1966, in favour of large coastal plants) .
	 The 17th annual
report (1967) of the Development Corporation expressed the
doubts and worries that the Urban District Council had been
voicing for much longer;
"The change in outlook which has taken place during the year
is of a fundamental kind, and it should not be thought it
springs from causes which are of a short term nature and are
liable to pass away.	 The importance of substituting new
industry for expansion of the steelworks springs not merely
from the present planning which covers reorganisation of the
steel industry, but from causes which lie deeper," p.11O.
"Corby has so far been deliberatly created as a 'one
industry' town, and fears that this economic imbalance might
render it vulnerable have been discounted owing to the basic
nature of the industry. Those fears are now less easy to
dismiss, and it seems important, as a long term programme, to
restore the balance by encouraging other industry in the town
on a major scale," p.110-ill.
"To draw new industry to the town it will therefore be
necessary not only to increase and develop its attractions
for industrialists (and there are many), but also to
publicise them," p.111.
It could thus be argued that Corby's reindustrialization
began not in 1980 (with steel closure) but in 1967, or
failing this, in 1978 when the Development Corporation
relinquished its housing role to the local authority. At
least in Corby, a "quango" set about the business of
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attracting alternative industry well before the
	 steel
closure.	 A direct result of the second diversification
campaign was the establishment of the Avon Cosmetics
warehouse providing work for 500, mainly women. In June
1967, Corby was added to the GLC's "overspill" population
list and began to participate in the London Industrial
Selection Scheme (for decentralising firms) . As previously,
there was a marked reluctance upon the part of central
government ministries in the late 1960's and early 1970's to
grant industrial development certificates for alternative
industry in Corby because the Board of Trade were encouraging
relocations to the Development Areas. The 1971 Development
Corporation report for Corby was unequivocal- "due, however
to the refusal of applications for industrial development
certificates, or to the time taken to announce a decision on
applications for these certificates, no large firm has moved
to Corby, and there is now a serious risk that the properly
balanced development of the town wil be jeopardised", p.110.
The thirtieth and final report (1980) of the Development
Corporation summarized its achievements as follows:
Dwellings constructed	 9,141
Dwellings acquired and modernised 	 3,284
Factories built for rent	 117 units 207,921 sqm
Factories under construction	 12 units 24,100 sqm
New Town Centre and extension	 263 shops
Offices	 22,480 sqm
Neighbourhood shopping centres	 8
Gross Capital Expenditure 	 63 million pounds.
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A considerable amount of industrial development had thus been
undertaken, albeit from a "greenfield" base before steel
closure became a reality. 	 The assets of the Development
Corporation, including 57 ha. of industrial land, were handed
over to the Commision for New Towns (CNT)- the residuary body
charged with winding down the Corporation's affairs.
4.3	 THE STEEL CLOSURE
Probably the first inkling of the insecurity of
steelmaking at Corby came about as a result of the Benson
Report, 1966, when doubts were cast about the viability of
inland sites and upon reliance on domestic ores.	 The
February 1973 white paper- Command 5226- was more explicit:
"Corby has an assured long-term future as a major tube-making
plant, and steelmaking will continue there at least for the
rest of the present decade.	 The steelworks is the major
employer in the town and a final decision on the future of
steelmaking will be taken in the course of the next few years
in consultation with those concerned," (S.7 para 59).
The	 British	 Steel	 Corporation's (BSC) first press
statement with regard to Corby closure (February, 1979)
emphasised the over-capacity problems of the Corporation as a
whole at a time of static demand but pointed out the
increased investment at Redcar and Ravenscraig. It quoted
Cmnd. 7149 (BSC: The Road to Viability, March 1978) "to
achieve financial viability, it is necessary for capacity to
move more into line with demand". The press release stressed
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Corby's role in the national drive for steel viability but
emphasised that notwithstanding the depressed market
conditions there would be investment in the commercial welded
tube plant. The three problems Corby had to overcome were:
"1) Corby ore's low iron content forces the use of more coke,
thus increasing energy costs and final tube costs;
2) Steel is made at Corby in ingots, a more costly process
route than the continuous cast slab made at modern,
large-scale plants such as Redcar/Lackenby on Teesside;
3) Corby iron and steel works are small by modern standards,
resulting in high fixed costs per tonne."
The consultation process adopted by the BSC seems to have
involved waiting for the unions to come up with unacceptible
alternatives; then announcing that the closure would go ahead
regardless! The 1st November 1979 "statement about the
closure of Corby steelworks" authorititvely deemed that "to
delay further would:
a) merely prolong the uncertainty for the workforce and Corby
community,
b) cost the country more money in funding the steel works
losses, and,
C) do nothing to improve the competitive postition of Corby
tubes in a progressively worsening market situation." 	 (BSC,
1979)
After announcing the special redundancy arrangements the
statement concludes: "Corby's greatest need is to introduce
new jobs into the town and the Corporation will actively
persue job creation by bringing new industries into Corby
through its subsidiary BSC(Industry) Ltd."
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The campaign against the steel closure has been well
described elsewhere (particularly, Baker, 1982) . R.O.S.A.C.
(the Retention Of Steelmaking At Corby) was the focus of the
campaign.	 This organisation was derived from the bitterly
divided Joint Trades Union Policy Group and turned to
academics from the universities of Warwick and Cambridge for
assistance in preparing a case for the continued viability of
the works. Both teams recognised the threat posed by the
opening of the Redcar blast furnace and indicated that
oposition to this on the grounds of sufficient existing
capacity should be pivotal to Corby's case.	 This idea was
rejected by the national officials of several unions who had
strong vested interests in the prestige project; particularly
by the ISTC, who maintained a tradition of non-involvement in
local campaigns against redundancy. The ISTC gave R.O.S.A.C.
only 200 pounds at a very late stage and Bill Sirs, the
General Secretary, refused to head a mass demonstration
whilst being quoted as saying: "we do not do things this way"
(Baker, 1982). The ultimate irony is that Corby's 8,000
membership of the ISTC was solidly behind the national steel
strike (it began in Corby on 4th December 1979)- over pay and
not redundancies. Many members realised that all the strike
could hope to achieve was a few weeks delay in the
implementation of closure. The R.O.S.A.C. initiatives were
successful in generating support within Corby, more outside
the works than inside, because of the neutralising prospect
of redundancy payments. At least two of the campaign's four
mass demonstrations in six months involved over 14,000
participants and there was a well publicised march to London
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by twenty men followed by a 1,000 strong rally in Hyde park
and procession to lobby Westminster. Support was not,
however, generated much further afield in Northarnptonshire
than Corby, due, in some degree, to the continued social
segregation of the town from its environs and the
long-established resentment of the "industrial cuckoo in a
rural nest" (see above) . The steel closure eventually began
in April 1980 and caine to result in the loss of over 7,000
steel jobs (by 1986) and a further 5,000 elsewhere in the
town.
As is usual, the government statistical information
available rarely coincides with the most desirable time
period. The Department of Employment Census of Employment is
only available until 1981 (despite an update to 1984 having
been completed but not yet released at TTWA level, September,
1987).	 In the case of the Corby AOA table 4.3 shows for the
period 1975-1981 not only the partial impact of steel closure
(incomplete in 1981) but also the fact that the growth
sectors of the economy failed to match even the jobs lost
outside the steel sector.	 Table 4.3 shows the top five
growth mlh's and the bottom six (to isolate 'steeltubes') as
a summary of the above mentioned inadequacies, despite the
strenuous efforts of the Development Corporation.
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Table 4.3.
Corby employment change by mlh 1975-1981
Top 5 and bottom 6 ranked mlh's.
MALE EMPLOYMENT
1.Other mechanical engineering nes
2.Other printing, publishing, bookbinding
3.Miscellaneous transport services etc 	 +635
4.Iron and steel (general)
5.Motor repairs, distributors, garages, etc
6.Other electrical goods
5.Educational Services
4.Other mining & quarrying 	 -1,904
3.Local government sevice
2. Construction
1.Steeltubes	 -7,287
Total MALE Change 19,536 - 10,932 = -8,604
FEMALE EMPLOYMENT
1.Other business services
2.Other services
3.Other printing, publishing, bookbinding 	 +1, 032
4.Womens and girls tailored outerwear
5.Dresses, lingerie, infants wear etc
6 .Footwear
5.Mens and boys tailored outerwear
4.Local government service	 -2,073
3.Other electrical goods
2 .Educational services
1.Steeltubes	 797
Total FEMALE Change 10,516 - 8,452 = -2,064
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ALL EMPLOYMENT
1.Other printing, publishing, bookbinding
2.Other services
3.Other Business services
	
+1,466
4 .Miscellaneous transport services
5.Other mechanical engineering nes
6..Other mining and quarrying
5.Construction
4.Other electrical goods	 -3,502
3.Local government service
2 .Educational services
]..Steeltubes	 -8,084
Total ALL WORKERS Change 30,052 - 19,384 = -10,668
Source: NOMIS
At least another 1,400 job losses have occurred at the tubeworks
since 1981. Those MLH's represented in the male job loss section
show the impact of steel c1osue on local allied industrieS
notably quarrying and construction. The job losses for female
workers highlight the earliest failures of newer, replacement,
industries -eg tailored outerwear and other electrical goods- and
the decline of a regional speciality- footwear. The totals for
all workers underline the trauma of steel closure- a 36%
reduction in employment in six years for a small, vulnerable
local economy.
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4.4	 THE EXPERIENCE OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION
4.4.1 Trends in Employment and Unemployment
The NOMIS data for Corby show in table 4.4 (below) it as
the only one of the three closure areas studied where the
total workforce actually increased between 1981 and 1984.
Unemployment has also fallen sharply according to these
official figures (the usual caveats should be applied).
Although the turnaround in Corby appears to be marked the
latest available employment figures show that there is plenty
of ground to be made up before a return to 1971 conditions
can be made.	 The 1988 census of employment for Corby will
make interesting reading in 1992. On a statistical basis the
unemployment figures for Corby appear to have fallen to the
national average (one of Duncan Hall's original aims)
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TABLE 4.4 TRDS IN EPLOYMENIY PND UNE7IPLOYMENP
cORBY
EN
YEAR	 1YIL DRXF0RCE
(JUNE)
1971	 28,982
1972	 28,841
1973	 30,060
1974	 30,255
1975	 30,052
1976	 28,570
1977	 28,936
1978	 27,499
PLOYMEN
TYrAL UNEIPL0YED RATE
821	 2.8
513	 1.7
746
	
2.4
1,183
	
3.8
2,402	 7.8
2,633
	 8.3
2,676
	
8.9
(SEPT)
1981	 19,384	 6,895
	 22.9
1984	 21,243	 5,196
	
19.9
1988	 2,124	 8.7
ScXJRcE: I't1IS
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4.4.2 The Agencies
The	 Coopers	 and	 Lybrarid (1979) report's principal
administrative recommendation was the formation of a Corby
Industrial Development Executive "to coordinate all aspects
of industrial development in Corby" (ie marketing, site and
premises provision, administration of financial assistance,
monitoring of training requirements and control of the
Development Corporation's land and property" p.44). Although
the constituent elements- the Commission for New Towns (CNT),
the District Council and the County Council were reluctant to
concede their relevant responsibilities to the new body there
was agreement on cooperation, thus the Joint Industrial
Development Committee (JIDC) came into being in November 1979
(with a Director of Industry appointed in April 1980)
Officer representation on this committe has always been high
(a ratio of 8:5 in relation to councillors) . Minutes and
personal interviews suggest that crucial decisions tend to
emanate from the officer executive group.
The timing of the JIDC's first publication is crucial.
The April 1980 "Strategy for Corby- A Community Plan" had
already been prepared well before steel closure.	 The Chief
Executive and key members of the District Council (including
some soon-to-be ex-steelworkers) proved themselves ready and
willing to concede steelmaking in order to concentrate upon
industrial regeneration. Apart from the central pillar of
employment and industry the strategy presented five other
"action fields" requiring external capital funding:
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transportation; housing; education; training and retraining;
personal social services; and the environment and recreation.
The strategy's objective was "stability" which it defined as
"the retention of the residual population of Corby and its
inbuilt natural growth based upon a restructuring of the
local economy to provide local employment, an attractive and
buoyant housing market and appropriate educational, social
and environmental services," p3. 	 In typical physical
planning usage the prime employment objective "to ensure the
availability of sufficient and appropriate industrial land
capable of being marketed and occupied by firms employing
some 11000 people " (p.11), was couched in property terms.
The aim was to effect a reduction of the local unemployment
rate to the national average- quite an optimistic aspiration
considering that Corby's unemployment rate, due to migration
and temporary steel employment had been higher than the
national average since the early 1960's.
The contribution of the constituent members of the JIDC
will be examined beginning with that of the Corby District
Council,	 the Labourist local authority.	 The post-hoc
rationalisation of the Chief Executive of the District
Council (Duncan Hall) would not be out of place on the
platform of any Thatcherite Tory party conference: "to
attract business you have to be a business" (from an
interview 30.9.85) . The Council's initial response to steel
closure was to adopt a non-traditonal, non-democratic,
management approach. The rejection of the usual bureaucratic
style was underlined by a 25% reduction in Council staff (see
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table 4.3 above).	 The speed with which the "strategy" was
produced is attributed to this "progressive managerialism"
which prioritises confidence ("we have nothing to sell but
the town itself") and committment (the sale of council
housing- including 1,450 "hard to let" dwellings at 1,000
pounds each- to retain population). Pictured in "The Sun"
(29th August 1985) as the man who led the fight back in the
"Town That Refused To Die", "dynamic" Duncan said "there's no
point in just talking about making businesses efficient
unless you practise what you preach". "We bought it just to
knock it down"- a reference in the same article to the
Council's desire to obliterate memories of the steelworks as
soon as possible.	 The District Council (in a joint
delegation with the Development Corporation and the County)
finally obtained development area status for Corby in
December 1979, after several previous attempts, dating from
the late 1960's. The District Council also became the first
English authority to lobby successfully for enterprise zone
status, in June 1981.
April 1980 was not only the month of the beginning of
steel closure but also marked the appointment of the Director
of Industry and the establishment of the Industrial
Development Centre.	 The promotional budget for the centre
now exceeds 350,000 pounds per annum- from a variety of
public sources. Despite the high profile media image of the
Chief Executive, the real "Mr. Corby" (for the first six
years after closure) was Fred McClenaghan, the first Director
of Industry.	 A discrete, highly professional person,
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McClenaghan took the task of attracting firms to the town to
new heights.'	 An industrial	 development	 centre was
established to create the impresion of a highly profitable
commercial undertaking with Corby as its product "on sale".
Locationally separate from the Council offices, the style was
geared up for slick marketing- with an abundance of
promotional literature, maps, models, aerial photographic
displays,	 videos,	 comfortable	 furnishings	 and an
inexhaustible supply of coffee- a dramatic change from the
more usual public service austerity.
McClenaghan managed to incorporate the local agency for
BSC(I) loans into the industrial centre but apart from
mentioning the continuing redundancies at the tubeworks was
not expansive about the Corporation's role after closure
(interview, 1985) . The New Jobs Team left Corby in 1982.
McClenaghan denied that his aim was to create employment,
"just to attract and promote it" but he insisted that he had
the right to use "any means" available "to get any jobs he
could" (interview, 1985) . Pay, conditions and unionisation,
he unashamedly admitted, were the concern of the company and
its employees, not the JIDC.	 He attributed the lack of
impact of the new jobs brought to Corby on the unemployment
figures, to the numbers of imported key-workers (no figures
available), commuters from outside Corby (1,897 in 1985,
compared with 757 in 1980), women not previously registered
for employment (figures unavailable) and people employed
directly from the steelworks. There are very few official
references to outmigration, but this has inevitably had a
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benign effect on the employment situation. According to the
1981 census data for migration for the year preceding, out of
a population of 52,395, 2,021 persons left the district, but
1,345 entered it, giving a loss of only 676 (352 went to
Scotland) .	 I4argaret Grieco (1985) identified an unspecified
number of Scottish return migrants who had left Corby prior
to steel closure. There is a real dearth of information on
this aspect of Corby's traditionally unstable population
profile. One of the Council's planners hinted at the problem
in 1984 when writing about the steel closure: "for the first
time Corby experienced a population decline. 	 The above
average rate of natural increase typical of a new town
(albeit o igh proportion of Roman Catholic immigrants) masked
a level of outmigration far higher than at first seemed the
case".
Any analysis of the unemployment figures must be as
superficial	 as	 the	 figures available (18 changes of
definition have occured between 1979 and mid- 1987) .	 The
total figures for Corby have shown a decline of 3,000 since
the highpoint of 7,000 recorded in July 1981.	 Only 500 of
this decrease has been in the female total indicating that
women seeking work do not have such an easy time of it as has
been suggested. The time series for the long term unemployed
makes even less impressive reading. 	 Those unemployed for
over one year between 1983 and 1986 have declined by 550
(leaving 1541 in Oct 1986) . 	 Figures for a similar time
period but for those unemployed for over two years show a
decline of only 33 leaving a total of 1,112.	 Thus 65% of
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Corby's long term unemployed have been so for over two years.
This points to a residual element of durable unemployement
which the r eindustrialization and various MSC programmes do
not appear to be addressing.
The most visible remnant of BSC(I) activity in Corby,
because BSC(I) loans have become commercially uncompetitive,
is provided by the workshop units currently managed by Mr
Geoff Bent.	 Over 63 firms use the 80 units (some use more
than one unit) and employ (June 1986) 185 people.	 The
emphasis is very much on "start-ups" in the small units
(mostly under 1,000 square feet) where 1 or 2 person
businesses predominate (the largest firm employs 11 workers).
The BSC(I) units complement the smallest sizes available from
the CNT (down to 700 square feet). It is freely admitted
that very few ex-steelworkers have used the units because
they tend to be "employees not employers" (G. Bent 16.7.85).
The "easy-in" "easy-out" terms of the workshop licences "make
it very easy for people to succeed and very easy for them to
fail" (G. Bent)
	
There is slightly more of a realistic
approach at the workshops than elsewhere in the town where
the small business "hype" predominates. 	 Failures are
admitted to- 40% of the 126 firms which have left the units
since the 1981 opening have discontinued trading. 	 Of the
remaining 60%, less than half have remained in Corby. These
figures are far higher, apparently, for the unmanaged units
provided by the CNT and also on a commercial basis by the
private sector on the enterprise zone. 	 Corby's BSC(I)
workshops have an international flavour, for example,
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Drilitec (UK) Ltd (a German firm who produce tube thread
protectors for Seamless Tubes Ltd.) and Brittania Engraving
Ltd.	 (a South African controlled firm engaged in specialist
glass work) .	 Despite the publicised aims of the Corby
workshops, ie "the wish to create jobs" and "to help
businesses grow," they have never been expected to make a
significant numerical contribution to the alleviation of the
town's unemployment problem. What they do provide is the
ideological room to foster entrepreneurialism in a town with
no such tradition.
Although after seven years of operation the Commission for
New Towns (CNT) is winding down its operations in Corby, its
contribution to the major elements of industrial development
since steel closure is important and must not be overlooked.
The CNT inherited 100 acres of industrial land from the
Development Corporation and purchased a further 304 acres
from the BSC to enable direct control of much ensuing
property development.	 Land ownership made possible the
necessary infra-stucture work otherwise too expensive for the
local authority: highways, sewerage,	 statutory service
provision and landscaping (particularly in areas affected by
open cast quarrying for iron ore and limestone). It is the
advanced factory building programme that has had the greatest
impact. Between 1980 and 1985, 186 units were constructed by
the CNT (in sizes ranging between 5,000 and 50,000 square
feet, discounting the workshops) to provide a total of
1,851,660 square feet of additional factory space. The
private sector has in the same period constructed a further
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1,432,700 square feet on land prepared by the CNT (46
transactions) .
	
An important but unsung contribution made by
the CNT has been the attraction of private investors to the
Corby industrial scene (in fact the creation of an industrial
property market) through lease-back arrangements on the
enterprise zone. City investors have been (whilst there was
any new property left on the enterprise zone) encouraged to
purchase factories from the CNT in order to gain the benefits
of the 100% income and Corporation tax allowances on the
price; to set against profit from elsewhere and obtain income
from the rents from the occupiers as arranged by the CNT.
The advantage for the CNT in lease-back deals i s that they
provide an important source of cash flow to fund other
developments (Wilson and Partners, 1985 interview)
Other enterprise zone incentives (such as rate relief,
simplified planning regime etc) have had far less of an
impact in Corby. The ten year rate exemption (starting from
22nd June 1981) has been almost totally nullified for
industrialists because of sharp increases in rents that
accompanied designation as an enterprise zone (ie the
levelling effect of the market) . This is a feature of the
majority of enterprise zones (see NAO 1986) . Corby is one of
the few places where higher rates of rental growth have been
used to attract industrial investment. Investors require the
certainty of rental growth to invest and take advantage of
the tax allowances mentioned above, and provide some
continued source of income after the end of the enterprise
zone period in 1991. The JIDC has used the concept of rental
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growth as part of its promotion of the town for private
sector investment. Duncan Hall, the Chief Executive, boasts
that Corby no longer has "to buy in" mobile industry by
offering rent and rate holidays (as other localities tend to
do) but prefers to let the Thatcherite "magic of the market"
operate.
The only other non-governmental agency of any significance
in Corby is the Northamptonshire Enterprise Agency (NEA)
formed in 1983. It was a joint venture by the County Council
and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.	 The NEA has
undertaken an expensive "secret agent" advertising campaign
using the agency "Vernons of London" for the County as a
whole.	 It	 emphasises	 the	 locational assets of
Northamptonshire in an imaginative "spy-dossier" manner- but
whether it will lead to an increase of interest in the county
is another matter. "Our intention is to keep the name and
image of Northamptonshire in the market place for serious
consideration by those with development projects, in order to
generate a reasonable flow of enquiries" (1985 Annual Report
on this campaign). With such nebulous aims any attempt at
evaluation of the campaign will be problematic. The NEA also
undertakes small business counselling in harness with the
Small Firms Service of the DTI (from Nottingham) . A recent
venture has been the promotion of tourism in the county and
has involved the formation of a wholly owned subsidiary of
the NEA- Nothamptonshire Tourism Ltd.- to develop
"commercially viable and employment generating projects".
Perhaps the NEA's main raison d'etre has been the small
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business grant scheme it provided after the transfer of
responsibility' for the County Council's rate and interest
relief schemes in 1983. 	 Any non-retail or non-personal
service business is eligible for a grant for the creation of
up to ten new jobs. 250 pounds per job can be granted under
the scheme.	 In the first full year of the scheme Corby
received 30 grants for 120 jobs (representing a commitment of
30,000 pounds and a part payment of 17,325 pounds- only 50%
of the grant is available initially) . In fact the managing
director of the NEA spends at least one day a week at the
BSC(I) workshops in Corby arranging these grants. 19 of these
grants for Corby went to manufacturing firms (91 jobs) and 11
for services (29 jobs) the highest ratio, for manufacturing,
of all the Districts in the County, though Wellingborough's
more recent enterprise zone status (1983-84) is having an
influence too.
4,4.3 The Impacts of Reindustrialization upon Industry and
Employment
Much of the information presented in this section is
derived from a questionnaire survey of 112 firms out of total
number approached of 174 (making a return rate of 63%),
undertaken in 1985-1986. 	 Table 4.4, below, itemises the
breakdown of employment as found by the survey; table 4.6,
below, itemises the other survey responses (less critical
data is to be found in Appendic 4).
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Table 4.5.
Corby Employment types by pre- and post- closure firms.
WORKER TYPE All Firms (112)	 pre-1979(23)	 Post-1979(90)
Total Workers	 9,376	 4,650	 4,726
Full Time Male	 6,068	 3,172	 2,890
Full Time Female	 2,383	 1,179	 1,204
Part Time Male	 51	 35	 16
Part Time Female	 305	 157	 148
Temp. Male	 148	 94	 54
Temp. Female	 274	 127	 147
The pre-closure employment includes the remaining BSC employment
total of 2,378 (1985) which originated in 1934 (see historical
material above) . The only other remaining firm from the same
year (and the 1930's) to respond was Shanks and McEwan, the civil
engineering, demolition and waste disposal firm closely allied to
the steelworks. Only two firms survive from the 1950's and four
from the 1960's- empirical proof of the combined effect of
Stewarts and Lloyds and the Board of Trade (by IDC refusal)
discouragement of alternative employment provision in the town.
The fourteen remaining firms from the 1970's (that completed the
questionnaire) reflect the problems experienced by the
Development Corporation in attracting mobile industry in a
worsening economic situation. 	 Although fewer in number the
pre-closure firms are on average four times larger (in employment
terms) than the newer ones (mean size 211 compared with 52).
There is little evidence available of the impact of steel closure
on the pre-existing companies except for the
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review of the "Strategy for Corby" (Corby District Council,
1984) . This shows that 40 out of the 110 companies operating
in the industrial areas in early 1980 had ceased trading by
late 1983; amounting to a job loss of 1,071, from a total of
5,063 to 4,242. The workforce of some of the still surviving
non-steel companies was drastically curtailed by steel
closure. For example, the British Oxygen Corporation cut its
employees from 120 to 6 upon the cessation of basic oxygen
steelmaking, marking a change from production to small scale
retailing.
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ThBLE C	 FI	 FI
XRBY	 ALL	 EBLISHED ESFALI
FIR	 BEFORE	 _____
1OJRE	 aE
1. Legal Status plc	 11	 6	 5
private carany	 70	 10	 60
subsidiaxy	 23	 8	 15
other	 8	 1	 7
2. Structure of multinational	 23	 10	 13
Organisation UK multiplant 	 21	 8	 13
single plant	 70	 9	 61
other	 0	 0	 0
3. Fur,tia-is	 heaãuarters	 65	 9	 56
r&d	 40	 5	 35
branch office	 15	 3	 12
services (office)	 42	 13	 29
sales/marketing	 7].	 14	 57
raw materials processing	 5].	 12	 39
canponent production	 40	 11	 29
canpnent assembly 	 39	 4	 35
final product assembly	 54	 7	 47
wareliDuSiflg	 54	 11	 43
retailing	 16	 1	 15
other	 15	 5	 10
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TABLE C	 F	 FI
RBY	 AlL	 BLISHED	 BLISHED
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 AFI'ER
OSURE	 aE
4. bvers fran yes	 46	 15	 31
Another	 no	 59	 10	 49
Location	 other	 5	 0	 5
5. Suppliers by Corby	 35	 13	 22
Location	 East Midlands	 79	 11	 68
UK	 188	 32	 156
EC	 44	 10	 34
rest of r1d	 31	 3	 28
6.Main Markets Carby	 31	 6	 25
by location Northamptonshire 	 28	 2	 26
neighbouring counties 	 31	 8	 23
East Midlands 	 20	 3	 17
UK	 95	 13	 82
EC	 27	 5	 22
rest of r1d	 34	 8	 26
7.Distribution direct to custaiier 	 72	 15	 57
Netrk	 direct to retailer 	 26	 5	 21
to warebouses	 28	 12	 16
other manufacturers 	 50	 9	 41
another division of firm 	 10	 2	 8
elsewhere	 39	 2	 37
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ThBLE C
cDRBY
8. E1oynit	 renained stable
thange in	 increased
past year	 decreased
Ffl	 Ffl
	
ALL	 ESTABLISHED	 ABLISHED
Ffl	 BEFORE	 AiTER
OJRE
	31 	 12	 19
	
66	 6	 57
	
10	 3	 7
9. Financial Aid banks
and Advice by BSC(I)
Agcy	 1amber of Ccmiierce
Carimissiori for New Tns
Corby Disict Council
CIDC
EcC
EIB
ESF
Dept.of loyment
Dept. of Environment
Dept.of Thade & Industry
IcFx
rc
Small Firms Service
other
aid adv
52 25
28 12
	
0	 7
21 24
	
4	 9
2 24
	
23	 2
	
2	 0
	
1	 0
	
0	 8
	
1	 1
67 15
	
8	 2
6 13
	
2	 4
	
5	 4
	
aid adv
	 aid adv
7	 4	 45	 21
6	 2	 22	 10
0	 3	 0	 4
3	 3	 18	 21
1	 2	 3	 7
0	 4	 2	 20
2	 0	 21	 2
1	 0	 1	 0
1	 0	 0	 0
0	 3	 0	 5
1	 0	 0	 1
7	 2	 60	 13
2	 2	 6	 0
2	 3	 4	 10
1	 0	 1	 4
0	 0	 5	 4
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TABLE C
	 FI	 FI
aRBY
	 ALL	 EABLISHED STABLI
Ffl	 BEFORE	 AFr
CLJRE	 CLOSURE
10. Financial Aid Cash Grants:
byTy	 RDG
	 71	 11	 60
FSA
	 31
	 1	 30
NSA -sectoral 	 3
	 0
	
3
-support for inncvation	 4	 1	 3
-rxxi-sectoral 	 1	 0	 1
enterprise allance	 6	 0
	
6
local auticrity 	 4	 2	 2
Low Interest Loans:
EC	 24	 3
	 21
EIB
	 1	 1
	 0
local authDrity	 0	 0
	 0
mall firms guarantee 	 11	 0	 11
BSC( I)	 16	 0	 16
Eiterprise Zone 	 23	 1
	 22
Advance factory units:
ar
	
18
	
0
	
18
local auttrity	 1	 0
	
1
other	 0
	
0
	
0
Business Expansion Schane	 5
	 0
	 5
Vature Capital
	
5
	
1
	 4
other
	 8
	 2
	
6
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	5 	 1	 4
	
15	 6	 9
	
6	 1	 5
	
6	 2	 4
TABLE C	 FIRE	 FI
DRBY	 ALL	 EBLID EBLISHED
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 AFTER
CLOSURE	 CE
11. Advice Location:
UK
Region
local area
site
Financial package
Firm:
creation
grcwth
survival
other
	
13	 1	 12
	
6	 0	 6
	
14	 0	 14
	
18	 0	 18
	
6	 1	 5
12. Would you have	 yes	 41	 10	 31
established here	 50	 3	 47
without incentives ? other	 11	 7	 4
13. Have the incentives yes	 18	 4	 14
increased	 36	 7	 29
aplomt?	 other	 48	 6	 42
14. Have the incentives yes	 42	 4	 38
been crucial for	 59	 14	 45
business survival 7 other	 4	 3	 1
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Despite all the attempts at diversification before and
after the steel closure the BSC still remains the largest
employer in Corby.	 Even with a continuing jobs haemorrage
the tubeworks still employs twice as many people as RS
Components, Corby's second largest employer. The steel tubes
business is not, especially at the bulk welded end of the
market,	 showing any real signs of recovery from the
recession. The situation is, if anything, worse for the
higher quality privatised parts of BSC Corby- Seamless Tubes
Ltd. (STL) and Cold Drawn Tubes Ltd. 	 (CDTL)- both joint
ventures with the TI group. STL is in a doubly uncertain
position because of the reduced demand for North Sea oilfield
products (due to a depressed world oil price) and because of
its external control by a previously hostile competitor with
the capability to replicate nearly all production functions.
Subsequent to privatisation STL has cut its workforce by
half, especially since the "plug mill" (the hot furnace and
basic seamless tube forming function lost to TI at
Wednesfield, West Midlands) days.
	 The joint venture has
meant that most of the strategic decision making takes place
at Wednesfield- a plant that can nearly match the Corby tube
finishing facilities. The only advantages left to Corby for
seamless tube finishing are that the licerices for the French
VAN special tube joints are held by BSC and the fact that
Corby has the sales and marketing expertise for oilfield
products- neither feature being untransportable.
Apart from the tubeworks most of the pre-closure firms'
employment is made up of women. This is a measure of the
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deliberate policy of the time (see above) .	 Most of the
established female employment is concentrated in the
following older firms:	 Aquascutum	 (gentlemens'	 cotton
outerwear), Avon Cosmetics (perfumery warehouse), Celebration
Arts (greetings card packaging and warehousing), Nielsen
Clearing House (money off coupon redemption and promotions
service) and Dubois plc (plastic traps and waste filtres).
The newer firms still show a bias towards full-time male
labour (in a ratio of 2:1) but this represents a much greater
female presence than existed previously in the steel
industry. The questionnaire also raises some doubts about
the increased use of part-time and temporary labour. Neither
appears to play a major role in Corby's labour market. 	 Four
firms account for most of the part-time and temporary
workers, amongst the older generation: BSC, Avon and Nielsen
Clearing House; and from the new generation RS Components.
The minimum industrial base wage rate per hour experienced in
Corby is was 1.94 per week (1985) for an unskilled worker
(average)- giving 77.60 for a forty hour week	 (Corby
Personnel Association).	 Thus if wages are low (much lower
rates are claimed by the Trades Council) the national
insurance premiums (the main reason for using part-timers)
will be commensurate and perhaps greater productivity, in
highly mechanised processes, can be achieved with full-time
workers.
RS Components is the only new firm with more than 1,000
employees in Corby. Its main function is the provision of a
same day order service on a wide range of electrical and
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electronic components from its quarterly produced catalogue.
It is, in effect, a modern warehouse.	 Its only remotely
manufacturing function is the repackaging and the inclusion
of the "RS" logo on batches of compatible products. 	 A
significant proportion of the company's 440 female workers
are involved in VDU operations of order processing- the
remainder tend to be in clerical/administrative or packing
grades. RS (it stands for Radio Spares) forms the major part
of the Electocomponents Group plc and must be one of the most
successful companies to establish in Corby: 1985-86 sales
amounted to 137,400,000 pounds and profits of 31,500,000
pounds (a 28% increase on the previous year) with employment
showing a rise of 71 (1985-86 annual report)
The level of success achieved by RS Components has not
been matched elsewhere in Corby. National proof that the
electronics industry has not provided the anticipated
cornucopia of jobs is available in the sector profiles of the
Engineering Industry Training Board which show a consistent
decline in electronics sector employment since 1979 (though
enterprise zones are exempt from the requirement to complete
of EITB figures) .	 Commodore Business Machines (UK) Ltd is
exemplary of the levels of exploitation that can occur.	 In
March 1983 Commodore announced plans to establish an assembly
plant in Corby to create 1,000 jobs. By December 1984 600
people were working at the non-union plant but 110 were made
redundant in January 1985 in a financial year when the
company as a whole lost nearly 100 million pounds. The build
up to the previous Christmas was a period when demand for the
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C64 range of micro's (from Corby) was particularly high
(Charlton, 1986) . It is no coincidence that the rest of the
plant was shutdown when the British home computer market
collapsed the following year. Although the exact amount of
public funding made available to Commodore is impossible to
determine reliable estimates (ComputerTalk) suggest a figure
of at least 2 million pounds. In November 1985 140 jobs went
at Commodore Corby with the final 250 employees going in
January 1986 leaving a remnant of 40 administrative staff.
Despite the data collection problems for the previous
occupation figures (several companies claimed that the
information was not readily available or records not kept),
some important themes emerge. Nearly 1,500 ex-steelworkers
are recorded from the responding companies. This is probably
an understatement because there have been over 10,000 job
losses from the steel works over the last decade, and, as has
been previously demonstrated there were few alternative
sources of employment in a "company" town. If however, the
figures are taken as a true record, less than half the
recently established male jobs went to ex-steelworkers (or
lust over a quarter of the the total new jobs). 	 ECSC
incentives have generally proved problematic for British
companies to obtain because of the strenuous qualifications,
time consuming administration and a number of moratoria on
expenditure imposed by the EC in times of financial stress
(caused by overcommitment to other policy areas). This
reinforces the idea that ex-steelworkers encounter problems
re-entering the labour market, even though the ECSC nominally
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provides incentives for companies to do this.
The slightly lower figures (than for ex-steelworkers) for
the	 "other unemployed" category may well include some
steelworkers as well as those whose previous employment was
at	 some	 of the recently closed "new" firms.	 "Other
unemployed" accounts for less than a quarter of the total
employment at the newer firms indicating some preference
amongst employers for either those in work or those with
recent experience.	 Housewives and under 25's are preferred
to school leavers, though there are concentrations of the
former in certain firms- particularly RS Components.
Situations for school leavers and opportunities for MSC
schemes	 seem particularly bleak. 	 Some, especially the
smaller, firms have indicated that the costs in terms of
administration and training time mitigate against the use of
MSC placements (such as YTS) . The wide availability of work
conditioned candidates also mitigates against the take up of
schoolleavers.
Most firms responding to the questionnaire claimed to have
increased their employment over the twelve month period
preceding the survey date, November 1985. Over 30% claimed
stable employment- but this is a more obvious feature of the
older employers. Few companies were prepared to admit to
decreases. The fact that approximately half of the firms
indicated employment stability must be treated with cautious
concern because of the potential for decline that this
offers- not, of course, that over-expansive growth (beyond a
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firm's	 capability)	 is necessarily a sign of economic
well-being. The situation is more volatile for the new firms
with higher nwnbers showing increases but also more showing
decreases (mainly single plant firms and multi-nationals).
The majority of the responding firms were private
(limited) companies with subsidiaries being the second most
important rather than public limited companies. 	 One
co-operative was also encountered. 	 The "other" section
appears quite small- it consists of individuals, partnerships
and sole traders; ie persons not in a position to register
for limited liability status. Not unexpectedly most of the
private firms have been established since steel closure.
Most of these firms are single plant firms. The more mature
firms show a higher proportion of plc's and subsidiaries.
The exterior control of the Corby economy (40% of all the
responding firms were multi-nationals or UK multi-plants) is
reinforced by the findings of Roger Tym and Partners (1984)
that the Corby enterprise zone has proved attractive to firms
from outside its economic region.
The use of organisatiorial structure to sort the responses
provided a consistent impression with that of legal status.
Recent establishments account for the majority of single
plant firms. Two thirds of the smaller group of mature firms
are either multi-nationals or UK multi-plants. This may be
partially accounted for by previous attempts to generate a
branch plant economy.
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The functional distributions show a somewhat surprising
prevalence of• the sales/marketing function- not normally
regarded as a strength of British industry. 	 It appears to
correlate strongly with the headquarters function of the
newer firms and could reflect centrality and proximity to the
growing markets of the South East and East Anglia. The
headquarters function is, not unnaturally, associated with
the private company/single plant firms.	 The other "high
order" function, research and development, is similarly
distributed to headquarters but at a considerably lower level
amongst the single plant firms (which raises questions about
their future survival chances). However, amongst the firms
encountered there were at least three "trial plants" devoted
to product and process development (if not primary research)
in various sectors: printing, heating systems and paper
products. There is no evidence that the "enterprise culture"
was instrumental in enouraging this kind of activity- one
industrialist, of the three, positively denied any such
linkage and was highly critical of the entire industrial
support system in Britain. Collectively the manufacturing
and storage functions were of the greatest importance
(particularly product assembly, component production and
assembly, and warehousing). The low levels of importance
given to branch office activity and retailing functions
underline •the previously	 mentioned	 local	 trading
difficulties.
A considerable number of firms indicated that they had not
moved from another location; this suggests the spontaneous
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development of a highly diversified local economy. This
masks the extremely local moves and new subsidiary and branch
plant	 initiatives.	 Only the pre-closure firms show a
majority which have moved from elsewhere,
	 perhaps	 an
indication of the greater industrial mobility prior to the
1980's.
The location of major suppliers shows a distinctly
non-local structure that is a measure of the town's narrow
industrial base and scepticism with regard to the durability
of many of the new finns. Corby and the "rest of the world"
are	 almost equivalent supply sources.	 One established
engineering company refuses to trade with any new firms
because of previous bad experiences in attempting to retrieve
goods sold on credit from liquidators and receivers. Most
firms use supplies from the UK outside the East Midlands,
though the longer established firms • have established more
local sources.	 Post-closure firms exemplify the recent
internationalisation of capital because they are supplied
more from the EC than from Corby (massively so when the rest
of the world is included)
A similar pattern emerges with regards to the location of
major markets for Corby firms except that a smaller element
has international markets than international sources of
supply (a local manifestation of the trade deficit?).
	
Corby
markets are far more important for the newer firms than the
pre-1979 establishments- another.measure of the vulnerbility
referred to above. The newer firms, however, seem more tied
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into the most prosperous UK market area: southern England.
Overall, the rest of the UK, apart from the East Midlands and
the South appears to be the dominant market area for Corby
firms.
The high proportion of (the particularly new) firms whose
distribution network is to other manufacturers suggests the
preponderance of part finished manufacture. A major part of
the high values recorded for distribution elsewhere can be
attributed to direct customer dealings by many of the new
single plant firms. The older and larger firms tend to have
developed more complex distribution networks.
In general, financial aid has proved more popular than
advice.	 The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is the
most prominent source of financial assistance- a measure, not
only, of the degree of certainty involved in regional
development grant attainment but also the fact that Corby
represents the East Midlands only whole example of a
development area in its operational region. Corby tends to
be the focus of attention for the regional office of the DTI
at Nottingham- exemplified by the permanent Corby exhibition
there.	 In its first five years as a recipient of regional
development aid Corby has received 35.835 million pounds
(19.8 million as regional developmnent grant and 15.9 million
as regional selective assistance) . 	 The largest	 single
payment was 4.25 million pounds in selective assistance paid
to RS Components. However, BSC received 3.8 million pounds
after a closure it had initiated itselfl Another major
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beneficiary was British and American Tobacco whose mechanised
leaf handling plant provides only 39 jobs yet received 2.56
million pounds.
	
There appears to be a very high awareness
amongst the Corby firms of ECSC loans, especially the newer
firms.	 Whether this is a function of relative proximity to
Bruxelles or the much vaunted efforts of the District Council
to obtain European assistance is uncertain.
Locational advice is utilised to a far greater degree than
business advice.	 But in general the response to the advice
section of the questionnaire was low, indicative of low
managerial perceptions of the need to take advice (action
amounting to an admission of failure) . 	 The newer single
plant firms are the main recipients of advice, the multiples
and older firms being less receptive.
The locational reasons for establishment in Corby suggest
that out of the newer firms financial incentives get the most
first order preferences but may, even so, well be under-
represented because of the traditional British reluctance to
discuss financial matters. One comment from a music
publisher who had relocated from central London was more
forthcoming;
"this town has nothing to offer, no culture, no nightlife-
nothing- don't kid yourself, the only reason people come to
Corby is money, pure and simple"	 (H.	 Fenton,	 1985
interview)
Site and labour availability are other	 important
cosiderations for many of the firms. The older firms are
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less concerned with financial incentives but stress the value
of site availability, local markets and other personal
factors. It appears that personal reasons are also important
for the smaller new single plant firms.
The company responses to a set of more subjective
questions about responses to the package of advice and
incentives show that most of the newer firms would not have
established in Corby without the package of assistance. 	 The
pre-closure firms did not have such opportunities yet for
three of them (those establishing immediately prior to steel
closure)	 the imminence of development area status was
potentially a determining factor. UK multi-plant firms seem
to be most swayed by the financial implications of coming to
Corby. Many of the smaller single plant (ie often single
person) businesses are dependent on a much more local
selection procedure than the larger firms. The response to
the question on the employment impact of the incentives
received was generally uncertain or negative. The impression
is, then, that the incentives cannot be associated with any
increases in employment. Whether the incentives are crucial
for survival obviously depends on the type of company. More
of the single plant firms needed the incentives to survive
than did not, it was equal for UK multi-plants and
unimportant for most of the multi-nationals.
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4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Corby has had the shortest industrial history of the three
areas studied. It has been the area most amenable to change
(that is the local authority has been the most willing to
abandon the post war consensus and embrace the New Right
ideologies), despite mounting the most vigourous anti-closure
campaign of the three areas. Corby remains distinct from the
surrounding Nothamptonshire towns and villages. 	 The
distinctions are demographic (the Scottishness of the place
remains strong but is being diluted) and sociological (the
description of the town as an "industrial cuckoo in a rural
nest" remains apt, despite the tendency for the East Midlands
to become part of London' s commuter belt). 	 Few of the
incoming company owners from the South East chose to live in
Corby; they prefer the surrounding villages.
	 Corby has
returned a Conservative NP at the the last two General
Elections (1983 and 1987)
A significant difference between Corby and the other steel
closure areas studied was its designation as a New Town
between 1950 and 1980. The problem of over- dependence on a
single industry was identified and some corrective action
attempted (eg the building of the Golden Wonder factory in
1967) well in advance of the closure. After the closure in
1980, the Commission for New Towns was well placed to develop
the nascent industrial property market. The problem, prior
to closure, was that not only Stewarts and Lloyds and British
Steel but also the central government opposed the
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introduction of new male employment; the former couple on
monopolistic grounds and the latter on the grounds that other
places had more urgent regional policy needs. 	 Even so,
significant progress in alternative employment provision had
been achieved before closure.
BSC argued the case for closure on the grounds of
technical problems with low grade local ores (the vast local
quarries also shut in 1980), ingot steel production (rather
than continuous slab), national steel over- capacity and
investment in other areas (notably at Redcar- Lackenby) . BSC
won the case amongst the steel workers with generous
redundancy terms. Some of the most vigourous opposition came
from outside the Works. Corby District Council took swift
and authoritative action after the closure, initiating the
Joint Industrial Development Committee (JIDC) and appointing
a Director of Industry (McClenaghan) . 	 The Industrial
Development Centre was run on small business lines with Corby
as the product for the "hard sell". It was by far the most
professional and commercially	 orientated	 industrial
development establishment encountered during this study (even
more so than the WDA)
Corby has been hailed, and vigourously promotes itself, as
the most successful steel closure area; claiming to have
created over 10,000 jobs since steel closure (to mid- 1987).
Despite this the BSC plant (and its 	 specialist	 tube
subsidiaries) remains the largest employer in the town.
Using the CNT annual census of employment (now the remit of
- 164 -
the District Council) a net gain of only 3,572 since 1981 can
be discerned (.to 1987) . There is a distinct impression that
the "new jobs" total has been accumulating with no reference
to job losses in the interim. The enterprise zone report by
the Department of the Environment (1985-86) shows a 500 job
decline for Corby, most probably as a result of the Commodore
closure. The Commodore closure exemplifies the dangers of
internationalising local economies: several million pounds
were lost to the public purse as this multinational
(supposedly at the forefront of "high technology" industry)
firm took the grants for an assembly plant then rationalized
production in favour of Germany when there was a dip in
demand. The ephemeral nature of the employment scene in
Corby was emphasised during the questionnaire preparation
period. The lists provided by the industrial development
centre were hopelessly outdated, with over 150 firms no
longer occupying the sites as listed. 	 Some industrialists
refused to allow trade credit to newly established firms for
fear of losing money in the likelihood of closure.
It is not only the number of jobs "created" that is
disputable, but also the wages and conditions and, by
implication, the quality of life they represent. The Corby
Personnel Association at the Jobcentre claimed a minimum
unskilled industrial rate of 1.94 per hour (giving 77 pounds
per 40 hour week) yet at the same time a local trades
unionist found wages of 40-60 pounds per week "quite common
in many of the factories" (P. Weston, 1985), even 120 pounds
per fortnight for 116 hours! The Commodore closure was not
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unexpected by Mr Weston and there had been no love lost on
the union side; the US company's hostility to unions extended
to blocking even the ultra-moderate EEPTU's attempt to
organise. The attitude of one unemployed ex-steelworker
(Financial Times, 1987b) appears quite typical:
"I know people today who were in the works with me. 	 Do you
know what they are doing now? They are doing women's jobs-
at 1.85 an hour. after 30 years in the works I don't think I
should have to do a women's job to survive."
Corby's Labour Council has implemented mainstream
Thatcherite initiatives with an ehthusiasm that allows no
criticism. Attendance at a Trades Council forum entitled "Is
Corby really working?" was forbidden in the following manner
by a letter to councillors from the Chief Executive:
"The policy committee agreed to support the recommendation of
the JIDC that both the Council and the Commission for New
Towns should not attend the meeting as they considered it to
be inappropriate at the present time and served no useful
purpose to the continuing regeneration of Corby. In addition
having regard to this decision it was agreed that the Council
Chamber should not be used or made available for the purposes
of this Forum. The Committee further emphasised that as a
confidential item no comment would be made to the media in
respect of these decisions and accordingly all Members of the
Council should be made aware of the position," (signed Duncan
Hall, who was an appointed, not a political, official; 27th
March 1985)
A headline on the front page of that evening's local paper
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read: "Council boycotts jobs summit," so much for secrecy.
The meeting was attended by two Corby councillors who
subsequently had the whip removed by the local Labour group
and suffered nine month suspensions from political activity
in the town. One councillor has been to the high court to
have his case sustained.
It must be stressed that Corby may have the "most
successful enterprise zone by most criteria" (R Tyrn and
partners 1984) and have generated an amount of private sector
industrial property development but unemployment remains
high. The commercial "success" of Corby is not surprising
considering its location as the closest development area to
London and its proximity to the Al and Ml routes.	 It would
have been very odd, in a time of considerable manufacturing
decentralisation away from the capital, if Corby had not
participated in this. The Wonderworld themepark (the great
development hope of the early nineteen eighties) is unlikely
to get much further than the weathering board which marks the
spot, in an abandoned open cast site to the east of the town;
City investors looking for such things are better provided at
Battersea power station. The most telling quotation from
Fred McClenaghan was "many is the time that I think my job is
like pouring water into a leaking barrel" (in Weston, 1985)
In answer to the hypothetical question: "is it possible that
new factories will replace the old industries such as steel
?" Weston replied "if Corby is a guide then the answer must
be a definite 'no' ."
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CHAPTER FIVE
EBBW VALE
"Stand on the massive flank of Mynydd Carn-y-Cefn at
Twynffwrdd, and gaze across the narrow valley to the slopes
of Cefn Manmoel. Below, elbowing its way along the valley
floor for almost three miles, and burrowing its way into the
valley wall in parts, lies the British Steel Corporation Ebbw
Vale Steelworks.	 Beyond and below the steelworks to the
south lies the village of Cwm and the Marine Colliery."
(H. Burgess and Partners, April, 1973)
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5.1	 THE PRE-1930S CONTEXT
Ebbw Vale is one of several "Heads of the Valleys" towns
with long histories of iron and steel production (nearby
Merthyr is another). Initially production was based on local
raw materials; water-power, limestone, ironstone and charcoal
(replaced through the nineteenth century by deep mined coal).
Watkins and Homfrey built the first Ebbw Vale iron furnace in
the 1780's at Beaufort (much of the land was owned by the
Duke of the same name) eventually to be taken over by Bailey
of Nantyglo (a slightly earlier iron site in a neighbouring
valley).	 The Harford family established the Ebbw Vale
Company in 1792 (on the present works site) and were
responsible for promoting the Non-Conformist character of the
area. Other ironworks at Victoria (to the south of the town)
dating from 1837 were absorbed by the Company in 1844. The
Quaker heritage of the Harfords and the Darbys (Abraham Darby
IV succeeded the Harfords in 1842) is reflected in the
present social geography of the town because public houses
were forbidden on Company land but there remains a
concentration of them on Briery Hill, an area owned by less
high minded landlords.
Despite the paternalistic nature of the Ebbw Vale Iron,
Steel and Coal Company (a title confirming its control over
the complete Valley economy) the mid-nineteenth century would
qualify Ebbw Vale for inclusion in Cooke's "radical region"
category. There was considerable local involvement in the
Merthyr Rising (1831), and the Chartist Movement (1839) when
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14000 men from Ebbw Vale marched on Newport to release some
imprisoned strikers. The Company's paternalism was by no
means benign. There were a number of very genuine grievances
over: pay being linked to product prices, the "truck" system
(monopolistic Company shops operating wages credit systems
which meant that no actual cash was paid), and atrocious
working conditions (it is recorded that women and children
continued to work underground in Ebbw Vale 20 years after the
passing of prohibitive legislation).
Employment in coal production tended to be more important
than that in steel production throughout the nineteenth
century. There was a transition from the smaller drift
working at the head of the valley (with the exhaustion of
easily worked seams) to deep mines further down the valley.
The last and only remaining colliery, Marine Cwm, was sunk in
1889 by German mining engineers. 	 It produces high-grade
coking coal.	 Two major pit disasters have occured in Ebbw
Vale, firstly at Victoria No. 1 pit in 1871 (18 deaths) and
secondly at Marine in 1927 (52 deaths) both due to
underground explosions. In 1901 in the Ebbw Vale Urban
District miners outnumbered iron and steelworkers by over 2
to 1 (3,684 to 1,685)
The political transformation from Liberal to Labour was
achieved in 1904 when Tom Richards the sitting M.P. abandoned
the Liberal Party and was returned as a Labour M.P. in the
General Election of the following year (with a majority of
10,250).	 The Labour hegemony has never subsequently been
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interupted. Aneurin Bevan succeeded Richards in 1929.
The first two decades of the twentieth century, although
marking the high point of the area's coal-based economy
(production and population peaked in 1921), were not without
social upheavals- the Riot Act was last read in Ebbw Vale in
1911. At the same time a civic consciousness was evolving;
the town boasted Britain's first electric street lighting in
1908 and Wales's first council house construction in 1909.
The post-Great War depression exposed the real
vulnerability of the Ebbw Vale works. Situated 20 miles from
the coast, 1000 ft. above sea level and with an increasing
reliance upon imported ores (from Northamptonshire or
overseas) the advantages of a coastal site such as was being
developed at Port Talbot were becoming apparent as the world
recession deepened.
	
During the 1920's throughout the Heads
of the Valleys area (from Merthyr to Blaenavon) coal, steel
and tinpiate closures and "temporary stoppages" resulted in
high rates of male unemployment. The closure of the Ebbw
Vale steelworks (which had been employing 6,000 people) in
1929 was by no means an unusual event for the area.	 The
unemployment effects were predictable: Ebbw Vale had a rate
of 35% whilst Brynmawr had a staggering 74% male rate
(Ministry of Labour, 1934)
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5.2 PRE-WAR REGIONAL INITIATIVES
The South Wales section of The Report of Investigations
into the Industrial Conditions in Certain Depressed Areas
(Cmnd. 4728), 1934, was compiled by Lord Portal. 	 He
identified Ebbw Vale as a "black spot" because of record
levels of employment decline derived from the coal and steel
closures, even though neighbouring districts suffered even
higher unemployment rates (Blaina 72% and Abertillery 55%,
both now part of Blaenau Gwent)
A somewhat confusing picture has emerged of the background
to the rebuilding of the Ebbw Vale steel industry in the mid-
to late 1930's.
	
Sir William Firth, chairman of Richard
Thomas & Co. decided on the necessity of rationalising the
British tinplate industry around a recently designed American
wide strip mill.	 He announced plans to establish a new
integrated works at Redbourn in Lincoinshire to utilise the
same type of plentiful. (low grade ores) that had attracted
Stewarts and Lloyds to Corby a few years previously. Such a
move had severe implications for the traditional centres of
the tinplate industry in the south west of industrial Wales
around Swansea and Llanelli. The ambiguity, mentioned above,
arises out of whether Firth's post-hoc rationalisation that
the Lincolnshire plan was a commercial feint or whether, as
is more likely, political pressure (from Lord Baldwin) with
promises of future subsidy was more influential. Whatever
the instigation, the move to Ebbw Vale was unexpected and
greeted with local rejoicing (though not in the traditional
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tinplate areas further west) .	 The Portal "black spot"
designation (the only other being at Blaenavon in the
neighbouring valley) and the change of government attitude
exemplified by the Special Areas Act 1934 probably induced
the intervention. A 40000 signature petition, presented by a
deputation of "commercial, trading and industrial interests
of Monmouthshire" (Times, 23rd October 1935) urged the
government to take steps to reopen the Ebbw Vale steelworks
and was probably significant in drawing attention to the
area. Baldwin claimed responsibility for intervening for
Ebbw Vale himself but there is evidence that Firth was the
first to suggest the town as suitable for his new plant (2nd
Report of the Commissioners for Special Areas 1935-36).
Construction expenses were supported from the public sector
by a consortium of Banks led by the Bank of England (6
million pounds was involved).
The demolition of the old works and construction of the
new (1936-38) employed over 8,000 men but only 3500 were
employed by Richard Thomas when the plant opened in 1938.
The imported Irish construction workers "imparted an unwonted
liveliness to the streets" on Saturday nights (reported the
Mayor of the time).
	
By the outbreak of war 6000 were
employed.	 Ebbw Vale was briefly a British centre of
technological innovation (as previously it had been with the
location for the country's first Bessemer plant): iron and
steel production was integrated with continuous hot and cold
reduction, strip, sheet and tinplate mills.
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The other Heads of the Valley towns (later to form the
Borough of Blaenau Gwent) suffered continuing high levels of
unemployment until the lead up to the 1939 war. Perhaps the
hardest hit town (by the decline of the coal industry) was
Brynmawr where the Society of Friends initiated an experiment
in 1929 by introducing semi-charitable boot and furniture
making to occupy the unemployed. These industrial activities
are still to be found in the town.
Two quotations from the 1938 Ebbw Vale town guide
indicate, in what are now familiar place promotional terms,
the Council's perception of the dangers of dependence upon a
single industry:
"With great natural resources at command, excellent road and
railway communications with all parts of the country, and
quick access to ports of the British Channel, the town has
many unexplored possibilities well worth examination by those
interested in securing sites for new industries, particularly
such as depend upon cheap power, suitable supplies of labour
and first class facilities for importation and exportation"
p.11.
"the air has a mountain freshness, and the keenness of the
climate accordingly breeds an energetic and virile populace"
p.13 (A. Gray Jones).
The last statement must be considered somewhat ludicrous in
terms of its climatic determinism as the population consisted
mostly of migrants; the period between 1891 and 1921 saw a
growth of nearly 75%.
- 175 -
5.3	 THE POST-WAR CONSENSUS: REGIONAL POLICY UNTIL THE 1970S
It is ironic that, as Morgan (1980) suggests, that the
steel industry was not used as a tool for regional policy
after nationalisation as it had been in the 1930's. The Ebbw
Vale locational decision was	 a private sector deal
"encouraged" by the government. Ebbw Vale stands out in that
the works were not denationalised in 1952 with the rest of
the steel industry. Such was the prior commitment of public
funds (see above) that the Ebbw Vale works remained in the
public sector until joined by the other major steel companies
in 1967.
Employment at the works peaked shortly after the end of
the war, at approximately 12,000. By the early 1950's it was
down to 9,000 where it remained for the subsequent twenty
years. Despite designation as a special development area and
always being in receipt of the highest levels of regional aid
available, little was achieved in diversifying the local
economy between the 1940's and 1960's. In Ebbw Vale itself
the only major new employer in this period was Berlei, the
hosiery manufacturer, who have since contracted from the
provision of 400 jobs to about 30 and have faced liquidation.
Tredegar and Brynxnawr, whose reliance on the coal industry
was almost totally eroded during • the 1960's, managed to
attract a few new employers during this period. At one stage
the Dunlop Semtex factory in Brynmawr employed over 3,000
people, it is now an empty listed building, the subject of a
recent public enquiry.	 The Beeching "axe" cut the
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bergavenny to Merthyr heads of the valleys rail link and
brought about the cessation of passenger sevices in the
valley, badly affecting employment as well as tansportation.
The situation thus arose that the Ebbw Vale locality was
increasingly dependent upon the steelworks during a time
(from 1962) when Llanwern (Newport) was being developed as a
preferred coastal location for basic oxygen steelmaking.
Ebbw Vale relied on the outdated open hearth technology.
It appears that whilst the steelworks in Ebbw Vale was
operational, and employing 9,000 at relatively high wages, a
"boomtown" air of complacency prevailed. A branch plant
economy did not develop there.	 It is possible, although
there is little hard evidence to prove it, that the Richard
Thomas Baidwins Company and later BSC took active measures to
discourage the provision of alternative, competing male
employment during the 1950's and 1960's when many firms
decentralised from the South East and West Midlands. The
only major employer to come to Ebbw Vale at this time
employed predominantly women. The town and district remained
reliant upon the "Works" until after the end of steelmaking.
Before embarking on an analysis of the closure, the
agencies and issues involved in the subsequent attraction of
industry to Ebbw Vale, it is worth establishing the
industrial structure and labour market conditions immediately
prior to the closure announcement. The consultants' impact
study (I-I. Burgess and Partners, 1973) identified six major
employers who accounted for 90% of the employment in the Ebbw
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Vale Urban District in 1972: BSC- 9,000, NCB-Marine Colliery-
630, Monmouthshire County Council (Education)- 470, Ebbw Vale
UDC- 420, and Construction firms (Hecketts, Birds etc)- 600.
The residential distribution of BSC workers shows the
dominance of Ebbw Vale and Tredegar but the importance of the
works for some of the smaller settlements, particularly
Brynmawr (467 BSC employees) and Nantyglo-Blaina (374),
cannot be over stressed.	 In 1970, 59% of the 9343 BSC
employees lived in Ebbw Vale, 19% in Tredegar, 5% in
Bryninawr, 4% in Nanrtyglo-Blaina, 3.2% in Abergavenny, 2.8%
in Abertillery, 2.4% in Rhyinney-Pontlottyn-Bargoed, 1.7% in
Merthyr and 2.7% elsewhere. The study identified a 9:1 ratio
of dependency of public to private sector industry in Ebbw
Vale.
Between 1966 and 1971 there were 15 new industrial
establishments in the Ebbw Vale Travel To Work Area (6 in
Ebbw Vale Urban District), providing an employment total of
790 (410 female and 380 male jobs) . This was at a time of
increasing regional development activity. The impact study
suggested that instead of creating 100 jobs per year (as in
the previous seven years) 1000 per year would now be required
for the four subsequent years. The study offered few ideas
as to how to cater for the predominantly male workforce
likely to be made redundant.
The age structure of the BSC workers is also of note
because it shows a relatively youthful distribution and thus
any effects of "natural wastage", through early retirement,
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will be minimised (even if 55 rather than 60 is taken as the
retirement age). The age structure immediately prior to
closure (December, 1972) was: under 18 years- 2.8% (254
workers), 18-21 years- 7.1% (638), 21-26 years- 	 12.4%
(1,122),	 26-41 years- 29.8% (2698), 41-46 years-10.4% (944),
46-55 years- 20.9% (1,887), 55-60 years- 9.7% (874), 60 and
over- 6.9% (624), total workforce- 9,041. Even in 1972 the
steel industry accounted for 25% of male school leaver
employment for Ebbw Vale and Abertillery and over 50% of the
apprenticeships (64/117). The average weekly earnings of BSC
workers	 (production,	 maintenance	 and ancillary) were
considerably higher at Ebbw Vale than the national averages
for manufacturing, coal and other industries in 1972: BSC-
40.20, NCB- 30.00, GB adult male manufacturing (manual)-
33.60, GB adult male all industries- 32.10.
The rateable value of the parts of the works to be closed,
stood, in 1972 at 341,775 pounds i.e. 49% out of a works
total of 702500 pounds (a figure which in turn represented
50% of the Urban District's total rateable value). Thus the
closure equated to a direct loss to the local authority of
between 25 and 30% of its rateable income (its major source
of funding) . The compensation for the loss of rates due to
steel closure proved only to be of short term duration.
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5.4	 THE SECOND STEEL CLOSURE IN 50 YEARS; A GRADUAL AFFAIR
The nationalisation of the rest of the steel industry in
Britain and, more significantly, the subseqent reorganisation
from regional to product group control in 1970 (Ebbw Vale was
moved from the South Wales Group to form part of the Strip
Mills Division- thus becoming more vulnerable 	 to
rationalisation on capacity rather than regional grounds),
made possible the dreaded events that had been the subject of
speculation over the previous decade. It is not the remit of
this study to examine in great depth the reasons for closure
(see, for example, Sadler, 1984) of inland sites, but a
number of technical and economic factors had been causing
concern throughout	 the	 1960's.	 These included: the
exhaustion of local ores and limestone, distance from deep
water access for bulk carriers, increasing international
competition for domestic steel markets, the technological
inferiority of the open hearth process compared with basic
oxygen steelmaking (BOS) and a continuing lack of investment
in new plant.
Lord Melchett (BSC Chairman) made the first announcement
on the future of Ebbw Vale in 1970 as he opened the new ore
terminal at the Port Talbot works, where basic oxygen
steelmaking (BOS) had just been introduced. Bulk iron and
steelmaking had no long term future in Ebbw Vale, but the
changes announced would only result in the loss of 1,000 jobs
because of new investment in tinplating.	 This has to be
viewed in the light of the expansive national plans BSC had
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at the time.	 However, only two years later (16th November
1972) at a meeting with the Ebbw Vale Works Council Lord
Melchett announced more drastic measures. 	 The scale and
timing of closures was far more serious than first imagined;
the blast furnaces were to close in 1975, the open hearth
furnaces in 1976 and the hot strip mill "before 1980". These
would be partially compensated for by 50 million pounds worth
of investment in tinplating, creating only 400 jobs. 	 The
workforce was to be halved to 4,500 over the eight year
period. New job opportunities, eg 200 at Lianwern, would
arise at the two expanding coastal sites. The BSC press
release of the time is a model of assured social concern, a
reflection of the widely held belief that mass unemployment
had been controlled and that foresight was all that was
needed:
"This forward planning by the Corporation in relation to Ebbw
Vale will ensure that a reasonable period of time exists to
enable all concerned with social and regional policies to
take steps to provide alternative job opportunities for those
affected.	 This will involve both the Corporation and
Government agencies, in London and in Wales, and the steps
will include the maximum degree of redeployment and the
provision of alternative work and new industry in the area,"
(quoted in Burgess & Partners, 1973)
The Ebbw Vale announcement was the first indication of
BSC's ten year development strategy for the concentration of
steelmaking in 5 sites (including Llanwern and Port Talbot).
This strategy was confirmed by Cmnd.5226 in February 1973,
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which also outlined attempts to alleviate the
	
social
consequences of closure.
	 There would be significant job
losses elsewhere in Wales (6500 at Shotton, 4500 at East
Moors Cardiff) . 	 The implications of the other closures for
the nascent place market were not lost in Ebbw Vale- as the
consultants impact study noted caustically:
"Significantly, however the case for special government
action and intervention in Ebbw Vale to provide alternative
job opportunities, and its likely success, has thus been
greatly jeopardised at the outset by the competing claims for
resources by other steel towns similarly affected or
potentially similarly affected," (H. Burgess and Partners,
1973)
The Urban District Council's (with the NP Michael Foot,
who had superseded Bevan, in 1960) response to the closure
proposals of November 1972 was to embark on a dual course of
action. With the Works Council efforts were made to retain
an integrated steelworks at Ebbw Vale. The second course,
seemingly inconsistent with the former, was to lobby the
Corporation and the Government to put back the dates of the
proposed closures to allow time for reindustrialization.
The review of the Corporation's closure plans undertaken
by Lord Beswick on the installation of the Labour government
in 1974 offered no temporary salvation for the Ebbw Vale
works. On February 9th 1975 the council of the newly formed
Borough of Blaenau Gwent (consisting of the Urban Districts
of Ebbw Vale,	 Tredegar,	 Abertillery,	 Brynmawr and
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Nantyglo/Blaina) met and accepted the closure proposals.
Michael Foot •and John Morris, Secretary of State for Wales,
addressed the meeting, and had the dificult task of
demonstrating that opposition was "unrealistic" and that the
government was committed to	 "no redundancies without
alternative employment". The Labour Secretary of State said
that there was "no viable alternative" to confirmation of the
Corporation's plans. Reindustrialization- the attraction of
"new industry to the area to provide alternative employment"-
was the top priority for government departments. Ebbw Vale
would be "more equal than other" Welsh areas.	 Mr.	 Morris
announced that since 1972, seven firms had moved to the area
(including Alfred Teves, Midland Oil, and Control Data) and
that a further five (including Winstone Rollers and BSC
Coated Strip Products) had yet to begin operations. 1950 jobs
were	 in the "pipeline", of which 1350 were for men.
Accordingly "never again would there be total dependence upon
one employer".	 Throughout the meeting the need for
industrial diversification was stresed, as was the obligation
of the government and the Corporation to provide alternative
jobs. This echoes the sentiments as reported by Lord Portal
(1934, s.V para. 3) that Welsh councils "go as far as to say
that the Government should be in a position to compel people
starting new industries to do so in their districts". The
magniloquence of Mr. Foot's conclusion has evaded even the
minute-taker's blunting: "the choice is not whether we accept
the closures but whether we accept a lingering death,
thinking of the past,	 or work	 for an industrial
resurrection". On 4th April 1975 the first blast furnace was
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shut down. On the 19th April a further 700 BSC employees
were given termination of employment notices: what was to be
a lengthy closure process had begun.
5.5 THE EXPERIENCE OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION
5.5.1 Trends in Employment and Unemployment
The NOMIS data shown for Blaenau Gwent (it includes the
Abergavenny rural area for the employment and late
unemployment data due to problems in maintaining consistent
geographical areas over the time period) in table 5.1 shows,
like that for Hartlepool, that reindustrialization has not
been notably successful. The total workforce continues to
decline in numbers (by nearly 20% between 1971 and 1984).
The level of unemplyment has fallen but remains stubbonly
high and well above the national average. The time delay on
receipt of employment data means that 1987 figures to compare
with unemployment will not be available for •some time.
Certainly the latest round of colliery closures (1987-88)
will have a marked effect on the total employed in Blaenau
Gwent and the privatisation of British Steel could mean the
end of tinplate production at the Ebbw Vale works.
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5.5.2 The Agencies Involved
1975 was a bumper year for agency formation with both the
Welsh Development Agency (WDA) and British Steel Corporation
(Industry)	 (BSC(I))	 coming	 into	 existence.	 BSC(I)'s
mainfestation in Ebbw Vale was very much an endorsement of
the locally determined strategy to provide alternative
employment as outlined by Michael Foot. The purpose of the
BSC subsidiary wa defined in simple but idealistic terms:
"the company has a single mandate, which is to create jobs in
designated steel closure areas. Its ultimate task (stemming
from a sense of social responsibility) is to safeguard the
well being of these communities affected by industrial
change" (press release 1984) .
	 In Ebbw Vale the BSC(I)
involvement stemmed from the New Jobs Team, established in
1971, under the aegis of the Board Member for Social
Responsibility.	 The notion of
	
social	 responsibility,
currently exemplified by the Business In The Community
Movement, was aduxnbrated in Ken Jones' "The Human Face of
Change- social responsibility and rationalisation at British
Steel", in 1974.	 BSC(I)'s activities have since 	 been
regarded as little more than of palliative value. At the
height of its influence (1978-1984) BSC(I) in Blaenau Gwent
was providing loans, grants, industrial land, managed
workshops and the wages of the Director of the Business
Advisory Centre.
	
In this period BSC(I) dealt with over 50
firms involving an expenditure of over 1.5 million pounds.
The only direct provision of employment by BSC(I) has been at
the small workshop units which were designed to provide local
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entrepreneurial stimulus rather than a panecea for the
locality.	 The 19 units at Brynmawr, BSC(I)'s smallest
workshops in Britain and located in a converted sports
centre, provide employment for a total which fluctuates
between 50 and 60. Small businesses are encouraged to leave
as they "expand into new premises". Since 1984 BSC(I) has
reverted to direct control by the Corporation but has had to
operate on a self financing basis. The effects of this, in
Blaenau Gwent and the other "opportunity areas" have been the
termination of all grant activity, a marked diminution in
loan activity (BSC(I) has become a "lender of last resort")
and that the rates of interest compare unfavourably with
those commercially available. Nationally, the job creation
claims of BSC(I) are almost impossible to verify (a figure of
90,000 jobs assisted has been put forward) but at the local
scale the social conscience of the Corporation appears to
have expired. Imitation of BSC(I), even to the point of
commerciality, has been a recent feature of other declining
nationalised industries (eg British Shipbuilders and British
Coal- NCB) . Further evaluation of BSC(I) will be undertaken
later.
The Welsh Development Agency (WDA) formally came into
existence on 1st January 1976.	 The first calls for a
regional investment agency came from the Welsh Labour Party
in 1968 and were followed by demands from Plaid Cwmru for a
national development agency principally to exercise control
over capital. The practical interpretation of the statutory
obligations of the Agency proved to be non-interventionary,
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but there was considerable Conservative Party anxiety over
the allowance "to establish and carry on new industrial
undertakings".	 Morgan (1980) has noted that the agency
preferred to operate in alliance with existing enterprise
rather than actually take equity in companies. The Welsh
Development Agency Act, 1975, charged the public body to:
"a) further the economic development of Wales or any part of
Wales and, in that connection, to provide, maintain, or
safeguard employment;
b) to promote industrial efficiency and international
competitiveness in Wales;
c) to further the improvement of the environment in Wales,
having regard for existing amenity."
The first two (a) and b) are implicitly contradictory
(manufacturing efficiency being usually associated with
employment reductions) . 	 The "completely new role 	 in
stimulating industrial development and employment in Wales"
(WDA, Annual Report, 1976) never materialised. 	 The self-
analysis of the first 5 years of WDA operation demonstrated
the Agency's view of its priorities:
"the task set us by Parliament was to make Wales a more
prosperous country- by developing industrial estates and
sites, building factories, investing in new and expanding
enterprises in Wales, providing business advisory services
and promoting Wales as a location for industrial development-
and by sweeping away industrial dereliction and improving the
environment, to create a still more pleasant and attractive
land," (WDA, 1981)
Employment generation, despite the statutory requirement, is
- 188 -
definitely secondary: "in so doing we have helped to create
11,000 jobs with prospects for a further 9,000... .We have
responded quickly to redundancies in the steel industry by
launching programmes to build more than 400 extra factories
in order to attract new job opportunities to these hard hit
parts of Wales" (WDA 1981) . 	 Blaenau Gwent was the first
steel closure area to be granted "special project" status for
advance factory building for 48 units (464,000 sqaure feet)
in 1978.	 The agency absorbed and accelerated projects that
were already going ahead with BSC(I), County and Borough
council support; e.g.
	
Rassau and Tafarnaubach industrial
estates.
If a more than merely nominal usage of the term "agency"
is adopted the Welsh Office, County and Borough Councils must
all be given consideration with regard to industrial
development and promotion.	 Each has an industrial
development role which it is keen to demonstrate does not
overlap with the others.
The Welsh Office came into being in 1964, headed by a
Minister (Secretary of State) of Cabinet rank. It gradually
assumed all the central government roles apart from Defence
and Health and Social Security. Its particular importance,
in this context, continues to be the handling of regional
policy measures (RDG's and RSA's) which form the bulk of
financial aid to industry- over 40 million pounds to the Ebbw
Vale development area since the 1972 Industry Act came into
force.	 Claims that 2,500 jobs were established because of
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Welsh Office involvement in Ebbw Vale between 1973 and 198].
will be examined below.
Gwent County Council, the strategic planning authority for
Blaenau Gwent (first strategic plan using 1976 data finally
approved by 1981) operates a small industrial development
section. The county publishes a glossy "high tech" style
promotional brochure as well as taking advertising space in
the national press. It adopts a "professional" approach to
the various enquiring company	 "projects", acting as
coordinating consultant.
It	 is,	 however, the Blaenau Gwent Borough Council
Industrial Development Committee (IDC) which has come to
dominate the reindustrialization programme in Ebbw Vale and
the surrounding towns that make up BSC(I)'s "opportunity
area".	 Sources in the Welsh Office have described the
Blaenau Gwent Council as "the most progressive in Wales" in
terms of giving priority to industry (interview 1986).
Certainly the IDC is one of the largest and most active
committees in the Borough, with the Chairman and his deputy
having complete executive powers. 	 The minutes of the
Monitoring Committee (chaired by the Welsh Office but
including representatives of BSC and all the other agencies
mentioned above) indicate the determined bargaining stance
undertaken by the Councillors for every scrap of economic
assistance that can be mustered.	 The chairman of the
committee has been quoted in the local press as saying that
he would "sell his grandmother" (Blaenau Gwent Gazette, April
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1986) to attract new industry. The motivation behind this
devotion to industrial development is the perception of the
threat to the existence of the Valley communities that
further	 deindustrialization	 represents.	 It	 is	 not
inconceivable	 that	 the	 desire	 for institutional
self-perpetuation has overridden the	 radical	 socialist
traditions of the area despite continued electoral support
for the Labour Party.	 The establishment of a local
development agency was not, as might first be supposed,
prohibited on ideological grounds (i.e. as a tool of the
Thatcherite enterprise culture) but on the grounds that
control of certain functions might be lost by the elected
representatives.	 The keenness of the industrial development
committee to promote Blaenau Gwent has resulted in occasional
over enthusiasm. Speculative enquiries from industrialists,
instead of being delt with in a quiet commercially confident
manner, are often greeted by a daunting delegation of maybe
15 experts ready to convince them of the location's
attractions.
5.5.3 The recent historical impact of reindustrialization
It is no surprise that precise information regarding
factory closures, liquidations, and job losses is difficult
to obtain.	 Such information counters the careful image
building of the place promoters; that theirs is the ideal
location for profitable business. It is worth remembering
that in many cases the number of jobs lost at closure is
considerably fewer than previously existed when the plant was
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in full production. It is also a fact that some firms take
on higher numbers of staff than they can sustain in order to
qualify for certain grant aid.	 The annual census of
employment (from NOMIS) provides a fairly accurate picture of
employment change by minimum list heading (MLH) until 1981.
For the four constituent amalgamated office areas comprising
the Blaenau Gwent steel closure area the change between 1975
and 1981 was ranked and the top and bottom 5 cases and totals
summarised as follows in table 5.2.
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TABLE 5.2
Employment Change 1975-1981
MALE
	 Change
1 .Electronic
2.Motor Vehicle
3.Textile Machinery and accessories	 +902
4.Wholesale Food and Drink
5.Furniture and Upholstery
5 . Construction
4.Other mechanical engineering
3.Local government service 	 -1,992
2.Linoleum, plastic floor covering
1.Iron and steel (genera1)	 -4,669
TOTAL MALE ALL MLH'S CHANGE 19,837-13, 604 = -6,233
FEMALE
1 .Electronic Computers
2.Medical and Dental serviths
3.Construction	 +930
4.Other services
5.Motor Vehicle manufacture
5.Retail food and drink distribution
4.Linoleum, plastic & floor covering
3.Educational services	 -1,108
2.Men & boys tailored outerwear
1.Iron & steel (general)	 -395
FEMALE TOTALS ALL MLH'S CHANGE 8,654 - 7,742 = -902
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Table 5.2 (continued)
ALL WORKERS	 Change
1 .Electronic computers
2.Motor Vehicle manufacture
3.Medical & dental services	 +1, 629
4.Furniture & Upholstery
5.Other services
5 .Educational services
4.Other mechanical engineering nes
3.Local government service	 -2,489
2.Linoleuxn, plastic & floor covering
1.Iron & steel (general) 	 -5,064
ALL WORKERS TOTAL ALL MLH'S CHANGE 28,491 - 21,356 = -7,135
Table 5.2 demonstrates the problems encountered in Blaenau
Gwent during the first few years of reindustrialization
activity. The most alarming feature of these figures is that
in no single case does the number of jobs "created"
compensate for the numbers lost even outside the steel
industry. This is also true for female employment which
during this period provided nearly 60% of the new jobs. The
major element missing from these statistics is the coal
industry which was, in this district, going through a
surprisingly stable period employing a consistent 3,430. Two
of the four pits that this represents (Abertillery New Mine
and Rose Heyworth) have been shut since 1981, Six Bells will
soon (1987/1988) close leaving only Marine Cwm (employing
700) operational. The workforce at the NCB central workshops
at Tredegar has been halved to approximately 200.
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The European Regional Development Fund submission by EM
Government (ERDF, 1986) provides some information for travel
to work areas (TTWA) which means that Blaenau Gwent is now
included in the more prosperous agricultural area of
Abergavenny, but manufacturing information should not be too
distorted. In Elaenau Gwent/Abergavenny the 23 manufacturing
plants known to have opened since May 31st 1981 (and are
still in production, mid-1986) employed
	 1,050	 people.
Manufacturing plants known to have closed which were in
production before 31st May 1981 number 26 and had a peak
employment of 2,400.	 These figures, therefore, do not
include those plants which have established and shut since
May 1981, i.e. some of the more short-lived and volatile
firms. In these categories for South Wales only Newport
shows any job gain (but a fall of 91 in the number of
plants). The totals for industrial South Wales shows 152
plants still in production employing 6,700 against 250
closures employing	 22,400	 Blaenau	 Gwent's	 industrial
experiences are by no means atypical of its sub-region.
5.5.4 Current activity- the Agencies
The most striking recent change in the South Wales
industrial development scene has been the November 1984
changes in regional development measures. There have been
reductions in the percentages of grants available for capital
expenditure (from 22% to 15% in special development,now
development, areas such as Blaenau Gwent) .	 The impact in
Ebbw Vale of the new ujob creation' qualifications has been
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particularly felt by BSC Tiriplate, who had received, under
the old system. 15.5 million pounds (62% of the RDG total for
Blaenau Gwent 1975-86) for the new tinplating and galvanising
plants, but now qualify for much less. 	 This is a further
disincentive for BSC to remain in Ebbw Vale. The spatial
implications for smaller firms are slightly more favourable
for the Heads of the Valleys area. The M4 coastal plain area
ktwen Newport and CrdWff
	 (traditionally the most
attractive part of South Wales for inward investment; see
Morgan, 1980) has been downgraded to intermediate status
therefore not qualifying for RDG's but oriiy for Selective
Assistance. This has led to a reversal of the early 1980's
situation where there was an excessive number of empty
advance factories; the Borough and County Councils now have
to lobby the WDA for an accelerated factory building
programme. Both tiers of local government have reported that
a number of industrialists have gone elsewhere because of a
lack of suitable factory accommodation, but verification of
this has proved impossible. Regional financial assistance
has been coming into Blaenau Gwent at a rate of 4 million
pounds per year since 1975 (this only incudes the figures
published by area- RDG and RSA). The new 15% ceiling (or
3,000 pounds per job) may well have been expected to reduce
this. However the reverse appears to have been the case, the
1984 changes were quite widely debated and thus publicised,
to the extent that take up of regional development grants,
particularly by smaller firms, exceeded expectations, causing
a temporary moratorium on this expenditure. The Welsh Office
and Gwent County recommend the capitalisation of factory
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costs (a calculation involving construction costs, rent and
area occupied) •to increase the amount of qualifying equity.
European Community money is available, but has in
practice, proved hard to obtain. The interest rates offered
by the European Investment Bank are not commercially
competitive, though other commercial European Banks currently'
offer rates that undercut most British sOurces. The European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) loans, only available in
designated coal or steel closure areas (Blaenau Gwent is
both) are sourced from central Community funds and have been
subject to delays and suspensions (particularly as the Common
Agricultural Policy continues to denude the Community of
funds) .	 An example of the problems local to Ebbw Vale was
experienced by Yuasa Batteries. ECSC freezing of loans in
mid-1986 caused this Japanese firm to seek help from
NCB(Enterprise); the coal industry's "job creation arm"
responded by providing its first million pound loan.
A large	 questiorixnark	 remains	 over the	 continued
involvement of BSC(I)- outside its small workshop units at
Bryrunawr- because in 1987 the contract to employ the Business
Advisory Centre DiLector expired and the intention is to
halve the declining financial commitment to loan provision.
The increasing trend for BSC(I) and the other "lenders of
last resort" is to syndicate loans; ie spread the risk
amongst a number of donor bodies- eg NCB(E) and the County
Council. It is claimed that the NCB(E) imitation of BSC(I)
evolved in South Wales (interview with Tony Fox, NCB(E) local
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manager) .
	 NCB(E) was founded in 1984 and has a dual role:
the provision of loans and the provision of coal board land
for industrial activity (though little has actually been
achieved). NCB(E) (now known as British Coal (Enterprise))
has converted far more rapidly to commerciality than BSC(I)
by progressively tightening demands for loan security for all
but the smallest amounts. Both agencies experience problems
being "lenders of last resort" because of the poor quality of
the firms encountered- these are distinctly not of the "blue
chip" variety. "We are operating at the margin, sometimes
below the margin"- Tony Fox, NCB(E) local representative
(interview 1986)
The Blaenau Gwent Borough Council- described as "the most
switched on" Council by a County Officer- has a (1986) glossy
"Action Valley" promotional presentation. It highlights the
borough's special set of industrial initiatives. 	 Economic
development grants offer up to 2,500 pounds for firms too
small to qualify for regional development assistance. 	 The
business improvement scheme offers a 15% top up (of the 55%
already provided by central government) for the cost of
feasibility studies and business plans. Employment subsidies
(in conjunction with the EC) provide firms with 30% of the
wages of new employees (up to a total of 70 per annum in the
Borough) for the first 6 months of employment. 	 Facilities
for specialised training are available at the Opportunities
Centre- an ex-Skillcentre the Council took over when the MSC
withdrew.	 Other, more standard, incentives include the
provision of housing for key workers and the negotiation of
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"competitive" terms for factory units and sites.	 The
imminent dissolution of the current industrial development
team has been brought about by the withdrawl of funding of
the Business Advisory Centre's Director by BSC(I) and changes
in councillors. This has led to a reopening of the debate on
the formation of a development agency through the
establishment of an Enterprise Trust (despite the ill-fated
Neath Business Venture, as a local model)
5.5.5 Current Activity- The impacts upon Industry and Employment
Much of the information in this section is derived from a
questionnaire survey of 90 firms undertaken in Blaenau Gwent
in February 1986, a reponse rate of 66%.
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TABLE 5.3.
Survey Employment Types
WORKER TYPE
	 All Firms	 (90)	 Pre-1975(l2)	 Post 1975(78)
Total Workers	 5,807	 3,560	 2,247
Fuiltime Male
	 4,717	 3,132	 1,585
Fuiltime Female	 907	 413	 494
Parttime Male	 29	 3	 26
Parttime Female
	 69	 8	 61
Temp. Male	 36	 0	 36
Temp. Female	 21	 4	 17
Table 5.3 reemphasises what has already been stated; the incoming
jobs fail to redress the balance of even the non-steel sector job
losses over the period.	 In fact the new jobs do not even
compensate for the 3,200 jobs lost in the mining industry since
1981 in Blaenau Gwent.
The BSC Ebbw Vale Works is still by far the largest employer
in the Borough of Blaenau Gwent with 2,086 workers.	 The second
largest private employer- Control Data,	 now the Xidex
Corporation, was in the midst of a takeover at the time of the
questionnaire and did not complete it. As elsewhere (eg NCB
Workshops, Tredegar) reticence to participate in such an
innocuous study proved ominous for jobs. 	 The computer disk
manufacturer announced a 200 reduction in employees (temporaries
mainly) to leave 900 remaining. Despite massive reductions the
third largest employer is still the NCB at Marine Colliery with a
total of 726 (this has shown a slight rise with the redeployment
of men from neighbouring pits) .	 The next largest industrial
employer has only 226 workers.
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The reliance upon the traditional sectors, albeit in much
reduced states, has not been challenged. It is unlikely to
be, at any rate by Xidex, because of the nature of the
Brynmawr company's product and the takeover's implications
for its previously philanthropic management style (a sense of
social responsibility is held to be partly responsible for
its original- 1978- location decision) . The company only has
one product- computer disks for mainframes- at Brynxnawr but
this is rapidly being superseded by micro-technology. 	 It
remains to be seen whether the new Californian owners will
re-equip the plant in Blaenau Gwent, the portents are not
promising.	 Table 5.4 (table A) gives the questionanaire
responses in tabular form.
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TPBLEA
	
Ffl	 FIRMS
BLAEAU	 r
	
ALL	 ESThBLISHED EBLISHED
FIRMS	 BEEDRE	 _____
1CSURE
1. Legal Status plc	 7	 3	 4
private canpany	 58	 5	 53
subsidiary	 13	 2	 11
other	 12	 2	 10
2. Structure of multinational 	
cii)
	
3	 9
	
Organisation UK multiplant	 5	 18
single plant	 53	 2	 51
other	 2	 2	 0
3. Furticzs	 headquarters	 36	 0	 36
r&d	 28	 0	 28
branch office	 16	 4	 12
services (office) 	 33	 2	 31
sales/marketing 	 36	 2	 34
raw materials processing 	 43	 4	 39
caTTxDnent production	 30	 4	 26
catlpDnent assiibly	 25	 3	 22
final product assembly 	 45	 5	 40
ware1using	 42	 5	 37
retailing	 13	 2	 U
other	 17	 3	 14
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TTBLEA
	 FI	 FIM
BIU EN
	 ALJ	 ESTABLID EABLISHED
FIRMS	 BEDRE	 PFrER
CLOSURE	 CLOSURE
4.!bvers fran	 yes	 26
	 3	 23
Arther	 60
	 8	 52
ocaticxi	 other	 3	 0	 3
5. Suppliers by Blaenau Gwent
	 22	 1	 21
Locatial	 Wales	 63	 6	 57
UK	 168	 25	 143
EC	 33	 2	 31
rest of world	 17	 1	 16
6.Main Markets Blaenau Gwent	 19
	
3	 16
by location Gwent	 21	 5	 16
neighbourir counties 	 19	 3	 16
Wales	 23	 4	 19
UK
	 60	 7
	 53
EC	 24	 4	 19
rest of world	 17	 2	 15
7.Distribution direct to custaner	 64
	
7
	 57
Network	 direct to retailer 	 24
	 2	 22
to waretouses	 8	 1
	
7
other manufacturers 	 11	 1
	 10
arther division of firm	 8	 1
	 7
elsewhere	 6
	 0
	 6
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TABLE A
BINU EN
8. Floynit	 raained stable
thange in	 increased
past year	 decreased
	
FIRMS	 Ffl
	
ML	 EBLISHED ES'rABLI
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 ____
	
CLOSURE	 CLOSURE
	
29	 5	 24
	
43	 2	 41
	
10	 3	 7
9. Finaixial Aid banks
arxl Advice by BSC(I)
Agecy	 Borough of Blaenau Owent
Qiamber of Carinerce
EC
EIB
ESF
Dept.of Eloyment
Dept.of Environnent
Dept.of Trade & Industry
IcFC
MSC
Small Firms Service
WDA
Welsh Office
other
aid ads,
28 11
11 5
18 17
	
0	 2
	
9	 1
	
2	 0
	
2	 0
	
1	 3
	
0	 2
	
7	 3
	
2	 0
	
7	 6
	
0	 4
29 18
31 15
	
3	 2
	
aid adr
	 aid adv
O	 0	 28	 11
0	 0	 1].	 5
0	 0	 18	 17
0	 0	 0	 2
O	 0	 9	 1
0	 0	 2	 0
O	 0	 2	 0
O	 0	 1	 3
O	 0	 0	 2
O	 0	 7	 3
O	 0	 2	 0
2	 0	 5	 6
O	 0	 0	 4
2	 0	 27	 18
1	 0	 30	 15
O	 0	 3	 2
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ThBLEA	 FIRS	 FI
BLU	 r	 AlL	 BLISHED ESTABIISHED
FIRMS	 BEFORE	 AFPER
CLOSURE	 CLOSURE
10. Financial Aid Cash Grants:
byType	 RDG	 52	 5	 47
RSA	 22	 0	 22
NSA -sectoral	 0	 0	 0
-support for inixvation	 1	 0	 1
-rx-sectora1	 0	 0	 0
enterprise a1lociance	 3	 0	 3
local autlrity	 14	 0	 14
L Interest Loans:
ESC	 14	 0	 14
EIB	 3	 0	 3
local authority	 1	 0	 1
a11 firms guarantee 	 3	 0	 3
BSC( I)	 9	 0	 9
other	 8	 0	 8
Advance factory units:
WDA	 30	 0	 30
local aut1rity	 8	 0	 8
other	 2	 0	 2
Business Expansion Schane 	 2	 0	 2
Venture Capital	 3	 0	 3
other	 7
	 1	 6
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	3
	
0	 3
	
12	 0	 12
	
3
	 0	 3
	
1
	 0	 1
ThBLEA	 FIRS	 FI
BLAEU qENr	 ALL	 EBLISIThD ES'rABLISHED
FflLS	 BEFORE	 AFTER
CLOSURE	 CLOSURE
11.. Tdvice Locaticri:
UK
Region
local area
site
Financial package
Firm:
creation
grth
survival
other
	8 	 1	 7
	
14	 0	 14
	
14	 0	 14
	
12
	
0
	
12
	
2
	
0
	
2
12. Would you have	 yes	 31	 4	 27
established here	 r	 44	 3	 41
without incentives ? other	 9	 5	 4
13.Have the incentives yes	 31	 2	 29
increased	 43	 7	 36
iloynnt?	 other	 9
	
3
	
6
14.Have the incentives yes	 32	 2
	
30
been crucial for	 rx	 43	 7	 36
besiness survival? other	 8	 3	 5
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Of the 90 firms in the survey only 12 pre-date 1975, the
beginning of• steel closure and the intensification of
reindustrialization efforts. Tinplating and coal dominate
the traditional, male labour market. 	 Although the newer
firms employ more female labour than their predecessors (it
would be difficult for them to employ less!), they still
employ three times more men than women. This is something of
a Contrast to the few "light" manufacturing firms which
arrived before 1975 that tended to employ more women than
men.	 This could variously be explained by the BSC's
relaxation of controls on incoming male empoyers,	 the
"success" of the agencies in attracting male employers or the
withdrawl of women from the labour market when their husbands
become unemployed	 (associated with qualification for
benefits) . Low wage rates, small firm size and technical
change may well explain the low numbers of temporary and
part-time workers in the area because the lower overall costs
of employing full time workers outweigh the training and
administrative costs of the other categories.	 The average
basic weekly rate for "factory operatives" (May 1985) in
Blaenau Gwent, according to the County Council, was 70 pounds
(5 pounds less than for shop assistants) . With such low
wages employers gain little in terms of National Insurance
advantage (a major reason for employing part-timers) and,
especially if a small firm, lose much in extra administration
costs.	 The increasing capital intensity of production
(implying a need to run machines longer to sustain
profitability)	 coupled with	 duplication of training
difficulties mitigate in favour of full-time employment
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(albeit for fewer people)
The size distribution of the firms is highly skewed. Over
1/3rd (35%) of the firms surveyed employ fewer than 10
people, and over 1/2 (55%) employ fewer than 20 people. A
mere 11% employ over 100 persons.
	 There is a distinct
temporal element to the size inbalance: 69% of the firms
surveyed were established in Blaenau Gwent since 1980 but
they account for a mere 24% of the survey workforce. As the
DTI(1986) presentation to the ERDF, see above, suggests, the
newer but smaller firms are most vulnerable to closure and
liquidation.	 Indeed their vulnerability is often a
fundamental reason for their development area status
requirement in the first place, because they cannot be
sustained without subsidy.	 Thus it is that an already
weakened local economy can be further undermined by the
importation (especially if it involves local inter-trading)
of firms susceptible to closure.
The companies responding to the questionnaire showed a
marked reluctance to admit to employment decline over the
year 1985-86. Most of the growth experienced was by the new
firms, but so too was most of the stability. The latter is
most likely to be a reflection of the small firm sector's
major management dilemma- the "small is beautiful" ethos that
mitigates against expansion. The admission of stability can
be a precursor to decline or closure. 	 Of the decreases
actually admitted to, there is a slight concentration amongst
the more recent UK multi-plant firms, highlighting the
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continuing problems for UK capital and the vulnerabilit y of
branch plants '(associated with external control, "management
by motorway" and the attendant liability of the
rationalisation of peripheral plants)
In terms of the legal status of participating firms, most,
predictably, were private companies. No cooperatives were
recorded- possibly as a result of distance decay factors due
to the nearest Cooperative Development Agency being in
Newport, though this is somewhat surprising given the radical
traditions of the area and the local strength of the
Cooperative Retail Society. That the "other" category is
relatively high could be a function of the advice given by
various agencies for "start up" businesses to become sole
traders or partnerships, not limited companies, for tax
reasons. One respondant even claimed to be "a single garage"
business!	 Publically quoted companies (plc's) are generally
rare in Elaenau Gwent but proportionately more numerous
amongst the older firms- a function of previous waves of
investment and takeovers.
The organisational structure question revealed that single
plant firms dominate overall but over 40% of businesses are
externally controlled (multi-national corporations and UK
multi-plant firms), though the comparable figure is reduced
to 34% amongst the newer firms.
	
Thus there has been,
numerically, a marked increase in the indigenous control of
industry.	 The problem for the labour market as a whole
remains that all the larger firms are controlled externally
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(including, the nationalised industries) . 	 No single plant
firm employs more than 100 people.
The functional analysis of responding firms' activity
showed that the older firms registered no headquarters or
research and development functions at all, but concentrated
upon the various productive, storage and marketing activites.
A broader range of higher order activites was evident amongst
the newer firms- particularly (and obviously) amongst the
single plant
	
firms.	 The multiples,	 especially the
multi-nationals, do not appear to favour Blaenau Gwent as a
location for "top flight" executive activity.
	 This would
appear to underline the image problem the area faces (BEC
World Service broadcast 06.01.87), not
	 only	 for	 the
attraction of industry but also for the attraction of office
development.	 The Borough Council has made persistant
requests for advance office building (something of a mixed
blessing further east along the M4) 	 and government
departmental relocation, but to no avail. It would seem that
only the small part of the Borough in the Brecon Beacons
National Park might offer any potential for these kinds of
developments.
Despite the claims of NCB(E) that the large amounts of
money distributed in the South Wales area demonstrate a
flowering of local entrepreneurism (in Ebbw Vale an assertion
countered by the loan to luasa of one million pounds) the
high proportion of non-moving firms is more a result of
branch plant establishments. 	 First time
	
industrialists
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reliant upon financial incentives form another important
element.	 Only 15 out of the 26 firms that have moved were
non-local to Blaenau Gwerit- with less than half of these
being complete company moves.
	 The WDA plan for the area
(1985) acknowledges the increasing difficulty of attracting
large, successful, firms to the Heads of the Valleys area,
despite the slight advantages offered by the new regional aid
package- these are more popular with companies with solvency
problems. The nearby M4 coastal zone has proved far more
attractive. A local councillor identified the problem as one
of scale- "a 100 job firm is a large one for us". 	 The
increasing emphasis on indigenous small business development-
promoted by, amongst others, "Business in the Community" the
enterprise agency umbrella organisation, is unlikely, on past
and present performance, to prove any more successful.	 Only
5 men out of over 12,000 who left the traditional industries
are known to have successfully established businesses in the
area.	 The activities the y are involved in- car repairs,
general building, electrical contracting and metal work
sub-contracting to BSC- tend to operated on a personal
subsistence basis rather than an employment generational
basis.
The manufacturing sector remains the norm in the area.
The growth in the number of service sector firms since 1975
has partly been a result of steel closure and the
subcontracting out of certain services as part of BSC's
subsequent restructuring. The services picked out by the
questionnaire tend, by the nature of the work, to be
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industrial ones (e.g. repairs ,cleaning, plant maintenance)
and are more prevalent in the smaller workshop units to be
found throughout the borough.	 The problems confronting
office development have already been mentioned- the only new
business service job provision has been at the Business
Advisory Centre (joint WDA, NCB(E), BSC(I) and Borough
Council) but all with imported expertise.
UK located suppliers dominate the upstream networks of the
companies examined in Blaenau Gwent. The single plant firms
are much more associated with the locality than the other
groups- and as such demonstrate the susceptibilty to
inter-trading referred to above.
	 The post	 closure
establishments have many more international suppliers than
the older ones. The multiple site firms have a tendency to
be supplied centrally thus minimising any multiplier effects
for the local economy. This is evident from the purchasing
patterns of the UK multi-plant firms and the multinational
corporations in the area.
A similar pattern emerges for the location of major
markets. English markets are of greatest significance with
the M4 link to the south being more important than the
northward route to the West Midlands.	 "Management by
motorway" is a feature of some of the companies with more
complex structures. The single plant firms are tied into the
local markets.	 One of BSC(I)'s first occupants of its
workshop units exemplifies the problems of local market
involvement: the firm is in severe trading trouble because a
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change of buyer at Xidex has cost it its staple printing
contract. It i.s no surprise that the newer multiples are
involved in more distant markets than the single plant firms.
The distribution network most preferred by the responding
firms was that of "direct to customer". Current trends in
trading activity indicate a move away from wholesaleing and
other traditional intermediate selling patterns. 	 Single
plant firms are more involved with part finished products,
and multiples with other divisions of their organisations.
The agency sources of financial aid and advice show the
dominance of the Welsh Office and the WDA as providers of
finacial assistance and advice, given their roles 	 as
described above.	 The Borough of Blaenau Gwent has a high
profile too- higher than BSC(I) which is curtailing its
commitment to the "Opportunity Areas".	 The problems in
obtaining European money are reflected in their generally low
levels of take up. The newer firms account for almost all
the financial aid and all the advice activity, but it must be
remembered that some of the older firms qualified for the
lion's share of RDG's under the old scheme. Most of the aid
is spread evenly amongst the various types of firms with the
exception of that derived from the Borough which, has a
policy to offer money to the smaller single plant firms
unable to obtain it elsewhere.
The type of financial assistance taken up shows
predictably that regional development grants were the most
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popular. This was probably because of the high degree of
certainty invelved in obtaining them and the discretionary
nature of most other types of "non-automatic" assistance.
National Selective Assistance for major projects (involving
growth sectors and technological initiatives) is almost
totally lacking- another example of the marginal status of
the area. The high degree of advance factory building by the
WDA is indicative of the lack of any real private sector
industrial property market.
The q-uestions referring to advice were less thoroughly
completed than those for financial assistance.	 More than
twice as many of tte nr fr	 iti.c1	 tcl 1it
as utilzed business advice. 	 The longer established firms
exhibited a greater degree of conservatism than the newer
ones, however there is nothing to suggest that their need for
advice is any less.	 Firm growth strategies appear more
important topics for business advice than firm creation or
survival (though these topics are by their very nature
unlikely to be admitted to by entrepreneurs). 	 All the
Blaenau Gwent company types take locational advice but only
the single plant firms seek business advice
	 (to any
significant degree).
Most of the newer firms indicated that they would not have
established in Blaenau Gwent without the incentives. The
older firms did not seem to find this set of questions
applicable.	 It is interesting from the policy evaluation
point of view, to note that 38% of the newer firms said that
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they would have established without incentives anyway. 	 This
is particular]y and rather surprisingly true of the UK
multi-plants though it should be acknowledged that the
personnel completing the questionnaire may not have been the
decision-makers.	 The single plant	 firms were highly
dependant upon the incentives- a built in weakness of the
post-closure industrial structure. 	 Overall, slightly more
firms said that the incentives had not increased employment
than said that they had. But amongst the newer single plant
firms slightly more firms said that the incentives had
increased employment. The recent RDG changes in favour of
smaller firms will emphasise this trend. 	 Generally the
incentives were not considered crucial for firms' survival.
However, if the responses are to be believed, 32 of the
existing firms would no longer be trading in the Borough,
without the incentives (including 4 multi-nationals and 6 UK
multi-plants) . Delays in the incentive delivery system may
have helped one company into receivership; Tabac Leaf
Industries suffered in this way with a 100,000 pound RSA
grant in the pipeline.
The first order priority in the locational preference
questions given to financial incentives demonstrates their
relatively great importance for the companies in this area.
The site availability factor probably gains more prominence
here because of the many physical constraints to industrial
development that exist throughout the Heads of the Valleys
area;	 particularly steep 	 slopes	 and post-industrial
dereliction.	 The local market is not a prominent locational
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reason for any but the single plant firms (indicative of
local dependance networks) and neither are communications,
despite recent ERDF inspired road improvements. Personal
factors are important for the smaller single plant firms- in
line with local residence, social and other ties.
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The mining and iron working of the Ebbw Vale area dates
back to the 1780's. 	 Through the nineteenth century the
town's working people actively participated in a number of
radical political and social movements (notably the Merthyr
Rising and Chartism). The twentieth century saw Ebbw Vale as
a mainstay of the Labour Party as the town produced the
largest Labour majority in the UK on a number of occasions.
The post-war MP's (Bevan and Foot) have risen to commanding
positions in the Party and government. The fortunes of the
coal and steel industries have fluctuated considerably with
the 1920's and 1930's being the nadir. In 1934 Lord Portal
identified Ebbw Vale as a "black spot" in industrial South
Wales- the wheel has come full circle. Ebbw Vale is unusual
in having experienced two complete steel closures (1929 and
1975-9)
Despite 50 years of regional aid, a host of agencies (from
the specifically Welsh to the European), a distressing scene
remains. On 6th January 1987 (BBC World Service) Rodry
Morgan of theEuropean Commission in Wales stated "I cannot
think of anywhere in Wales where we've created- recreated-
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more than a quarter of the jobs lost on the heavy industrial
side.. .1 don't know how we're going to get it (the high male
unemployment rate) down". Many of the hopes currently are
being pinned on the development of an indigenous small firms
sector by such bodies as the WDA and NCB(E) but the turnover
of businesses and risks are high, the success a matter of
some conjecture (see Storey, 1982, 1987; Hudson and Sadler,
1987).	 In the questionnaire suryey 55% of the firms
responding employed fewer than twenty people. The firms that
are often particularly vulnerable to closure also tend to be
those most likely to set up in assisted areas because of the
necessity of being sustained by subsidy. In Ebbw Vale the
BSC plant still dominates the local economy albeit at a much
reduced scale but the small firms encouraged to generate new
employment are still dependent upon state subsidy.
Diversification away from state dependency has not been
achieved through reindustrialization (but BSC privatisation,
1988 is another matter). According to a WDA official the
main problem for small businesses is one of overtrading (or
under capitalisation) e.g. finding a large order irresistible
but not having the resources (including labour and materials)
to cover a 60 day repayment period. The WDA management
adviser stated, of the enterprise culture, "things would be
much better if people gave the same amount of consideration
to setting up a business as to going on holidays"
(interview, 1985)
There is a strong political element to the location of the
various industrial sites in Blaenau Gwent. 	 There are
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currently 15 industrial estates in the Borough ranging from
the "strategic" such as Rassau (the largest in Wales) and
Tafarnaubach to the small blocks of workshop units as at Cwm
and Brynmawr (see fig. 4) . Despite the logistical and other
problems with the small sub-optimal sites, each of the small
ex-pit villages of the Borough has had to have physical proof
(ie the small units) of its continued viability as a
work-based community. The problem is that the nature and
amount of work available has now changed dramatically and,
interms of pay, comradeship, and security, if not absolute
safety, for the worse.
The good news, as far as the Borough Council was
concerned, of December 1986 was the announcement that the
Ebbw Vale "heavy end" site had been selected for the 1992
National Garden Festival. The hope is that, apart from the
much needed reclamation work to be done on the slag banks'
"lunar landscape", the garden festival will provide work for
2,000 people.	 This may be the case but the problems
experienced by Liverpool and Stoke-on-Trent with similar
events, do not suggest that such a festival will be the
anticipated panecea.	 The link between the attraction of
tourists and the attraction of industrialists has yet to be
established. More revealing in the growth of tourism related
activity is the tacit admission that reindustrialization will
fail (if it has not done so already) and that efforts should
be concentrated upon developing a leisure society.
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Bleanau Gwent has been the recipient of large amounts of
public expenditure for industrial regeneration but the
employment problem remains. The jobs "created" in the small
firms sector have failed to compensate for local non- steel
job losses in numerical, qualitative and remuneration terms.
The' small firms are very dependent on the incentives offered.
Michael Foot's 1975 dream of an "industrial resurrection" for
Ebbw Vale has yet to be realised.
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CHAPTER SIX
COMPARISONS
6.1	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter endeavours to draw some comparisons from the
empirical material of the preceeding three chapters before
conclusions with more theoretical implications are attempted
in the final chapter. The first section is concerned with
historical comparisons and, by implication, the contrasts
between the three areas, which caine to be dependent upon the
steel industry by the midnineteen seventies, in different
social and regional settings. The second compares the common
experience of reindustrialization by examining its impacts on
industry, employment arid unemployment after assessing the
various agencies involved.	 The third section, briefly,
examines the alternatives to reindustrialization, stressing
the limitations of those attempted so far and the increasing
dependence of local government upon central authority.
Fourthly, other areas, both steel closure and otherwise, are
introduced into the comparison in order to demonstrate the
differential influence of similar (small area initiatives)
and other forms of state intervention (such as defence
spending and innovation support). Steel closure areas are by
no means the only ones active on the place market, nor are
these forms of locally specific initiative unique to
Thatcher's Britain, they are to be found in a number of other
European settings with different political formations.
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Steel closure areas can be said to represent the apex of
the pyramid of places attempting to generate new industry.
They, as is so frequently asserted in their publicity
material, encompass the full range of state industrial
incentives. Steel closure areas bear comparison amongst
themselves but also with areas where industry is being sought
to replace types of activity less monopolistic (of the labour
market) and areas where industrialisation is a relatively
recent occurrence (such as in certain New Towns and in places
on the M4 corridor).
6.2	 HISTORICAL
Each of the three areas under consideration came to be
dependent upon the steel industry by different historical.
routes.	 Ebbw Vale has the longest history of steelmaking
(dating from the last decade of the eighteenth century) but
this had lapsed by the late nineteen twenties. For much of
this period coal mining was the dominant economic activity.
The opening of an expanded, integrated steelworks in the
mid-nineteen thirties (as a regional policy measure) brought
about a new dependence upon the steel industry as pit
closures proceeded to decimate the coal sector. Hartlepool's
steel industry dated from the mid-nineteenth century and came
to dominate the local labour market from the late nineteen
fifties as other major employers (shipbuilding, heavy
engineering and,	 later,	 telecommunications)	 curtailed
operations.	 Hartlepool had the most recent steel plant, of
the three, (the South Works; opened in 1962, but with almost
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immediately outdated open hearth technology) . 	 Corby's
involvement with the iron industry dates from the
exploitation of local ores in the late nineteenth century
followed by the erection of blast furnaces in 1910 and the
opening of a large integrated works for tube production in
1934	 (previously the
	 locality was	 characterised by
agricultural village conditions) . It is easier to compare
the historical trajectories of Hartlepool and Ebbw Vale, with
their longer traditions of industrial and associated social
development,	 than conditions represented by Corby.
Hartlepool and Ebbw Vale both have industrial histories of
over 150 years duration with all the associated Labourist
power and social structures this implies. Corby's industrial
history has lasted little over 50 years so the traditions are
less ingrained. The regional industrial histories applying
to each of the areas underlines these differences: Hartlepool
and Ebbw Vale developed "heavy" industry in relation to the
proximity of coal (the former as a port, the latter through
mining). Northamptonshire' s manufacturing tradition, where
it existed, was centred upon small workshop production of
footwear and shoes. The responses, to recent steel closures,
followed in the three places would seem to bear this out:
Hartlepool and Ebbw Vale have conformed very closely to a
Labourist consensus of post war Britain, whilst Corby has
embraced, to a far greater degree, the New Right "enterprise"
ideology of the Thatcherite years.
Before embarking on an analysis of more recent historical
events it is perhaps worthwhile to compare economic
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conditions in the three areas during the last period of major
recession; the .nineteen thirties. Hartlepool and Ebbw Vale
were suffering the most debilitating impacts of the slump in
world trade, both recording levels of unemployment, for the
insured population, in excess of 50%. There were crucial
differences for all three places in the responses of the
state to the various situations. The decision to locate an
integrated steelworks on the iron ore site at Corby
repesented a triumph for the unadulterated commercialism of
Stewarts and Lloyds, an example of state "laissez faire" or
non-involvement.	 The commercial economic geography of the
time suggested that ore field locations were optimum sites
for steel production. The Special Areas Act of 1934 marked
an abrupt volte face in government policy considerations with
regional aid objectives taking precedence. In Ebbw Vale this
involved the inducement of the Richard Thomas Company away
from its preferred Lincoinshire site and thus the
re-established the dominance of steelmaking. The Hartlepool
pre-war assistance was less dramatic but set the pattern for
regional development nationally for the ensuing fifty years.
Mobile industry was to be attracted (Davy Forge is a remnant)
and, in 1946, a trading estate was established. The salient
difference between the three steel towns in the nineteen
thirties was that Corby was undergoing a massive "boom"
whilst the other two places were suffering slump conditions
and as a result were recipients of regional aid. 	 In fact
some men from both of the other towns moved to Corby in the
early 'thirties and faced the accommodation difficulties that
could only be solved through labour camps. For at least
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twenty years, during the expansion of the tubeworks, Corby
had a deserved reputation as	 a wild	 "frontier-town"
emphasising	 its	 separateness from its rural surounds.
Regional policy provided something of a boom for Ebbw Vale
but there was more than enough local labour available to man
the works after the construction had been completed, so
migrants proved to be a temporary social problem. For
Hartlepool it was the war that provided the temporary
economic salvation in the demand for ships, marine
engineering, ship repair and the heavy steel plate that was
the speciality of the town's works.
Corby, of all steel areas, accords most closely with the
notion of a "company town" with, at the height of employment
over 40% of the town's workforce being employed in steel
tubes production. This is more a function of its relatively
short period of industrial and New Town development for the
purpose of promoting the single industry. The steel unions
became particularly dominant in Corby (extending influence
from ' the Works to other areas of employees lives through the
District Council, the local Labour Party and the various
social clubs) .	 In the other areas the steel unions were
important but in the context of slightly more diverse
industrial structures. There is evidence, particularly from
Corby and , to a lesser extent from Ebbw yale, that the major
steel companies and later the nationalised industry acted
deliberately to discourage and exclude other male employers
from their areas.	 In the case of Corby this conflict was
starkly highlighted during the late nineteen sixties' and
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early nineteen seventies' by the problems faced by the
Development Corporation in gaining industrial development
certificates for new industry. This represents a pertinent
example of the inherent conflicts between two arms of the
state; the Board of Trade and the New Town Development
Corporation.
There is some physical evidence in each of the three areas
of the effects of pre-closure regional policy or (in the case
of Corby) New Town development policy. Apart from the steel
finishing remnants Blaenau Gwent has least to show from the
earlier phases of regional policy; a reflection of the
overwhelming predominance of steel and coal well into the
nineteen seventies'. Hartlepool actually boasts a surviving
factory from the interwar years- Davy Forge (1939), but very
few of the original occupants of the Oakesway Industrial
Estate remain (GEC retains a nominal but vastly reduced
presence) . In Corby the diversification undertaken by the
New Town Development Corporation from the mid-1960's, being
more recent, has resulted in more survivors, most notably the
first factories on the Earlstrees Estate (including Weetabix)
and far fewer from the older St.
	
John's Estate (but
including York Trucks). 	 In fact when the Development
Corporation handed over to the New Towns Commission in 1980
it transferred nearly 200 completed factories and a
well-advanced building programme (none of the other areas had
such a head start) . Corby did not actually become eligible
for regional assistance until granted development area status
in November 1979.	 Thus, despite the protestations of the
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Development Corporation and the District Council, Corby was
not perceived as a "problem" area, by central government,
until immediately prior to closure. Hartlepool and Blaenau
Gwent had been designated as such over forty years
previously.
The nature, timing and duration of steel closure have been
considered important, not only for the labour market effects
but also in terms of the political impact on the resources
made available to alleviate the situation. It is important
to recognise the influence of the local administrative
history and parochial loyalties which have shaped local
attitudes towards, and support for, anti-closure campaigns.
Both Hartlepool and Blaenau Gwent have local authorities
which came about as a result of the amalgamation of long
established, smaller areal units (the former in 1969, the
latter in 1974). For much of the time since 1951 the Corby
District Council was dwarfed by the Development Corporation
but retained control over a similar area and came to
represent a similar set of interests. The transfer of powers
from the Development Corporation was not as traumatic as
might first have been imagined but involved and allowed for a
transition to an almost total concentration upon industrial
development under the JIDC- Joint Industrial Development
Committee (through the rationalisation of the planning
department) . The historically parochial tensions between the
Boroughs of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool have generated a
bitter mythology, with local perspectives tending towards the
myopic. The problems are less exaggerated in Blaenau Gwent
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but are of a similar nature. The Borough (dating from 1974)
is a federatJon of five small towns (little more than
villages) in three separate valleys with a common history of
coal and steel closure; these are- Ebbw Vale, Abertillery,
Tredegar, Brynmawr and Blairia/Nantyglo. Corby's constituency
of common interest, undeterred by long standing territorial
complications, provided the	 social	 and administrative
platform for the most vigorous of the defensive campaigns.
The Ebbw Vale anti- closure campaign, despite being
motivated by the charismatic oratory of Mr. Michael Foot NP,
foundered on the attractions of the redundancy payments and
proved unable to obtain its much vaunted guarantee of
employment for all, before the works were relinquished. 	 In
Hartlepool steelworkers admitted to being amongst the least
militant in BSC, as demonstrated by their phlegmatic
acceptance of the inevitability of economic decline that was
the norm throughout the town. Maunders (1987) has completed
an exhaustive study of internecine complexities of the inter-
union rivalries that beset the ROSAC- Retention Of
Steelmaking At Corby- campaign. 	 The common feature
throughout is that the immediate benefits offered by the BSC
(particularly redundancy and "make up" payments) overrode
opposition to closure with little regard for future
employment prospects.
	 The unions, in most cases, seem to
have been unable to generate support within the works
compared to that generated in the local communities, but not
regions. No response could be found to the cash incentives
to take	 redundancy.	 At the time of closure the
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reindustrialization issue took second place to that of the
cessation of steelmaking (except, partially, in Ebbw Vale)
because they were incompatible, taking on the former
amounting to an admission of defeat by the unions.	 The
palliatives offered by BSC(Industry) seem to have paid off.
There is also the internal divisions argument: having lost
the anti- closure campaign the opposers were often bitter,
divided, and in no position to argue cogently for adequate
resources for industrial regeneration.
In each of these cases the closure of iron and steelmaking
left an amount of finishing capacity relying on steel from
elsewhere (sometimes from non-BSC, even foreign sources) . It
could be argued that for Corby and Blaenau Gwent steel
closure, though drastic, only marked a diminution in BSC
dominance of the local labour market as the Corporation
remains the largest single employer in both areas.	 This
dependence has, in the light of continuing contractions, to
be seen as vulnerability that reindustrialization programmes
have not properly addressed.
It is almost impossible to assess the importance of the
time element of the closure in terms of generating
assistance. However, the administrators where the closure
was most prolonged (eg Hartlepool and Blaenau Gwent) consider
a short closure duration to be an advantage in terms of
publicity and public consciousness raising. If Consett is
taken as an example the benefits from this public exposure
should be questioned; Consett has a high profile as a steel
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closure area but it has not greatly benefitted from this.
Although the length of the closure period was short in Corby
it had been widely anticipated (from at least 1973) within
the works, as investment declined and certain workers
returned to Scotland (Grieco, 1985) . Certainly the levels of
incentives available to industry in each of the areas was
roughly	 equal	 (from	 the central government and
BSC(Industry)), but with certain administrative nuances.	 In
terms of regional assistance, Corby was a development area,
whilst the other two were special development areas, before
the reorganisation of November 1984. This is reflected in
the higher levels of selective assistance in Corby than
elsewhere.	 It is important also to recognise the regional
departmental organisation of the DTI (or Welsh Office) for
each area.	 Hartlepool and Blaenau Gwent are both set in
traditionally declining industrial regions with many other
assisted areas competing for attention, often within the same
county. Corby, on the other hand, is the only development
area wholly within the East Midlands Standard Planning Region
and as such has been the natural focus of the DTI regional
office; to the degree that a permanent Corby exhibition has
been	 established there.	 As	 a	 corollary,	 Corby's
reindustrialization efforts are less well supported by its
Conservative Northamptonshire County Council, than those of
the other two's Labour controlled counties.
If the vigour of the three anti- closure campaigns could
be ranked Corby might come at the top, Blaenau Gwent second
and Hartlepool third. The Corby campaign involved several
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mass demonstrations, marches to London and lobbying of MP's;
all	 facilitated by relative proximity to the capital.
However, the campaign and the reindustrialization efforts of
the District Council retained almost completely separate
identities, unlike in Blaenau Gwent (in 1983 the safest
Labour parliamentary seat) where traditional Labourist
loyalties were slightly harder to dispell.	 In Hartlepool,
where the weakest campaign was fought, the Labour and trade
union politics are notoriously right wing and male
unemployment recently exceeded 30%, the "beggars can't be
choosers" philosophy prevailed and the enterprise culture has
come to be embraced with almost as much energy as in Corby.
In most respects local attitudes had little or no influence
on the amount of state assistance given to regenerate
industry and compensate ex-steelworkers. The major exception
being the allocation of enterprise zones in 1981 and 1983.
Here the willingness of the local authority to cooperate with
Thatcherite ideology and policies was crucial. Corby was the
first English zone to be designated and was declared open by
the then Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael
Heseltine as he cut the infamous "last piece of red tape in
Corby" in June 1981.	 Hartlepool was granted a zone in
October of the same year, not only as a response to the scale
of economic hardship, but also for regional reasons, as it
offered one of the least challenging administrations in
Cleveland, and, indeed, the North East.
	 The Hartlepool
Labour hierarchy has always been somewhat to the Right; as
exemplified by the MP Ted Leadbetter being the only Labour
to declare his purchase of British Telecom shares.	 Blaenau
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Gwent's MP, on the other hand, was at the
	 time	 of
designation, Leader of the Opposition and villified by the
Thatcher regime. Thatcher's Secretary of State for Wales,
however, represented the marginal seat of Pembroke Dock and
it was thought prudent to boost his chances (according to
political opinion prevalent in Blaenau Gwent) by awarding his
constituency the second Welsh enterprise zone- the first
having gone to Swansea. Had the criteria of selection for
enterprise zone status been those of most
	 need,	 as
represented by industrial degeneration, unemployment or
other, more objective measures, Blaenau Gwent would have been
at the top of most Welsh lists. As it was, Blaenau Gwent
Borough Council felt aggrieved at having missed out on the
marketing opportunity that enterprise, zone status was thought
to represent (few other lasting benefits have been
identified)
A common feature of the three areas has been the desire to
eradicate the memory of steel production from the local
environment by bringing about the rapid demolition of the
steelmaking sites. 	 In Corby and Blaenau Gwent the councils
have actually purchased the "heavy end" and undertaken the
demolition and attempted landscaping with European Community
aid. In Hartlepool demolition has taken place on the BSC
site but landscaping has only recently been undertaken, in
the view of union leaders, as a prelude to privatisation of
the remaining mills.	 Only in Corby has there been any
development of the steel site; a Dutch plastics factory and
two hypermarkets	 (one food and one DIY), with other
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developments to follow. Retailing facilities seem to be land
users of last resort, as exemplified by the Tees Bay shopping
centre	 currently	 (June	 1987)	 under	 construction on
Hartlepool's long unused Brenda Road slag bank (enterprise
zone designated) .	 The councillors of Blaenau Gwent are
optimistic that the 1992 National Garden Festival will be
responsible for the renovation of the scarred steel site.
Time will tell if their optimism is well-founded.
6.3 THE CO4ON EXPERIENCE OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION
The responses to steel closure have been broadly similar
in each of the three areas under consideration, due, in no
small measure, to the activities of BSC(Industry) . It should
be noted that although Hartlepool, Corby and Blaenau Gwent
each have BSC(I) workshop units only six out of the fifteen
other steel closure areas have them too. The three areas
studied have each experienced the full range of BSC(I)
activity as well as that of a host of other agencies. Each
area has had the attention of an average of fifteen different
state agencies; dealing with a range of activities, sometimes
overlapping. Mainstream reindustrialization can be described
as the attempted regeneration of the previously dominant mode
of economic activity, in this case manufacturing industry.
The aims of most of the agencies involved are not concerned
with the regeneration of employment opportunities per se, but
with the generation and sustenance of business enterprises,
with employment creation part of a secondary "knock on"
effect. There appears to have been little in the way of well
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defined strategies but plenty of uncoordinated "ad hoc"
measures.
6.3.1 The Agencies
Perhaps the most uncoordinated aspect of the work of the
various agencies is that of place promotion and activites on
the place market. It is here that the Thatcherite vision of
competition is carried to its greatest heights. The steel
closure areas compete, not only amongst themselves, but also
against a multitude of other places (deprived or otherwise)
seeking a decreasing amount of mobile industry. 	 The most
striking recent example of the place market in operation was
provided by the cut-throat competition for the Nissan plant,
but such activities, at perhaps a less intense level, are
part of the daily routine of industrial development officers
and enterprise agency staff. There are currently over four
hundred local enterprise agencies and trusts operating at a
time of continuing manufacturing employment decline (as
exemplified by what little of the 1984 census of employment
has been published).	 The evidence from many of the
industrialists interviewed during the course of this study
seems to indicate that much of the slick marketing (a wide
range of promotional tools was discovered) effort of local
agencies was wasted and that personal contact and willingness
to cooperate was more highly prized.
In terms of the character, aims and scope of the agencies
operating in the steel closure areas there seem to be few
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material differences. 	 The contrasts are mainly titular
rather than functional.	 Each of the three borough or
district councils have industrial development committees
served by a number of full time officers who report directly
to the Chief Executive. In strictly formal terms industrial
development budgets and activities remain associated with
planning sections on a subcommittee basis. The minutes and
reports of industrial development subcommittees are treated
with great	 confidentiality.	 The desire to protect
individuals and companies is understandable but there is more
than a suspicion of political motivation behind the excessive
secrecy surrounding these powerful committees. Are the
councillors concerned to preserve the mystique of their
positions, to keep their methods secret from others in the
place market or merely to avoid embarrassing criticsm? Such
questions remain unresolved, but some clues as to which are
the more plausible interpretations emerge from the analysis
below.
The county agencies involved in reindustrialization tend
to be less important than the more local agencies and may
actually overlap, particularly in the type of promotional
activity undertaken. 	 They are usually represented on the
joint committees in some planning capacity.	 This is
especially true of Gwent and Cleveland Counties where the
industrial development and economic initiatives departments
are part of the planning arrangements. In Northamptonshire
much of the industrial promotion work and budget has, in
effect, been "privatised" to the Northamptonshire Enterprise
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Agency.
BSC(Industry) spawned a similar set of initiatives in each
of the areas when closure or severe manpower reductions were
announced. The most common feature was the establishment of
"Task Forces" of civil servants, local government officers
and councillors and representatives of other interested
agencies.	 In Corby this evolved into the Joint Industrial
Development Committee but in the other two areas the same
label remains but the role has changed to a more advisory one
(in Hartlepool the task force concept is used as a marketing
tool under the banner of the "H- Team"!). The BSC(I) legacy
remains in the enterprise agencies it now supports, with some
private sector involvement. In Hartlepool and Blaenau Gwent
these (the Hartlepool Enterprise Agency and the Blaenau Gwent
Business Advisory Centre) retain a close working relationship
with, but a distinct identity from, the local authority.	 In
Corby the distinction is less apparent as the Council's
Director of Industry	 is	 also	 the	 BSC(I)	 nominated
representative but is based at the industrial development
centre rather than in council offices.
The only other nationalised industry "job creation" agency
represented in the three areas is British Coal (Enterprise)
in Blaenau Gwent (British Shipbuilders' (Enterprise) Ltd
evolved twenty five years too late to be of any use for
Hartlepool). BC (Enterprise) (ex-NCB(E)) has a narrower loan
giving remit than BSC(Industry) but is open to similar
criticisms of being incapable of replacing the jobs lost
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qthrough cutbacks in the previously dominant nationalised
industry.
Each area has a different state industrial property agency
with the same basic functions of providing serviced advance
(and occasionally purpose built) factory units in a variety
of sizes. In Hartlepool the English Estates Corporation has
been the principal industrial property developer (in the
absence of any effective kind of private sector provision)
but has been involved with little outside the perceived
confines of its statutory framework. Corby's Commission for
New Towns (CNT) is a "rump" organisation that is (1986- 1987)
increasingly winding down its operation but was responsible
for an enormous amount of industrial construction before and
after steel closure in 1980. Corby's position as the nearest
development area to London has proved attractive to a limited
number of private sector interventions not found elsewhere;
on the enterprise zone the CNT have undertaken a number of
lease-back arrangements for tax concessions by investors and
outside the zone the Prudential Assurance Comapany has
developed a small units complex, as well as a number of
firms'	 commissioning their own factories (OUP, EAT,
Hunterprint and Pilkington to name the largest four).
Blaenau Gwent's industrial property development, beset by
difficulties of the availability of suitable land, remains
firmly in the hands of the Welsh Development Agency. The 1DA
also has other investment, advisory and environmental roles
which are the envy (albeit with little evidence of
dramatically improved results) of the English regions,
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particularly the North. Ebbw Vale was also the subject of a
special WDA factory building project in 1978 as a direct
result of steel closure. 	 WDA powers to take control of
equity through direct intervention and participation in
company management have not been utilised (Morgan, 1980 and
WDA Annual Reports to 1987)
Blaenau Gwent differs from the others in its access to
central government departments because of the umbrella of the
Welsh Office. All departments, apart from defence and DHSS
are operated on a regional basis from Cardiff with the only
salient difference being that they are under the jurisdiction
of a minister of cabinet rank. As mentioned above, Corby has
unique assisted area status within its region, especially as
far as the DTI is concerned, but has to deal with the normal
regional networks of other departments. 	 Hartlepool is, of
the three,	 least favourably situated, with regard to
ministries of state because of its location in a county and
region with many other "black spots" of dereliction, decay
and deprivation.
Blame for the predicament of steel closure is sometimes
levelled at the European Community, but, as will be revealed
below, European relief agencies do not appear to have been
very active in the three areas considered. The ECSC, the EIB
and the ESF are really noticeable by their absence from the
consciousness of firms. There have been problems of delivery
for European loans in the face of budgetary constraints and
even freezes, coupled with generally lengthy administrative
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procedures. In the case of EIB loans there are quantitative
difficulties in that lower rates of interest can be readily
obtained from the private market. Another difficulty may be
that of identifying the original source of funds: central
government departments have to bid for certain money (for
example to the ECSC or the ESF) and, if passed on, these
funds may well masquarade as emanating from national sources.
Corby appears to be the most successful of the three in
capturing European assistance, with Blaenau Gwent second and
Hartlepool somewhat further behind. The Chief Executive of
Corby District Council (Duncan Hall) attributes this to
sending delegations to and lobbying of the European
Parliament.
Apart from the banks, which appear to be universal
adjuncts to industry, there is little sign of other private
sector investment activity in these steel closure areas.
Recent reports in the Financial Times (1986) have highlighted
the concentration of venture capital in the more prosperous
regions of the country. Venture Capitalists are noticeable
by their absence from the steel closure areas, seemingly
conditioned by negative environmental, social and economic
success images.	 Although DIDA at Consett claims contacts
with over 60 venture capital organisations in the City of
London, there is little evidence of a positive impact
resulting from this within north west Durham. The WDA has
established a venture capital section but its activities seem
confined to the Cardiff and M4 areas, not the Heads of the
Valleys,	 such as Blaenau Gwent. 	 Some industrialists
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encountered were angered by the disparity between the amounts
of venture capital available in competing countries such as
Germany and Japan, whereas in Britain a very common way of
raising start-up funds is through remortgaging or selling
property.	 The North-South housing price differential may
work to the advantage of the North in terms of small industry
provision because of the release of capital involved by a
northward move and the cheaper house prices in the new
location.	 The principal effect of the house price
differential in practise is to reinforce the status quo.
Home owners are reluctant to relinquish highly profitable
(recently over 20% annual gains) domestic investments in the
South East in "once and for all" moves elsewhere. For many
moving away from London is equated with "burning the boats"
because nowhere else can match the growth rates in house
prices experienced there, and to return would be financially
crippling.
6.3.2 The impacts of reindustrialization on industry
Much of the material presented here relates to a
questionnaire survey of 278 firms undertaken in the three
areas in 1985 and 1986. Each area was surveyed using the
prime criterion of trying to contact pre- and post- closure
manufacturing firms using the lists available from the
various local authorities.	 There proved to be a wide
variance in the the quality and accuracy of the
industrialists lists, with surprisingly, Corby, proving the
worst with over 150 companies having moved or gone out of
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business out of a total of over 300. Table 6.1 below shows
the percentage • of firms in each area dating from before and
after steel closure. It gives a fairly accurate impression
of the established industrial structures of the three areas
(thus the levels of dependence upon a few industries prior to
closure) and the subsequent degree 	 of	 diversification
representec	 the numbers of new frrras arriving.
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Table 6.1.
Firms Established Before and After Closure (%)
Area	 Before	 After
Hartlepool	 35.1	 64.9
Corby	 20.2	 79.8
Blaenau Gwent 13.3	 86.7
Source: questionnaire survey.
These figures should not be read solely as an index of
attractiveness to incoming firms but more as demonstrations
of the diversity or lack of it prior to steel closure.
Basically Blaenau Gwent and Corby had less to build upon so
are now more dependent upon the newer firms. 	 In absolute
terms Corby has the highest number of new firms (87) recorded
on a more substantial base (than Blaenau Gwent) of twenty two
firms dating from the 1960's.
It seems remarkable that in each of the areas 64% of the
firms surveyed were private companies. Hartlepool and Corby
have very similar percentages in public companies and
subsidiaries but Blaenau Gwent has fewer of both. In Blaenau
Gwent there tend to be more companies whose legal status can
be described merely as "other"- a category that includes sole
traders and small business arrangements outside standard
limited companies.	 The WDA has deliberately encouraged
start-up enterprises not to go the whole way and become
private limited companies in order to avoid expensive
accounting and initial administrative overheads.
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In terms of administrative structure there is a broadly
similar pattern between the three areas. Single plant firms
are by far the most common form of industrial organisation
experienced. Again Hartlepool and Corby are similar in terms
of hosting higher percentages of multi-nationals than UK
multi- plants.	 Blaenau Gwent has a far lower percentage of
multi- national firms but compensates with the largest share
of UK multi- plant firms. 	 This could be a reflection of
slightly differing marketing strategies between the three
areas	 rather than major differences in the locational
preferences of such organisations.
The functions undertaken by each firm in the areas show a
few similarities and some important contrasts. Branch office
services and retailing functions tend to be less prominent
than, manufacturing, sales! marketing, headquarters, and
research and development. 	 Corby tops the rankings for all
the "higher order" functions particularly headquarters and
sales! marketing. This could be a regional spin off because
the East Midlands is regarded as a somewhat progressive
economic region where such functions tend to prevail, and has
attracted some overspill from London and the South East.
Blaenau Gwent is at the other end of the scale with the
lowest involvement in these activities but the highest in
final product assembly and raw material processing. Thus
there is something of a tendency for the more traditional
manufacturing activities to be found in Blaenau Gwent whilst
Corby has a more diverse industrial structure (some purely
research or trial product and process development plants are
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solely to be found in Corby) . The greatest differentials
occur when the . figures for sales! marketing are examined; in
Corby 65% of firms indicated this function, in Hartlepool,
48%, whilst in Blaenau Gwent only 40% did so. This points to
more dynamic and vigourous business conditions existing in
Corby, and the adjacent region, compared with the other
areas,	 as	 well	 as being highly correlated with the
headquarters function which shows a similar pattern, except
at a slightly lower level.
The pattern of movers (firms which indicated that they had
relocated to the steel closure areas rather than established
in situ) again shows an extraordinarily high degree of
correlation between the experience of Hartlepool and Corby
(though with numerically fewer firms involved in Hartlepool).
In both towns 44% of the firms responding declared that they
had relocated and 56% said that they had not.	 This appears
to be a statistical quirk rather than a more telling
similarity because there are distinct qualitative differences
between the two towns' (identified by R. Tym & Partners
enterprise	 zone	 analysis,	 1984)	 recent	 industrial
attractiveness to incoming firms. Corby has proved uniquely
attractive to extra- regional relocations. The non- movers
in the above figures include new firms whose productive
capacity was established at that place for the first time.
The figures for Elaenau Gwent show a 30/70 ratio against
movers giving the impression that the area is even less
attractive to mobile industry than the other two. What these
figures do represent, however, is the relatively small (well
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under fifty per cent) amount of mobile industry actually
attracted to these areas. 	 This raises questions as to
whether the efforts to attract footloose industry are
worthwhile and whether the emphasis could be better directed
to the encouragement of new, but essential investment in all
functional areas (not necessarily routine production branch
plants with few higher order functions) . Some of the other
questions examined later will throw more light on the
"deadweight effect", the problem of a number of firms getting
assistance to undertake projects that they would have
followed through anyway.
Some minor differences appear in the comparitive patterns
of the locations of suppliers for the three areas.	 In each
case most firms are supplied from within the UK, but outside
the region, with Blaenau Gwent particularly so (over 55% of
responding	 firms indicating this).
	
Hartlepool has the
strongest regional supply network, a function of its longer
established diversity; it also, more difficult to comprehend,
has slightly a slightly higher percentage of suppliers from
the rest of the world (outside the EC), perhaps a relict of
its port heritage? Here, as with most of these figures,
sample size deficiencies must be noted. Corby firms have the
highest percentage of suppliers from their own district, but
more significantly have the highest ratio from the EC.
The location of major markets shows little variation
between the patterns for Blaenau Gwent and Corby with local
and regional markets important but not as much, collectively,
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as for the rest of the UK. Corby and Blaenau Gwent also tend
to have more• vigourous European markets than 1-lartlepool.
Hartlepool firms tend to have much stronger local and
regional links than national or international ones. Corby
has a fairly weakly developed industrial hinterland with
agriculture being generally more important whilst Blaenau
Gwent's local industrial structure has traditionally rested
in a very small range of industries.
The analysis of the information for employment change (see
table 6.2) highlights the difference between Hartlepool and
the other areas. In Hartlepool most of the firms responding
to this question indicated that their employment had remained
stable over the past year, but it also showed the highest
percentage of decreasing firms.	 Of the other two cases,
Corby had the largest percentage of firms showing increases
and the fewest decreases. 	 Blaenau Gwent had a similar
pattern to Corby but with more signs of stability and
employment decrease.	 This would appear to indicate that
Corby has the most buoyant and successful economy of the
three, but it must be rememebered that figures for increases
include 100% increases (ie start ups)
	
and that	 the
reliability of this information can be questioned because it
measures a firm's self image (suceptible to executive
manipulation).
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Table 6.2.
Employment Charge: Over preceeding year
(% of firms answering this question)
Area	 Stable	 Increase Decrease
Hartlepool	 47.1	 38.6	 14.3
Corby	 29.0	 61.7	 9.4
Blaenau Gwent 35.4	 52.4	 12.2
As mentioned before, the figures indicating stability should
not necessarily be read as indicies of economic wellbeing. A
stable situation tends to be the prelude to decline rather
than increase: this is borne out by the corresporidance
between levels of stability and levels of decrease in table
6.2.
When it comes to comparing the experiences of the steel
closure area firms in terms of financial aid by agency,
Blaenau Gwent and Hartlepool are very similar indeed. 	 Both
are very similarly served by the banks (in the 31-37% range)
and BSC(I) (12% each); also in terms of levels of service
provided by central government through the DTI and the Welsh
Office. Corby has higher levels of firms receiving aid from
banks, BSC(I) and particularly from the DTI (over 20% higher
than the other two) . As mentioned above, this could well be
a result of Corby receiving the almost undivided attention of
the DTI regional office in Nottingham.	 Corby firms also
receive over twice as much ECSC assistance as those in the
other areas (21% against c. 10% for the others) . Corby firms
use their local authority much less than the others (only
3.7% compared with 11.7% of all firms in Hartlepool and 20.0%
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of firms in Blaenau Gwent), for financial aid.	 It would
appear that a ligher proportion of Corby firms gain access to
financial assistance than in the other areas. This points to
a more successful business advisory service coupled with a
local authority unconcerned as to the terms of employment
which new industries establish. These conditions are more
appropriate to the Thatcherite enterprise culture model than
the "Labourist" culture of the councils in traditional
working class areas.	 As alluded to above, very little
financial aid anywhere is obtained from venture capital
companies such as the Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation (ICFC also now known as Investors in Industry,
the "3i's" Group)
A similar,	 but	 less	 distinctively Corby centred,
arrangement is observed when the financial aid available to
firms is analysed by type.	 A higher proportion of Corby
firms than the others obtain most types of assistance. 	 The
fact that Corby firms seem able to obtain a higher proportion
of regional selective assistance may relate to its previous
status as a development area when the other two localities
were designated as special development areas, and therefore
concentrated more upon regional development grants. However
since equalisation of status, Corby has overtaken the others,
not in the total amount of regional development grant
allocated, but in the percentage of firms receiving payments.
Firms	 in Corby are more likely to receive regional
development grants but in smaller amounts than in Hartlepool
and Blaenau Gwent.	 Table 6.3 shows the totals for the
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published regional aid figures by area. It must be noted
that in both Hartlepool and Blaenau Gwent there were malor
multi- million pound recipients, ETP Tioxide 11.6, and ESC
Tinplate 15.6, which somewhat distort the figures.	 It is
also ironic to discover that BSC received a total of nearly
23 million pounds in regional development grants for new
plant and machinery in these three areas where its closure
decisions had been instrumental in bringing about, or at
least maintaining, assisted area status.
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Table 6.3.
Regional Aid Totals '000's Pounds sterling (to end Dec. 1986)
Area	 RDG	 RSA	 TOTAL BSC Max.Private Co.
Hartlepool	 29,459	 5,012	 34,471	 3,429	 11,557(*)
Corby	 22,830 20,538	 43,368	 3,782	 4,250(#)
Blaenau Gwent 26,836 16,376
	
43,412 15,594
	 2,983(s)
KEY
* = BTP Tioxide
# = RS Components (RSA)
$ = Control Data
Source: DTI, British Business.
Levels of national selective assistance are uniformly low
(never more than 4% of the total number of firms responding
to the questionnaire). Local authority grants are taken up
far more readily in Hartlepool and Blaenau Gwent than in
Corby. These grants are the dominant form of local authority
financial aid to industry, as very low levels of loan take up
have been found. Enterprise allowance scheme assistance for
previously unemployed "entrepreneurs" is used by a mere 5.5%
of Corby firms and even less elsewhere. Overall the ECSC is
the most important source of loans but even so at quite low
levels of usage: Corby has 22% of firms, Blaenau Gwent 15.5%
and Hartlepool	 7.8%,	 utilising these
	
loans.	 These
differences may be attributed to the factors mentioned above;
that Corby has made exceptional efforts to get European aid
and is also the focus for DTI (often an agent of European
finance) activity, whilst Blaenau Gwent has benefited from
WDA influence.
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These comparisons confirm that the regional development
grant is the rn most important and influential regional policy
instrument in Brtain. It is liked by industrialists because
of the degree of certainty involved in its operation; unlike
the more discretionary regional selective assistance (of
which only section 7 monies over 5,000 pounds are totalised
in table 6.3). BSC(I) loans are utilised but at what appears
to be far lower levels (by 10-14 % of firms) than prior to
the 1984 reorganisation (information derived from interviews
with BSC(I) personnel) .	 The financial assistance by type
table also confirms the lack of penetration of venture
capital and the government's business expansion scheme into
these areas.
Some of the qualitative questions asked of the firms show
significant areal differences. When asked whether they would
have established without the package of advice and incentives
nearly sixty per cent of the Hartlepool firms announced that
they would have done so anyway (it must be remembered that a
larger proportion of them were founded before steel closure
incentives became available). In Corby and Blaenau Gwent, by
contrast, a majority of firms said that they would not have
established without the incentives.	 Further analysis of
these results by size of firms reveals, that 1-lartlepool is
not any more successful as a nursery for entrepreneurs (the
attachment to place is so strong that they feel obliged to do
business there) but that the north eastern town seems to be
lacking a whole cohort of newly established middle sized
(employing over 11 people) and larger (over 31) firms present
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in the other two areas. Thus, in Hartlepool, the firms most
likely to be interested in industrial incentives are not
present, making the opinions of the residual element of local
entrepreneurs more	 statistically	 influential.	 This
dependence upon incentives, demonstrated by Corby and Blaenau
Gwent, can be interpreted in two conflicting ways.	 Firstly
it could narrowly be seen as a measure of the success of the
industrial development marketing strategies of the agencies
because firms have come to the areas on the strength of the
incentives. Secondly, this dependence can be seen as a sign
of the inherent weakness and vulnerablility of these local
economies; marginal forms of capital tend to be reliant upon
incentives (as evidenced by the frequent occurrence of firms
leaving these areas, or becoming insolvent, when entitlement
to rent and rate free periods ceases) . This is held to be a
particular problem under the Thatcher administration which,
whilst making strenuous efforts to encourage individual
enterprise, has proved unsympathetic to more general support
of industry (paticularly loss making, highly unionised
ones) . Some of the incentives have finite durations; for
example enterprise zones which have little prospect of being
renewed in their present forms after 1991 when the first
generation (including Corby and 1-lartlepool) expire, as a
result of National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee
criticism.	 Local authority rental subsidies are often of
much shorter duration- up to a maximum of two years. A WDA
business advisor identified these rent! rate "holidays" as
being potentially dangerous for the trading habits of certain
companies because after they are over, some companies
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realise, too late, that their profit margins were too narrow
to cover the additional cost burden of rents (particularly
when they were occupying over- large premises)
A much more uniform picture of the impact of the
incentives emerges when their effects on firms' employment
change are analysed. In all cases more firms declared that
the incentives had not increased employment than had. The
firms most likely to show increases as a result of the
incentives were those in the employment size range 11-30 in
Corby and Blaenau Gwent and in the over 31 range in
Hartlepool (but with a smaller sample) . These are the sizes
of firms most likely to show increases in employment anyway.
There is a tendency for the small one man businesses not to
grow (see Storey et al 1987) because many entrepreneurs (to
make a very broad generalisation) prefer to retain control of
all aspects of their business and may find the transition to
employing several people impossible to make. The medium size
band (11-30) are the firms that have already made the
breakthrough and are more likely to be expansive. Growth
oriented small firms are the targets for much of the
enterprise marketing of the industrial development officers
and agents. The impression derived from this survey is that
industrial incentives are failing to increase employment,
which is, in most cases, their ultimate declared intention.
The other principal aim of most industrial policy is the
safeguarding of existing employment. 	 To discern this the
firms were asked if the incentives had been crucial for their
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survival.	 In each area over 50% of the firms said that they
had not been crucial but there was more variation in the
percentages who replied that the incentives had been crucial.
Corby had the highest dependency rate of 40% followed by
Blaenau Gwent with 38.6%, Hartlepool had 29.9% of firms in
this position.	 These rates of reliance upon incentives
should be the cause of concern for local adminstrators and
politicians. In these steel closure areas a new kind of
dependency has been created. 	 Instead of resting upon a
single dominant industry the industrial structure now depends
on a variety of much smaller units of which a large
proportion, in turn, are dependent upon incentives and
subsidy. It is no coincidence that Corby, the place which is
regarded as having been the most successful of the steel
closure areas, should be the most dependent upon industrial
incentives for the survival of a significant proportion of
its new firms (particularly in the 11-30 size range) . The
fragility of these local economies is reflected by the high
turnover of companies, a recurring subject of conversation
with many industrialists but difficult to address in the
questionnaire format.	 Several firms, again most noticeably
in Corby, would not trade with other new firms in the area
because of the high risk of incurring bad debts. It would
appear that the more industrial promotion and assistance
offered the greater the dependency generated. In the long
term it must be counter productive to create an industrial
sector that is incapable of sustaining itself, yet is equally
as dependent upon state expenditure as the steel industry,
but employs fewer people. There is no evidence yet of any
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diminution, in the promotional campaigns undertaken in these
areas, of the selling of steel closure areas as those which
offer the highest levels of incentives. Indeed, Peterlee, a
new town neighbour of Hartlepool, recently ran a competitve
cartoon publicity campaign featuring a gentleman called "Max
Grant".
Interpretation of these questions has to recognise some of
their weaknesses.	 The last three	 questions	 in the
questionnaire (see Appendix 1) dealt with quite subjective,
almost hypothetical, issues; concerning events that may or
may not have happened. They are all subject to problems of
recall and post hoc rationalisation. 	 There is also an
element of prejudice in that entrepreneurs might tend to
suggest that they acted for the best motives and play down
the role of financial incentives. These questions tend to
amplify what has become known as the "deadweight effect";
industrial development, difficult to pin-point, that would
have taken place without any state intervention.	 Obviously,
this phenomenon exists, but assessing its true extent is
beset with problems of measurement and interpretation because
of the particular (single industry dominated areas do not
tend to foster entrepreneurism) atid general (discerning
alternatives not undertaken) difficulties involved. As a
corollary to this, it is also impossible to interview
personnel from firms which were not created or very difficult
to trace companies no longer trading or who took decisions
not to locate activity in steel closure areas. Given all
these interpretive difficulties these questions provide a
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useful	 qualitative	 insight	 into the attitudes	 of
industrialists' towards measures taken supposedly in their
favour.
6.3.3 The impacts of reindustrialization on employment and
unemployment
The 1984 (10% sample census) census of employment levels
of accuracy are expected to be unacceptibly low (personal
communication,	 M.Blakemore	 June 1987) . 1981 is not a
particularly convenient year from which to analyse employment
change in these steel closure areas.
	
In Corby the full
impact of the closure had yet to be felt and
reindustrialization measures had not been implemented.
Similarly in Hartlepool, where most of the closure of the
steelmaking had been completed by 1981, but the rolling mill
was still in operation. In both these areas 1981 figures
fail to show the effects of enterprise zone designation in
that year. Probably the most useful set of figures for 1981
comes from Blaenau Gwent where reindustrialization efforts
had been in motion from the middle of the previous decade and
most steel redundancies completed. 	 Table 6.4 shows the
changes in total employment for the three areas as recorded
by the Department of Employment between 1975 and 1981. These
are workplace figures and so include people who commute from
other areas and do not include residents who work elsewhere.
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Table 6.4.
Total Employment Change 1975-1981
Area	 1975	 1981	 Change	 Steel
Hartlepool	 41,383	 32,981	 -8,402	 -20.3 -2,901
Corby	 30,052	 19,384	 -10,668	 -35.5 -8,084
Blaenau Gwent 28,491
	 21,356	 -7,135	 -25.0 -5,064
Source: NOMIS
Each place has faced a drop in total employment of over
twenty per cent in six years due, in varying degrees, to
steel job losses.	 The influence of reindustrialization
measures had failed to show by 1981, as evidenced by the
paucity of job gains. In Corby, for the same period, the
largest gain was only 403 in the printing, publishing and
bookbinding mlh. The biggest gain in Hartlepool was 1,045
for the electricity mlh involved in the construction of the
nuclear power station (total employment 1985, 664) .
	 The
electronic computer mlh provided the largest employment rise
in Blaenau Gwent over the period 1975-81, a gain of 669.
There appear to be problems matching the employment gains
claimed subsequently with the unemployment figures. Corby
District council claim to have created over 8,000 jobs
between 1981 and mid- 1987, in Blaenau Gwent the figure is
2,500 jobs and in Hartlepool it is 2,000 jobs.
The mismatch between numbers of jobs claimed to have been
created and the unemployment totals can partly be attributed
to the importation of key workers by newly arrived firms, the
attraction of workers not registered for unemployment benefit
and creative accounting by some of the more unscrupulous
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individuals, keen to emphasise the 	 success	 of their
initiatives.	 producing an accurate time series for the same
area for unemployment data is beset by the well publicised
problems regarding changes in methods of counting (most
noticeably from registrants to claimants in 1982) and in
boundary changes for travel to work areas. The ten year
period between 1972 and 1982 is probably the best recently
comparable decade of unemployment statistics available.
Table 6.5 summarises the available information.
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Table 6.5.
Unemployment change 1972-1982 1978TTWA Unemployed Persons
Area	 Option	 1972	 %	 1982	 %
Hartlepool	 Male	 3,140 12.3
	
6,577 25.2
Female	 552	 3.7	 2,385 14.7
Total	 3,692	 9.1	 8,962 21.2
Corby	 Male	 600	 3.0	 5,058 25.7
Female	 221	 2.3	 1,515 14.4
ii	 Total	 821	 2.8	 6,573 21.8
Ebbw Vale	 Male	 1,271	 5.7	 4,358 24.5
Female	 308	 4.0	 2,003 22.0
Total	 1,579	 5.3	 6,351 23.7
All taken in June (source NOMIS).
Subsequent changes in areal and methodological bases for
calculating unemployment rates (for example the inclusion of
the largely rural Abergavenny district with Blaenau Gwent in
the 1984 TTWA) make continuation of this series impossible.
The new TTWA figures, using claimants, show signs of recent
falls for Corby and, to a lesser extent, Blaenau Gwent, but
not for Hartlepool.	 Residual rates remain high. It is
uncertain how much of the fall in unemployment can be
attributable to the changes in calculation, the introduction
of new schemes (eg "Restart") or to the attraction of new
industry.	 In Corby, accepting for the moment that the claim
of 8,000 jobs is correct, only 2,300 people have been removed
from the unemployment register. The similar figure for
Blaenau Gwent is not available because of the boundary
changes, but it would appear to be little more than 1,000.
In Hartlepool the situation has been far worse,
	
with
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unemployment rising into 1985 and showing a fall of only
1,000 since then, with little change since the early 1980's.
As has been mentioned above, quantitative assessments of
reindustrialization are decidedly problematic (Dept. of
Employment figures are treated sceptically even by civil
servants and by other bodies e.g. Welsh Office and National
Audit Office) but it can be concluded that the measures
adopted are generally inappropriate to the scale of the
problem. What has, so far, been overlooked have been the
qualitative implications of the measures for the
characteristics of employment created, and the influence
these have on the evolution of the post- steel labour market
(including pre- existing firms) .	 It is proposed here to
compare the wages, terms and conditions of a selection of the
new firms in each area with those prevailing in steel
finishing remnants. The figures date from 1985-86 when the
bulk of the interviewing was undertaken.
Official figures for wage rates, though often available to
provide a guide for incoming firms, are not readily
comparable because of different clasifications and an absence
of definitions. It is, nevertheless, interesting to compare
the average wage opportunities for semi- and un- skilled
industrial workers in these areas because these are the
grades which are applicable to many ex-steelworkers (most
have found their original skills untransferable). Many would
appear to have found (especially in the post "make up" pay
period) the new wage levels unacceptable, as they frequently
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involve cuts in pay of in excess of 100 pounds per week. The
Corby personnel association • (based in the Jobcentre) provided
the most detailed breakdown of wage rates by occupation;
basic contract rates for unskilled industrial workers ranging
between 1.94 and 3.23 (average 2.61) per hour (with shift
premiums between 0.69 and 2.92) 1985; (increase in 1986 5.5%,
though still to an average of less than 5,000 pounds per
annum) .	 The figures for Gwent and Hartlepool are more
similar to each other but less well defined. 	 Gwent (no
figures for Blaenau Gwent alone are available) has "factory
operatives" average weekly rates at 70 pounds per week (an
amount that rises to over 85 pounds when overtime and bonus
are included). The Hartlepool figures are not aggregated in
the same fashion but the personnel association reports that
in some of the new firms a 40 hour week is rewarded with
60-70 pounds.	 This confirms the interview findings where
rates of 1.60 per hour (for established personnel) and less
were discerned (at CDL44 Foods and Isocom) . These extremely
low levels of pay (longer established firms in each area can
pay double for similar grades of work) are indicative of the
new firms' eagerness to exploit the high unemployment
situation.	 They are encouraged to do so by the Thatcherite
philosophy for workers to be "priced back into jobs".
	 In
1985 the average gross weekly earnings of male manual workers
in Cleveland was 166.7 pounds (Cleveland County Council) with
the national average at 160.6 pounds. The Cleveland figure
was boosted because of the higher than average wages paid by
the chemical and steel industries; albeit to an ever
decreasing number of workers. This can be used as a guide to
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the wages differentials between pre- and post- steel closure
labour markets
Not all the new companies pay so little in wages. The
high paying employers are rare but find that they are
rewarded in loyalty and low staff turnover; but competition
is severe for jobs (one personnel officer declared: "we
daren't even advertise").	 Tolaram, one of Hartlepool's
newest and most prestigous firms (part of a Singapore multi-
national) employs 79 fulltime male workers at 160 pounds per
week for process and 180 pounds per week for crafts. These
rates are allied to, but at a much lower level, the Teesside
chemicals industry and are paid to men who mainly live
outside Hartlepool. RS Components (Corby) have a basic rate
of 120 pounds per week for manual workers and 145 pounds for
craftsmen. It should be noted that the standard 40 hour week
prevails in most of the firms mentioned in this paragraph.
The same cannot be said for some of the others: for example
workers at PMA ("Positive Mental Attitude") Textiles in
Hartlepool had to do four twelve hour shifts for their 122
pounds (with no supplements) in 1985. Twelve hour shifts and
particularly low pay for women (50-55 pounds per week) are a
feature of each of the areas.
Rearing in mind the prevelence of small firms in these
areas there is a tendency towards low wages and poor
conditions of work and employment. The small firms do not
have the resources to provide anything but the most basic
facilities (and sometimes even less) for their workers. 	 It
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was not felt feasible to include questions on the degree of
unionisation in the firms' questionnaire, in order to ensure
adequate returns. 	 Other evidence, from trade union and
personal interviews with industrialists, indicates that the
new firms tend to be hostile or at best ambivalent towards
trade union recognition of any description. Geoff Jacob
(T&GWU Ebbw Vale secretary) noted that out of 16 factories
established on the Rassau Estate in 1984 only 3 recognised
trade unions: "They (the workers) are persuaded, often very
forcibly by the employer, not to join a trade union and are
threatened with the sack if they do .join a trade union."
Such experiences are replicated both within Blaenau Gwent and
in each of the other areas. In some cases union organisation
has been allowed, but very much on management terms. An
example is the Control Data (now Xidex) works at Brynxnawr
near Ebbw Vale (the largest private company in the area) who
have a no strike agreement with their single union (EEPTU)
under the title of "compulsory conciliation" (which involves,
among other things secret balloting of the employees whilst
negotiations are in progress- a high price to pay). Another
feature of the Control Data "US style hiring and firing"
(Jacob, G. 1984) is the use of "supplementals" a pool of
labour used on ten month contracts with no employment
security.	 When the post-takeover rationalization occurred
the 100 supplementals were the first to be made redundant
(1986)
In Hartlepool three of the larger firms established on the
enterprise zone in 1983 (PMA, CDL44 "Mr Chris" Foods and
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Isocom) have been explicitly hostile to any suggestion of
trade union organisation. The PMA (now taken over by Coates
Viyella) image was firmly based upon American management
philosophies involving "a progressive industrial culture" and
non-union training and re-education. This may most vividly
be discerned through the recruitment procedures (at PMA 3,500
people applied for the first 24 jobs); successful applicants
were interviewed up to 6 times at various times of the night,
day and week for attitude rather than aptitude. Those
selected became "associates" and had to be prepared to work
flexibly (with on- site training) at any point in the 24
hour, 365 day per year, process (except certain specialist
functions).	 It is tempting to draw comparisons with the
Victorian values more appropriate to Dickensian work houses
than the late twentieth century conditions. 	 In one
Hartlepool case the analogy is most apt, even down to the
"larger than life" characterisation of the principal. CDL 44
Foods (brand name "Mr. Chris") has built up a reputation for
the harsh treatment of its employees, much of it, for reasons
of libel and problems of insubstantiation, uncorroborated.
The factory owner, Mr. Chris Liveras, is known to have had
two convictions for fraud yet was still given considerable
grant aid and assistance to establish his frozen cakes
factory in the town. Union activity is expressly forbidden
and punishable by dismissal; workers representation is
limited to a consultative but not executive "works council".
Conditions	 in the	 factory	 (access	 refused even to
Hartlepool's industrial chaplain) have been described as
stringent- the threat to deny access to ladies toilets for
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alleged time wasting was countered by sabotage of the cakes
(according to an employee) . Two clauses from a 1986 contract
at CDL 44 illustrate the type of conditions experienced:
"8. There will be 1 - 15 minute break, and 1 - 30 minute
break (15 minutes of which is unpaid), during an 8 hour
shift.
17. TIMEKEEPING
Anyone late more than 5 minutes in any one day will
automatically be sent home before starting work and will lose
any attendance or productivity bonus, or both, for that
week."
Clause 17 inspired a recent and amusing headline,
"CUSTARD PIES FOR CAKE KING Jobless anger at boss's 'lazy'
slur," (Hartlepool Mail, 5.9.86 p1)
Mr Chris accused the town's unemployed of being unable to
arrive at his factory on time and provoked a reaction from
local unemployed groups.	 According to the employee (who
wished to remain anonymous for fear of loosing her job) the
bonus levels were set so high that they were achieved on
extremely rare occasions. It is fact that in his first year
of Hartlepool operating Mr.
	 Liveras sacked his entire
workforce over the long Christmas and New Year period (a
particularly awkward one due to weekends etc.) and proceeded
to reemploy them from the 2nd January, thus obviating the
need to pay his workforce any holiday money.	 Isocom,
ostensibly a "high tech" firm, actually utilises most of its
female labour force on extremely routine machine-minding
tasks and pays them low wages (1.54 per hour) for the
privilege.	 Again unions are barred and replaced, in the
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minds of the management, with a works council. Another
Hartlepool employer, Lab Systems Furniture (the first factory
to open on the enterprise zone in 1981) is also non-union and
maintains that its profits are too marginal to be able to
offer wage rates competitive with the older employers in the
town. Although Tolaram offers relatively good wages (see
above) one of the few imposed directorial decisions from the
Singapore based parent company was that there were to be no
trade unions (interview, May 1987)
Antipathy and ambivalence towards trade unions and the
provision of adequate (despite problems of definition) terms
and conditions was also a feature of many of the new firms in
Corby, where the local "Labour" council were adamant that
these issues were the concern of agreements to be negotiated
between companies and workers. Commodore's denial of union
representation was such that even the ever- flexible EEPTU
were	 refused	 negotiating	 rights (Weston, 1984) .	 The
Commodore management were unwilling to be interviewed just
before the company withdrew from the town in 1986. The
Trades Council in Corby is still dominated by the ISTC but
has come to be associated with the small radical element of
the local Labour Party because of its sponsoring of seminars
arid meetings which question the Council's overt "no strings"
promotion of new industry.
The standard response from three of the average sized
Corby companies encountered (employing between 11 and 40
people) was that people were very welcome to join trade
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unions if they wished to do so but none actually did (Hamlet
Circuits, Fresl'i Fruit Juice Manufacturing and Falcon Crest).
Falcon Crest, the smallest of the three, had developed a
flexible work culture based on the small size of the plant
and the fact that each of the three.managers was capable of
doing any of the factory tasks and was prepared to "muck in".
Any employee was allowed to answer the telephone too. This
type of system depends very much on the personality of the
managers involved.	 At Falcon Crest it appeared to have
worked well because in the first three years of operation of
the caramel food colouring plant, only one out of the eleven
employees had left the firm.	 The exigencies of small
business management meant that one night four (including two
directors) of the workforce stayed at the factory until 02.00
hours cleaning out a cooker where the caramel had begun to
set. It would appear that in larger organisations such
rapport is rare.	 At Hamlet Circuits, for example, the
managing director, identified the workforce as his biggest
problem- "we train up so many people (in production and
inspection of printed circuit boards) and then they go and
screw up everything we do." This firm used "low tech" manual
production and visual inspection methods for many parts of
its "high tech" product- double sided and multi-layered
prototype printed circuit boards. Its philosophy being, in
two significant areas, that it is cheaper to employ young
people than to purchase machinery in excess of 50000 pounds.
The Fresh Fruit Juice Manufacturing Co. (the only UK source
of poly- bottled freshly squeezed juice for immediate
consumption) payed similar wages (70-75 pounds per week) to
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the other firms but had a more aggressive management style
than Falcon Crest arid reported a higher turnover of staff.
Fresh Fruit Juice reported an approach from a food industry
trade union (Corby promotes itself as a food processing
centre) and held a staff meeting to discuss it. The meeting
concluded that there was nothing to gain from establishing a
recognised branch; the few ex-steel men in the firm have a
jaundiced opinion of trade unions general ability to deliver.
It is perhaps significant that the largest and most
profitable of the firms encountered in the three steel
closure areas actually made the conscious decision to adapt
to the Corby conditions and recognise a union- USDAW- for the
first time in over fifty years of company history. Out of RS
Components 1,200 employees, 500, mostly on the manual side,
are members of the union which has negotiating rights, but
not a closed shop.
	
The personnel manager indicated that
theirs' was not a militant branch, a measure, in his opinion
of its non- militant local union antecedents. 	 There have
been two stoppages since the same-day distribution centre
opened, the longest lasting an hour after the imposition of a
smoking ban in the warehouse. The company is also attempting
to increase employee involvement in management by inviting
union contributions prior to decision making.	 Although
indicating a desire to integrate further into the "social
fabric" (Personnel Manager, 1986) of Corby most of the RS
managers live outside the town for the declared reason of
poor availability of good quality housing. It is admitted
that problems remain, for the 150 ex-London managers who
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moved with RS, in coming to terms with a Scottish unionised
town and that the unionisation allowed was an attempted
palliative to the new workforce.
In general the wages, terms and conditions compare
unfavourably with those pertaining in the steel works when
they were operational.	 In the case of Corby and Ebbw Vale
they also compare unfavourably with the wages existing in the
steel finishing remnants but the gaps between the steel
industry and the better new employers is diminishing,
especially in gross terms (as bonus payments become rarer in
some of the steel finishing plants) . For example, the range
of wages paid by Seamless Tubes Limited (one of Corby's
BSC-TI Group joint ventures) is between 130.08 and 161.27
pounds per week compared with RS Components 112 to 145 pounds
per week (1986, in both cases).
	
Previously the steel
companies made strenuous efforts to dominate the local labour
markets to the extent of excluding competing employers.
Since closure working conditions have changed within the
finishing works- the numbers of unions has been reduced
(without blastfurnacemen for example) and more flexible
working practices introduced (such as crane drivers having to
be prepared to move around the works instead of waiting for
work to come to them) . 	 Redundancies have continued long
after the main steel closure (over 2,000 after 1981 in each
of the areas) . For example privatisation of the plug mill to
Seamless Tubes in Corby resulted in a halving of the
workforce to under 250.
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Perhaps the most drastic change of conditions has occurred
at the 44 inch pipemill at Hartlepool. After the closure of
the adjoining plate mill in 1983 (incidentally the only
British mill properly equipped to roll the heavy plate
required for oil and gas uses) the 44 inch mill was reopened
on a core and contract worker basis.
"It was agreed the Corporation would retain the minimum
number of employees (to be known as core employees) to keep
the mill operational, provide a customer service and who
would have the knowledge, expertise to carry out trials and
be competant to train and supervise future Mill employees.
It was agreed that the Core Employees would be retained on
existing terms and conditions and their range of duties would
be the subject of a separate agreement.
It was agreed that Short Term employees would be recruited
for an individual customer order or a specific combination of
orders in the Mill on an individual contract of employment
for the duration of the defined orders." (BSC Enabling
Agreement 27th May 1983, signed by ISTC and GMBTU and NCCC
representatives)
Rates of pay for the contract workers ranged between 90 and
130 pounds per week from 1983. Maximum flexibility and
mobility was stipulated for contract workers from the outset.
For certain small orders only six contract workers have been
taken on and they have had to undertake each process in tube
production, following the work down the line.
Section 24, of the work practises acompanying the agreement
reads as follows:
"Semi/non skilled grades will perform any work as directed.
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For example:
Pipework
Rigging
Lubrication Duties
Boiler maintenance
Cleaning as required
Slinging as necessary
Chart changing
Crane driving"
BSC claimed that this arrangement was the only way to save
the mill, but it certainly resulted in their gaining the
upper hand with the trade unions and the large pool of
already trained labour that their own redundancy prograitme
had produced.
6.4 ALTERNATIVE PESPONSES TO REINDUSTRIALIZATION
Each of the areas has considered a very similar range of
alternative responses to the crisis of steel closure. 	 Most
are very much in line with the traditions of urban planning:
the promotion of tourism, retailing and office development.
The promotion of tourism and leisure are currently being
considered as the most promising methods of generating
employment and also attracting interest through casual visits
to the areas concerned.	 Blaenau Gwent markets its tiny
fragment of the Brecon Beacons National Park as a key focal
point of interest as well as proximity to the Big Pit mining
museum at Elaenavon.	 The main thrust of this Welsh steel
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closure area's leisure and recreation department is in
connection with the 1992 National Garden Festival which is to
be sited on the "heavy end" (the actual iron and steel
production sites) . The experience of previous British garden
festivals does not lead one to be optimistic about the
chances of successful commercial spinoffs in Blaenau Gwent.
At least it may result in the landscaping of the badly
disfigured part of the valley. Corby has Rockingham Castle
in its boundaries but the Council is now making strenuous
efforts to develop its own tourist attractions (apart from
the annual Highland Gathering which is already well
established). In 1987 a breakthrough was achieved in that
the council managed to reopen Corby station and sponsor a
shuttle local train service to KetterLng, on the main line to
London.	 This was thought to be the main obstacle to the
development of "Wonderworid" a large themepark scheme that
has existed only in glossy brochures and as a notice board in
a disused iron ore quarry for the past
	
five years.
Hartlepool has had more difficulty in developing its tourist
potential. The ancient resort of Seaton Carew now caters
mainly for day trippers and would require a major face lift
to become anything more. It is widely believed that more
could be made of Hartlepool's harbour facility, plans for a
marina development are being reevaluated. There has recently
been a debate in the local press (Hartlepool Mail) about the
missed oportunity presented by the HMS Warrior restoration;
it is felt that more access could have been provided and that
a stronger case made to retain the ship in Hartlepool rather
than letting it go to Portsmouth, for permanent exhibition.
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Retailing has already been discussed as a land use
alternative to industrial development. 	 Both Corby and
Hartlepool have now allowed retail developments on their
enterprise zones. Blaenau Gwent has not been able to match
the grandiosity of these schemes with its single Coop
superstore.
Office development has been considered desirable (Michael
Foot attempted to have BSC and central government office
functions located in Blaenau Gwent to absorb some of the
administrative staff made redundant by steel closure) for
these areas, but there has been little demand. If the
situation is difficult in recognised office centres such as
Reading (Boulding, 1984) where there is over-provision of
office space then it is compounded in steel closure areas,
where there is little or no tradition of commercial activity.
It is generally the local administrations and job creating
agencies themselves which provide the main demand for office
accommodation in these areas. 	 In Corby the council has
recently (1986) purchased the only hotel (the "Strathclyde")
for conversion to offices for its social services department
(at a controversial cost of over one million pounds) . In
Hartlepool the commercial rents are so low that it is a
mathematical impossibility for English Estates, the County
and Borough Councils ever to recoup the renovation costs of
the Old Municipal Buildings; now available as de luxe suites
(one is occupied by the enterprise agency). In Blaenau Gwent
the only new office built since steel closure houses the WDA
branch office, British Coal (Enterprise), the 	 Business
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Advisory Centre and the local representative of "Business in
the Community" (the enterprise agency umbrella organisation)
Hartlepool is the only one of the three areas where third
sector (ie community, non- market lead) responses have been
encouraged. These forms of activity are typically small
scale, often chaotically controlled and tend to involve very
little employment creation. 	 Hartlepool has a Community
Enterprise Trust and Enterprise Centre (directed by Tony
Mason) which has evolved out of the Cleveland Council of
Churches Unemployment Project's, Community Programme scheme.
A recent royal visit to the centre (combined with the opening
of two new factories) amounted to official sanctioning of
these efforts. The leader of Hartlepool council suggested
that he regarded these initiatives as merely temporary
measures to occupy the unemployed while awaiting a return to
full employment, an indication of the extent to which past
attitudes refuse to die. In Corby, although it was the only
area to have a workers cooperative operating in industrial
premises, the attitude is far more hard line capitalist with
attention to third sector activities considered an admission
of defeat. The same is true, to a lesser extent in Blaenau
Gwent, where the necessarily committed and dynamic leadership
has not come forward.
Given the ideological and financial restrictions upon
these particular (and many other) local authorities it is not
really surprising that
	 reindustrialization should be
attempted so readily. The local authorities in these areas
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are traditionally Labourist rather than socialist, seeing the
capitalist solution as the only way forward. They seem to
have taken Thatcher at her most negative: "there is no
alternative".	 In strictly financial terms they are probably
correct, as so much (and the amount is increasing to over
80%) of their budget is derived and controlled directly by
central government (Hudson and Plum, 1984) and there are
severe sanctions for "overspending".
6.5 COMPARISONS WITH OTHER AREAS
It maybe worthwhile including brief comparisons with other
areas in order to determine whether the experience of steel
closure areas has been unique or whether lessons can be
drawn, and applied, for other areas where industrial
development is being sought, or is taking place as a result
of other forms of state intervention. 	 Some general points
arise, firstly through examining other steel closure areas,
then other reindustrializing areas and finally industrial
growth areas.
Consett (Derwentside) provides an example of another steel
closure area in the north east which has had a similar "steel
town" social background to Corby. The conditions in Consett
have been as severe as any of the three areas selected for
this study. In Consett the steel closure was complete; with
no finishing capacity remaining at all.
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Elements of the Consett story compare strongly with
different onesof the three other areas of prime interest.
Consett most closely resembles Ebbw Vale in that very little
was achieved in terms of industrial diversification prior to
closure; but Derwentside's delay in appointing an industrial
development officer until July 1980 appears barely diligent
(Robinson and Sadler, 1984, p39) even if one has doubts
concerning the efficacy of such a move. The role of BSC(I),
as elsewhere, was to encourage the formation of a local
enterprise trust- the Derwentside Industrial Development
Agency	 (DIDA).	 A "Task Force" of central and local
government institutional representatives was established in
Consett to the same pattern as in each of the other areas.
Most critically, even using DIDA's figures, there had, by
1984	 (and there is little subsequent evidence to the
contrary), been insufficient jobs created in the Consett area
to cope with other closures, after the steel works shut. The
unemployment effects of the steel closure had not even been
addressed.	 English Estates have reported increased lettings
in Derwentside but these are not substantial enough to
account for the fall of over 1,000 in the unemployed total
for the district between February 1986 and May 1987. 100
extra YTS and 250 additional Community Programme places in
the same period account for a significant proportion of this
reduction.	 An associated, but unknown dimension, is the
effect of the "Restart" scheme in reducing the number of
unemployment benefit claimants (whilst offering few material
advantages)
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Derwentside has experienced a proliferation of community
ventures in the first seven years of the 1980's (primarily
under the MSC' s Community Programme) . The biggest agencies
in Consett were run by the YMCA and the Boys Brigade (see
Robinson and Sadler, 1984) . Perhaps the most high profile
effort has been the Consett Music Projects (established
1982) . This co-operative of local unemployed people began by
constructing a small recording studio and rehearsal space.
The project has now developed into music promotion and
established a regional record label. 	 It has also been
involved in a number of local educational projects using the
medium of popular music. Judging by the high level of demand
for studio time, this project is very popular with the young
unemployed but it suffers from the usual funding difficulties
of third sector organisations and faces an uncertain future.
Chapter 7.6 provides further evaluation of the alternatives.
Derwentside most closely resembles Hartlepool in terms of
claimed job creation totals, with 2,000 being indicated
(DIDA) but it must be remembered that the effort is far more
dispersed because the coal closure areas of Stanley and
Lanchester are also included. Blaenau Gwent, another steel
and coal closure area, has had a slight advantage over
Derwentside in being able to attract a number of motor
vehicle parts manufacturers from the West Midlands. The
contrasts between Corby and Consett have been highlighted
(Boulding, Hudson and Sadler, 1988) particularly in terms of
accessibility, but also in the fact that over four times as
many jobs have been created in the Northamptonshire town.
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The two places represent the extremities of the spectrum of
post steel closure experience.
There are eighteen steel closure areas (not including the
addition of Merthyr Tydfil in late 1987) and available
evidence (from unemployment figures, limited employment data,
personal contacts and other studies- eg Storey,
	
1983)
suggests that Blaenau Gwent represents something of a typical
level of achievement in terms of job generation (between
2,000 and 2,500 up to mid- 1987). Apart from Corby all the
others are a considerable distance from London and have
suffered as
	 a result	 of southern bias in business
perceptions.
Of all the area based economic interventions of the
Thatcher era the only major one not to include some steel
closure areas was, until mid-1986, the idea of Urban
Development Corporations (UDC's) . The experiences of the two
existent ones, in London Docklands and Merseyside could not
be more contrasting. London Docklands. is heralded as the
shape of things to come, in terms of the interaction between
public and private sector finance that is the mainstay of the
enterprise culture philosophy (where government spending will
be minimal and partnerships are expected to materialise
between the private and public sectors) . 	 The Docklands
development can justly be criticised for having offered
nothing to the indigenous population, apart from menial
janitorial types of employment; but plenty to property
speculators and expansive "post- big bang" City finance
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companies.	 It is reported now that rental values have been
ramped to such . a degree that the manufacturing enterprises
are increasingly unable to afford to stay in Docklands and
are moving elsewhere in a second stage decentralisation.
Although the Merseyside Development Corporation has achieved
some environmental improvements to its water front areas it
has failed to achieve much in the way of employment
generation. This, rather than London Docklands, is more
likely to be the model for the second wave of UDCs recently
announced for Tyneside, Teesside, Traf ford Park and Stoke on
Trent. Part of southern Hartlepool is actually designated in
the proposal for the Teesside UDC. The words of the regional
chief of the Department of the Environment, before being
appointed director of the Tyneside UDC, that "we always
forget	 Hartlepool"	 (A.	 Balls, 1986), may well prove
significant because the lion's share of the Teesside UDC
(director, Duncan Hall from Corby) is along the Tees at
Billingham, Middlesbrough and Stockton.
It may at first seem spurious to attempt to compare steel
closure areas with what are supposedly dynamic high growth,
"high tech" concentrations such as the M4 "corridor," but
both have been areas of manufacturing decline and the former
attempt to imitate the latter. 	 Indeed, in Britain, the
industries sought after to provide the new growth prospects
do nothing of the sort, in fact they are comparable with the
steel industry in their downward trends (if not at the same
rate and on the same scale). The EITB (Engineering Industry
Training Board) has compiled a set of employment figures from
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their statutory returns which
	 shows totals	 for the
electronics irdustry declining from 395,631 in 1978 to
329,906 in 1986 (though not as rapidly as in the rest of the
engineering industry). 	 The only regions to show employment
growth over the same period were Wales and Scotland (by 3,000
and 1,500 respectively) . When this information is ranked by
county, Berkshire and Hampshire show the greatest growth,
with other counties of perceived importance (eg Avon and
Cambridgeshire) outside the top twenty counties.	 Avon's
modest 1,000 growth came from a low base (smaller than Tyne
and Wear, Cumbria and Northumberland) and Cambridgeshire
indicated a decline of 1,300. Wiltshire, included in the
notional western corridor, also showed a decline.
The findings of the above paragraph are confirmed by the
work of the Reading based geographers Hall, Breheny, McQuaid
and Hart (1987). Also Hall and Markusen (1985) conclude that
"high tech" industrial growth is (apart from being very
difficult	 to	 define)	 located in highly specific
concentrations (between Cambridge and Hampshire and not all
along an elongated "corridor") has demanding environmental
and labour market requirements and is unlikely to be
replicated elsewhere.	 A key feature of the development of
the Berkshire sector of the "crescent" has been state
expenditure on government research establishments in the
smaller (to use another geometrical euphemism)	 "golden
triangle" between Reading, Oxford and Newbury. The main
elements of employment growth in most of these places has
been office	 services,	 largely decentralised routine
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functions.	 At the western end of the hypothetical corridor
state military expenditure has also been important but
directed through the aerospace rather than nuclear or
electronics industries (Lovering 1985 and 1987, and Boddy et
al, 1986) . Considering Bristol the latter authors concluded:
"The city's high-tech growth image and Silicon Valley
comparisons	 are	 largely wishful thinking, with little
immediate prospect of fulfilment," p.206.
If this is the situation in areas high on the lists of
potential "high tech" investors, what chance is there for
places such as Hartlepool with none of the benign images of
the Thames valley supposedly necessary to attract the
demanding specialist workers?	 This makes the 1984 press
release issued on Isocom's opening all the more improbable:
"HI-TECH HARTLEPOOL
Hartlepool is a town well used to adapting to the changing
face of industry, and is welcoming the arrival of the
microchip with open arms.
Sir Charles Villiers, former chairman of British Steel and
now chairman of BSC (Industry) Limited, 	 has compared
Hartlepool to California's "Silicon Valley" saying that the
town is well on its way to becoming Britain's "Silicon Port."
In the past few years no less than seven high technology
companies have set up in Hartlepool , providing a thriving
nucleus for an even bigger hi-tech "colony" in the future,"
(Hartlepool Borough Council, 1984a)
Reading has already been mentioned with regard to office
accommodation but it has also attracted a large number of
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more modern manufacturing developments (particularly in
computers and electronics sectors as well as more traditional
printing and warehousing) with very little promotion at all.
In fact, Reading's planners claim to be among the few
actually practising planning, in that their jobs involve
selectivity of the developments they approve. 	 Another
example of an industrial growth area, but a more local
competitor of Corby's, is Milton Keynes. 	 As a London
overspill New Town (Corby only acquired that status as an
afterthought) Milton Keynes has undertaken a great deal of
expensive industrial promotion: expenditure of over 500000
pounds per year, but has been substantially more successful
than Corby in generating new jobs (facilitated by its prime
Ml location and closer proximity to the capital) . For the
vast majority of firms in Reading and Milton Keynes the
industrial incentives offered by steel closure areas do not
outweigh the commercial and business environmental incentives
offered by the south east (and do not even outweigh the
higher domestic and commercial property prices that are
endured as a result).
Reindustrialization is not solely a Thatcherite or even
monetarist phenomenon, but is a feature of several capitalist
economies most notably France, particularly in the early
years of the Mitterand regime. Mitterand built upon the
administrative systems of the previous Gaullist eras
represented by the DATAR (Delegation a l'Ainenagement du
Territoire et a l'Action Regionale) regional commissions for
reindustrialization (Zukin, 1985). In 1982, in an attempt to
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break down the forces of centralisation, so long a feature of
the French state, the Socialist regime granted the regions
autonomy on local and regional economic issues (Hudson and
Sadler, 1986) . The two regions primarily concerned are the
Nord-Pas de Calais and Lorraine, which hosted concentrations
of steel, mining and textiles. The Nord-Pas de Calais now
has a regional enterprise agency (Association pour le
Renouveau Industriel- ARI) and an economic development
directorate which provide direct subsidies to investment (for
land, employment, enterprise creation and business advice).
The French have also developed a limited nunther of enterprise
zones (three) with one in the steel area of Dunkirk. 	 The
French equivalents	 of BSC(I) and NCB(E) are Sodinor
(established by Usinor)	 and Finorpa	 (established by
Charbonnages	 de	 France) (Financial 	 Times 1987b).	 Both
organisations provide loan finance (often unsecured) in very
similar ways to their British counterparts. A French variant
has been the attempted use of other (newly nationalised)
industries to locate in the hardest hit regions. Thus the
Thomson electronics group was encouraged to locate a plant at
Longwy, the architypal French steel closure town, scene of
riots in 1979. This policy has met with only limited success
(Zukin,	 1985)	 as unemployment remains high in these
localities. The parallels with Britain extend into the
absurd too; like Corby, Lorraine has been promoted as a venue
for a themepark which has yet to materialise. 	 A site at
Hagondange, near the Luxembourg border, has been selected by
a group of entrepreneurs for an American style venture
centred on the "Smurfs" (or "Schtroumpfs" as they are known
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locally)
The first use of the term "reindustrialization" was in the
United States of America, hence the americanised spelling of
the term used in this study, (attributed to Amitai Erzioni,
New York Times, 1980) and something of an intellectual debate
has resulted (see, for example, Wolff,1981, Luria
	
and
Russell,1981, and Block, 1984).
	
It has featured in the
policies of both the Carter and Reagan administrations. 	 As
one might predict, in America the word has come to be
associated "in terms of international	 productivity
comparisons and considerations of enhanced competitiveness"
(Lembcke and Hart-Landsberg, 1985), rather than the European
concern for employment regeneration. 	 Re-tooling and
technological developments are integral to the American
corporate vision of reindustrialization. 	 Despite the
rhetoric, most recent employment growth in the United States
has been in the service sectors (often domestic and personal
services) with an emphasis upon part-time, low paid work.
There have been efforts on the part of city administrations
in the "rust belt" (places such as Cleveland and Pittsburgh)
to diversify and regenerate "downtown" areas using measures
familiar in Britain. There is a decreasing amount of Federal
aid available (though the Urban Development Action Grants are
still in use) but money has mostly to be found from the
decreasing (as suburbanization continues) metropolitan tax
bases or charitable foundations of major corporations left in
the heartland areas	 (Standard Oil in Cleveland, the
Rockerfellers in Pittsburgh, Industrial Union Dept., 1986).
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Between 1981 and 1984 23 States initiated enterprise zone
laws on the British pattern with a few significant changes,
namely: exemption from environmental laws and the overt
waiving of rights of workers to trade union organisation.
Elsewhere the (elected) city administrations have used the
inducements of tax abatement to encourage inner city
industry.	 Under this system the city undertakes to
relinquish revenue for a decade from newly-arrived
industries. This is in marked contrast to the small scale
tax incentives offered in Thatcher's enterprise zones.
Losses of up to 39% of jobs in "smokestack" industries have
not been made up by the various efforts to induce new
businesses and demolish ghettoes.
6.6 ,CONCLUSIONS
Overall the most striking aspect of this exercise has been
the similarities between the post- closure experiences of
Hartlepool, Corby and Blaenau Gwent.	 With a few minor
exceptions the incentives package offered by each of the
areas has been very much the same. The differences have been
of a mainly local administrative nature, indicating the
variety of social traditions these areas represent (these
historical differences will be referred to in the final
chapter, below) . A generalised assessment of the political
product of these differences might conclude that Corby could
be described as mainstream Thatcherite, Hartlepool as right
wing Labourist and Blaenau Gwent as centre Labourist. BSC(I)
has been even-handed with its dealings with each of the
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areas, but has been reducing its presence since 1984.
Perhaps Hartlepool has had least government attention due to
the absence of any major intermediate state body (such as the
CNT or WDA) because the English Estates Corporation has a
much more limited function, despite its recent advertising as
an imitation of the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies.
The nature and extent of the anti- closure campaign, has
had very little effect on the resources invested to
reindustrialize.	 Perhaps the main legacy of the anti-
closure campaigns has been the degree of urgency given to
reparation measures by the local councils.	 Corby took the
most extreme mea5ures, rejecting the predicted socio-
democratic route and opting for the New Right expediency of
direct control (through the all- powerful JIDC) and by
restructuring the local authority, particularly the planning
department. Blaenau Gwent (the new council was formed at the
time of closure) gave the chairman of the Industrial
Development Committee full executive powers and developed the
Business Advisory Centre in conjunction with the WDA and
BSC(I). The reaction in Hartlepool was more conservative- to
continue in much the same way; to support the establishxnnent
of the Enterprise Agency but ensure that it was strictly
controlled.
There is a considerable imbalance between the relatively
small reductions in the unemployment totals and the numbers
of jobs claimed to have been "created" in each of the areas.
It is a matter for some debate as to whether this is due to a
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large residue of "unemployable" ex-steelworkers, as suggested
by Corby's director of industry, or whether the jobs have
been going to people not registered for benefits or whether
the agencies have been "economical with the truth" over the
number of jobs "created" (and especially the numbers lost
through subsequent closures)
There are common elements to all three areas in the nature
of the industries generated by reindustrialization. The
firms tend to be small, non-unionised and unstable. 	 Wages
and conditions compare, in general, unfavourably with those
pertaining previously in the steel industry. 	 The
opportunities for organising the labour forces into trade
unions are much reduced by: obstructive management practises
(playing on the large reserve army of the unemployed), the
balkanisation of workers into small units, and by high levels
of antipathy towards the union movement amongst workers
because of the inefficacy of the steel unions' opposition to
closure.
Probably the most telling set of factors	 in
differentiating the ability of the various areas to generate
new industrial development has been geographical. In almost
the same way as it has been extremely unlikely that the
London Docklands would fail to develop in the way that it
has, so has Corby, the nearest development area to London,
the best chance of attracting the highest proportion of
mobile	 industry amongst steel closure areas. 	 If, as
government propaganda would have us believe, 	 we are
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experiencing a market led recovery, then proximity to markets
seems to be a deciding industrial location factor.
Enterprise zones and other incentives have been important for
marketing and highlighting the areas rather than being
particularly significant in themselves. These steel closure
areas have sought to overcome the problems of single industry
dependence through reindustrialization but have not been
successful in encouraging a stable blend of responsible
employers. The prospects for all of them (including Corby as
the CNT reduces its commitment) are not promising.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUS IONS
"Surely, the first fact we must face is that all three
parties are stuffed with aged tub-thuxnpers and superannuated
windbags.	 To most intelligent people, politics are
synonymous with claptrap. To be a candidate is to submit to
a personally huniiliating experience, in which the set smile
freezes on your face like a grin on a corpse.	 Dead ideas.
Dead thoughts. Dead slogans. All of them sicked up on your
doorstep. No wonder people are disgusted by this gruesome
charade, this withered apology for the passion and compassion
which ought to be slicing through all the apathy,
bewilderment and cynicism .....which is there."
Dennis Potter (1967) "Vote Vote Vote For Nigel Barton."
7.1	 INTRODUCTION
This final chapter attempts to draw together the
preceeding material into some sort of unity. The intention
is to reintroduce some of the theoretical material from
chapter 2 in such a way as, not only to enhance the
understanding of evolving historical situations in the three
specified steel closure areas, but also to generalise the
lessons learnt for the many other areas in similar
predicaments.	 Evaluation of past events inevitably leads to
speculation as to future ones. These speculations tend to
the pessimistic becauseit is felt that reindustrialization
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is,	 at	 best, a partial solution to the problems of
economically declining areas and, at worst, a
	
cynical
palliative exercise with sinister overtones for the erosion
of workers' rights, the deliberate fostering of mass
unemployment and the destabilisation of socialism.
This chapter consists of six sections dealing, in turn,
with the	 salient	 issues	 of the	 thesis.	 Firstly,
methodological issues are discussed, as these impact on the
relationship between the theoretical and the empirical.
Secondly, attempts are made to condense the abstract theories
concerning the web of interactions between the state, civil
society and capital. Suggestions will be made as to how and
why the UK state has attempted to reindustrialize and whether
such policies have come about as a result of pressures from
within, from capital or from civil society. In the third
section the impacts upon manufacturing capital will be
assessed.	 The questions addressed here will include the
variable impacts upon different sizes and types of firms and
whether manufacturing itself has become a pawn of the state
as it is being increasingly asked to display a social
conscience and pay for services previously rendered by the
state. The fourth section is concerned with the residual and
perhaps perpetual problem of employment generation: the fact
that despite the exaggerated claims for numerical success in
job "creation" there remain distinct doubts as to the quality
and durablility of many of the new jobs. 	 It is hoped to
show, too, that the relationship between employment and
unemployment is becoming increasingly tenuous,	 on a
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statistical basis, as other factors (such as temporary
training or "make work" schemes and certain demographic
effects) intervene. In section five there is an analysis of
the paucity of policy alternatives; both those considered and
those ignored.	 What are the electoral and political
obstacles to the implementation of policies more atuned to
the needs of such distressed communites? The final section
(the sixth) concludes with an examination of the poverty of
the prospects faced by these areas, in the absence of signs
of a major structural upturn in the national economy, the
likely contiriuence of jobless growth in manufacturing output
(through the application of new technology and ensuing
increases in productivity) and the corollary of perpetual
high levels of unemployment in traditional manufacturing
areas. Given the current electoral predominance of the
Thatcherite Tories, are there any signs of hope for anywhere
outside the south that does not have very specific dependence
upon certain types of manufacturing (particularly military
related)?
7.2 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Perhaps the most important initial consideration for
methodolgy has to be selection of the topic and secondly the
approach adopted in its examination. In this case both were
determined, to a large degree, by other people. This study
has been undertaken with an Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) linked award. It is apparent in other cases
that there is a considerable degree of laxitude in the
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strength of linkages involved: not so here. At the time of
specification, . the title of the award was designated as:
reindustrialization programmes in steel closure areas in the
European Community.	 It was linked to the work of Dr. Ray
Hudson and Dr. David Sadler on European steel closures.
There was a strong suggestion of opting for a comparative
methodology as this had been successfully adopted in Dr.
Sadler's thesis. Personally, the linked award was useful as
a solution to subject selection problems and provided the
basis for further study of material of interest brought to my
attention during an undergraduate course of Dr. Hudson's on
deindustrialzation and regional change. 	 As part of this
course a visit to Hartlepool's Industrial Development Officer
(Eddie Morley)	 was	 arranged; his enthusiasm for the
regeneration of industry was memorable, as was the tour of
PMA Textiles.
The comparative method in geography can be described as an
extensive one, depending upon the location of, and number of
places to be studied. The problem was to decide just how
many places could manageably be attempted, allowing a
reasonably intensive coverage of each, within the three year
allocation of the award. After some consideration a total of
three British areas was decided upon (it was initially hoped
to include a fourth area from elsewhere in the European
Community, but this proved to be unworkable). 	 Concurrently,
attempts were made to obtain as much secondary information as
possible on all the eighteen British steel closure areas.
The most important sources of this information were: Storey's
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(1983) study of BSC(I), NOMIS (National Online Manpower
Information System) and published material obtained by
circularising the areas. A matrix was produced showing the
importance of steel employment in each area (using absolute
figures	 and Storey's location quotients and rankings),
unemployment figures, rates and changes, the numbers of new
jobs created (claims and projections) and (where available)
costs per job, assisted area and enterprise zone status, and
a qualitative indication of the response to the requests for
information. Other important considerations were that the
areas selected should represent as wide a variety of social
and political conditions as possible. The NOMIS ACE (Annual
Census of Employment- actually triannual after 1978) data was
used to produce tables showing changes in regional steel
employment (as percentages of male and steel employment) and
for each of the steel closure areas (as defined using
amalgamated office areas) to produce tables and histograms of
the 1971-1981 changes in male and total employment using 1968
SIC orders.	 Changes in MLH's 311 (iron and steel general)
and 312 (steel tubes) 1971 -1981 were also examined for the
steel closure areas.	 The terms of usage of the ACE data
restrict the publication of much of this information as it
might identify individual companies in matters of company
confidentiality.	 The three	 areas	 eventually selected
represented the range of steel closure experience and nearly
the entire range of state assistance to industry available
(only certain textile and British Shipbuilders' area measures
are lacking).
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It may be important to discuss the applicability of the
steel closure' area experiences to other areas. In effect,
the steel closure areas have experienced the very worst
influences of structural industrial decline and have had
significant, if not commensurate, amounts of state aid as a
result.	 It is by no means easy to determine if the steel
closure areas chosen here are representative of assisted or
"inner city" areas.
	 In terms of the historical causes of
industrial decline they represent a severe manifestation of
the influences of recession and structural decay. They may
be less typical in that this has come about as a direct
result of nationalised industry activity (on a par only with
the coal fields) . BSC(I) was the first (1975) of the major
industrial job "creation" agencies so it can be argued that
it is the only one with a history long enough to merit
in-depth analysis. The initiatives fostered by BSC have been
copied widely, in particular the development of local
enterprise agencies and the widespread development of small
industrial workshop units. Perhaps of most significance is
the fact that the conditions existent in the steel closure
areas have now been generalised to cover large parts of the
UK outside the South East, East Anglia and parts of the South
West, as well as many of the older industrial regions of
Western Europe,	 and,	 increasingly,	 parts	 of Japan.
Unemployment is a widespread problem. It is ironic, then,
that the measures taken in steel closure areas should be the
subject of so much flattering imitation when their
achievement brings such dubious benefits. Local initiatives
(particularly the inculcation of the values of the enterprise
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culture) are very much the international "flavour of the
month" in the increasingly desperate attempts to generate
employment. The "fiddling while Rome burns" continues, as
the fundamental questions of the state's inability to manage
capitalist society and the alienation of large swathes of the
population in "redundant places" remain unaddressed, let
alone answered (by the mainstream of politicians)
As mentioned above, the main element of the research
strategy employed has been the comparison of three British
steel closure areas. The approach adopted for this task was
to collect material from comparable sources in each of the
areas.	 Key actors (with slightly varying titles) were
interviewed on a semi-structured basis (most were taped).
Central	 and local government administrators, 	 local
councillors, industrialists, personnel managers, enterprise
agency directors, BSC(I) representatives, factory workers and
ex-steelworkers formed the bulk of those interviewed (see
Appendix 2).	 In each area the residual BSC plants were
visited to gain an impression (albeit partial) of the local
characteristics of steel-related employment.	 A week (in
1986) was spent on the Corby (ex-BSC plug mill) site in close
examination of the privatised Seamless Tubes Ltd (part TI
Group, part BSC) . This visit provided useful insights into
the troubled "oil country tubular goods" market, some of the
difficulties of partial denationalisation and the extent to
which trade unions have had to give way to repeated calls for
redundancies at the same time as adopting increasingly
flexible working arrangements.
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The principal quantitative (though there were some
important qualitative elements) comparitive tool was 	 a
nineteen section questionnaire, distributed amongst the
manufacturing firms in each area. 	 To ensure as complete
coverage as possible I attempted to identify all the users of
industrial premises possible, from the various 	 lists
published by local authorities (including in the case of
Corby, the Commission for New Towns) . 	 I also included
several firms encountered but not mentioned in the lists.
The accuracy of the lists was extremely variable with Corby
Industrial Development Centre's being the worst (nearly 150
of the firms mentioned had either failed or moved elewhere)-
this, incidentally, did not give rise to confidence in their
"employment created" data, and Hartlepool's being the best
(the reasons being that its was the most recent and included
the presence of an established nucleus of companies and a
relatively small number of new arrivals). Where possible the
addressee was the individual company owner/manager identified
in the lists.	 In order to maximise the return rate each
questionnaire was personally delivered to the firm,
preferrably to the manager in question, or at least his
secretary and at worst to the receptionist or another
employee.	 The accompanying letter gave a brief explanation
and included a date for collection of the completed
questionnaire.	 The return visits proved important as memory
joggers and frequently involved spending time with the
recipient,	 often actually filling in the questions as
dictated (in the form of a structured interview). 	 If no
response resulted after four weeks a follow up letter
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requesting postal return was sent out including another copy
of the questionnaire. Such activities resulted in an average
response rate of 66%, which is considered satisfactory.
During the course of the work several refinements emerged
that were not included, in order to retain the validity of
the comparative method. There could have been a question
which analysed in greater depth the nature of the
establishment of the firms (apart from the date and whether
and whence they had moved); it would have been better to have
discovered the date of foundation of the company and where
the owners originated or had previously worked. This would
have helped to distinguish amongst the non-movers which firms
represented an influx of capital, which were genuinely local
"start ups" and which were formed by managers "buy outs".
The only agency not included that should have been, was
NCB(Enterprise) as this was proving increasingly important,
especially in Elaenau Gwent. Ideally, it should have been
referred to by the companies under "other" (as it was in some
cases), but the observed tendency was for them to tick only
those actually there.	 The usual caveats about post hoc
rationalisation of company behaviour apply to several of the
later questions; it is assumed that the companies were being
truthful, but there is no way of authenticating the responses
to such subjective demands.
Perhaps the most interesting secondary material used on a
comparative basis for each area were the consultants'
reports.	 At various times (usually immediatley prior to
steel closure) the local authorities and BSC(I) commissioned
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reports from consultants in order to identify the best course
of action to create new jobs. More important than their
recommendations were the accompanying studies of previous
attempts to generate employment and existing industrial
conditions. Other significant secondary material (apart from
the usual academic avenues) was provided by various
broadcasts (particularly Channel 4 's "Union World" and
certain BBC Radio 4 and World Service productions)
It was most instructive attempting to gain access to
industrial development committee reports and minutes. Every
possible bureaucratic obstacle was erected, or I was simply
met with outright refusal. This posed something of a moral
dilemma- if official channels were denied how far could
unofficial channels be justified? In the cases of Hartlepool
and Corby the compromise was achieved by gaining access
through sympathetic local councillors. In Blaenau Gwent a
sympathetic councillor provided the introduction to the
official source only after written requests and protracted
negotiations which included	 repeated	 promises	 of
confidentiality.	 It	 is	 difficult to	 see how the
deliberations of industrial development committees	 (in
general exceedingly dull) can merit such excessive caution.
The desire to preserve commercial confidences is used by a
number of state bodies as justification for restriction of
access to a broad range of data. Of more pertinent political
interest is probably the desire to keep secret (from the
electorate and other competing capitals) the type and extent
of particular assistance to companies. It is also likely
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that the authorities wish to keep the public as ill-informed
as possible abeut the failures of industrial policies for the
sake of legitimating their continuence. Each authority, as a
competitor on the place market, attempts to preserve its own
industrial initiatives from imitation by others; the problem
is that in industrial development there is almost nothing new
under the sun, local authority incentives being instituted
within the financial limitations placed upon them by central
government.
In conclusion to this section, it must be stressed that
throughout this work there was tension between the intensive
and the extensive methods, i.e. how .much time and effort
could be devoted to a particular area and how this could be
replicated in the other areas. Distance from Durham and ease
of access played important roles in this. 	 Hartlepool
received the slightly more attention than Corby (where I was
fortunate enough to have a very convenient research base).
It is freely admitted that it was less easy to get access, on
a regular basis, to Blaenau Gwent and that this resulted in
fewer follow up company interviews and fewer trade union
contacts than in the other localities.
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7.3	 THE CONFUSED STATE?
In attempting to explain and understand the phenomenon of
reindustrialization, as experienced in Britain, it seemed
sensible to examine the various strands of state theories.
The problem, often encountered elsewhere, has been that these
theories tend towards the abstract and are not easily or
directly relatable to the reality as empirically realised.
The problem faced here is how to select, from the body of
state theory, that which is sufficient to form the basis of a
more prosaic approach, which recognises some of the inherent
contradictions between different manifestations of state
intervention in industry. Because of restrictions of time
and the intensive/extensive tension. referred to above, this
study has been limited to direct involvement with the tiX
state (although there are references to studies in the US and
elsewhere in the EC), which is by no means typical of even
OECD nations.	 For example, bureacratic insularity and
excessive secrecy are the norm in Britain; there is no
written constitution and the electoral system is grossly
unrepresentative. Increasingly, control of activities which
were the traditional province of local authorities has been
centralised or concentrated in Westminster. However, many of
the initiatives experimented with by the UK state have been
imitated (or derived from) elsewhere, so examination of them
may not be solely an Anglo-centric interest.
As mentioned in chapter two, Offe provides the most useful
set of state theories for the purposes of this study. It is
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proposed to link the main elements of Of fe's state theory to
reindustrialization as experienced by this study.
	
Each of
the four principal characteristics of the state- exclusion,
maintenance, dependency and legitmation- has some bearing
upon reindustrialization. Exclusion, whereby the state keeps
its distance from profit making capital, is represented by
the state's adoption of a "hands off" approach offering loans
and subsidies to firms with very few qualifications and no
actual management input.	 It is becoming increasingly
fashionable for public and private sector "partnership"
arrangements to take place (eg "Business in the Community",
the new inner city technical colleges and task forces), but
the terms of the partnership are generally in favour of
capital.	 Maintenance,	 through the implementation of
political decisions most conducive to the needs of private
capital, certainly provides an adequate rationale for
nationalisation of key industries (such as steel) but only a
general reason for reindustrialization. 	 Without the
reindustrialization measures it would be very difficult to
maintain the conditions for private accumulation in the steel
closure and other hard hit areas. Offe (1975) indicates that
the state is dependent upon private capital for the means to
fulfil its political programmes. The income of the state is
derived from taxes upon property, wages and profits.
Reindustrialization can be seen as an attempt to increase tax
revenue by encouraging the proliferation of industry and
income tax payers, through notions of wealth creation. It is
supposed (a major supposition) that this rationale is based
upon longer term considerations than the costs of closure and
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the costs of regeneration (eg subsidies, rebates, promotion
and the employment costs of industrial development sections)
Perhaps legitimation is the most important of Offe's state
characteristics to have a bearing upon reindustrialization.
In its desire to conceal its true nature as a capitalist
state (see also above on the local implications of this) Offe
suggests that the state acts in accordance with the
continuous requirements of accumulation within the rule of
law, as established through the democratic process. This is
especially true of steel closure areas where the state is
directly implicated as the major cause of economic and social
hardship. Reindustrialization programmes offer the illusion
of future economic sustenance for a locality and can be said
to legitimate the closure decision in the minds of the local
inhabitants (particularly when the displaced workers are
offered seemingly generous redundancy payments). Through
reindustrialization the state is seen to be "playing fair",
by giving people in the assisted areas equal opportunities to
participate in the commonwealth. A potentially antagonistic
electorate is appeased and the conditions of capital
accumulation are generalised. As in much else, the practice
is rather different from the theory.
In chapter two it was suggested that reindustrialization
programmes could be described as "post productive" using
Of fe's approach to modes of state intervention. This, whilst
being undeniable, masks the fact that reindustrialization is
more properly described as allocative in that resources
already under the state's control (particularly financial
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ones) are allocated to regenerate industry. 	 The productive
input is limited to the characteristics of the allocation;
e.g. regional development grants are	 often used for
investment in machinery. Of fe also argues against study of
the content of state policies alone, the adoption of
functional procedures merits equal attention. The duality of
problem recognition and response is important as circular
linkages tend to alter the perception of the problem
(potentially raising new issues) and shape the formation of
subsequent	 policies.	 The	 current	 concern	 for
reindustrialization (i.e. a tendency towards
	
in	 situ
regeneration of manufacturing) has definitely grown out of
the post war regional policy consensus.
	 The concern for
manufacturing persists (particularly in the DTI) despite the
rise of the ill-defined and heterogeneous service sector.
The rise of local measures is partly a result of the failure
of regional policy to bring about an equitable distribution
of industry and a recognition of the general collapse of
manufacturing (though not to the extent of abandoning it
altogether), in that it is recognised that there are too few
mobile firms.	 It also conveniently fits into the
liberalistic	 notions	 of	 the	 enterprise	 culture,
entrepreneurism and popular capitalism, which have been the
hallmark of the last three Thatcher regimes.
The concept of civil society, as developed by Gramsci and
later	 Urry,	 is	 important	 for this	 analysis	 of
reindustrialization because it helps to explain why on
occasions the state may appear to act against the interests
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of capital.	 If one accepts the premise that steel closure
areas have beeN declared "redundant spaces" (i.e. of no
further use for capital) then to attempt to regenerate
industry in these localities is to run counter to the
requirements of capital. The magnitude of the inducements in
such areas endorses such a view. It is as a response to the
private social interests of the civil society that the state
undertakes obligations that include 	 reindustrialization.
Urry's	 (1981) diagrammatic representation of the three
interacting "spheres" 	 of	 civil	 society-	 circulation,
reproduction and struggle provides the key to this response.
The state wishes to maintain the reproduction of the work
ethic and the circulation of money in civil society whilst at
the same time reducing the impact of any struggle resulting
from its prior decisions.
The term hegemony has been used to describe (again by
Grainsci and Urry) the belief system implantation throughout
civil society of establishment values. Capitalism has to be
seen to	 care	 (often	 a Tory Party claim) or, more
specifically, to have an acceptible face 	 (Ted Heath,
reversed) .	 If "ghost towns" were allowed to develop in
Britain as a direct result of state action, the hegemony
exerted by the state might be seriously questioned beyond the
realms of academia.	 Perhaps the most pertinent recent
example might be the Thatcherite claim that "there is no
alternative"; economic hardship is (this plays very much upon
the Protestant work ethic) somehow good for one, and that a
leaner industrial base will be better able to cope with some
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future upturn in the economy. 	 Reindustrialization supports
the	 traditional	 values	 of	 the	 capitalist	 classes,
particularly reinforcing the manager's "right" to manage, in
its subjugation of organised labour. Judging by the weak
responses of the labour movement to closures and the
perpetuation of high levels of mass unemployment, the threats
to a breakdown in the capitalist state's hegemony seem
unlikely to be realised.	 The recently "bullish" stock
market, coupled with generous state share issues, whereby
millions more people own shares and profitted (until
mid-October, 1987) by the fluctuations of capital, can be
seen to have had an impact on the June 1987 election results.
It is generally recognised that those people participating in
the capitalist system on a full-time job basis, are better
off under this regime than previously.	 Thatcherism has
succeeded in hegemonising the individualistic rather than the
collective notions of capitalism. 	 This has been so
successful that local initiatives are increasingly being
accepted as the norm and that the central government has no
further responsibility in these matters.
It may well be that the efforts of Offe and others to
define rules for policy formation have been misguided,
because there seems to be no adequate rationale behind the
sum of government industrial policy.	 The closest to a
guiding strategy was the broad intention to create wealth
(DTI interview August 1987) . It may be preferrable to return
to Of fe's state- duality problem solving approach, whereby
the state's reaction to a particular problem (by adopting new
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organisational procedures) colours the perception of future
problems, through the very nature of the policy solutions
offered. It is possible, then, that the state has got itself
into a rut, so that the only solution possible is to continue
along the lines of reindustrialization. Particular policies
tend to arise according to the needs of the moment, implying
that, within the limitations of the capitalist system, the
state lurches from one crisis to another.	 As one set of
policies	 fails, another emerges to do the same, each
sustained momentarily by the prevailing hegemony. 	 The main
aim of	 reindustrialization, the locally deconcentrated
regeneration of industry, can be seen as the end point in a
chain of
	 industrial policies which originated in the
redistributive national economic intentions of regional
policy, as it existed for most of the post-war period. If,
as is likely, the local option proves fruitless, it is
difficult to see how policies can go any further along this
continuum than the stimulation of prospective entrepreneurs
into setting up their own businesses. Unless third sector
initiatives (essentially acting within capitalist societies,
but outside the capitalist relations of production) are given
serious consideration, the options currently to be faced
involve: a continuence of present policies, a return to more
active national state intervention (including, potentially, a
purposive industrial policy) or some kind of withdrawal from
industrial support (with the exception of support 	 for
enterprise)
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7.3.1 The Place Market- a hard sell
Some state theory indicates that contradictions emerge in
the mode of operation of the state (Offe,1975) but there are
none that explain the state actually engendering competion
within itself for its own resources. Competition between
places to attract new or mobile industry has been a feature
of British local government practice since before the
recession of the 1920's and 1930's. The characteristics of
this competition (i.e. the extent to which central government
dictats are followed and socialist integrity put aside) are
derived from the class attributes of the local authorities.
This idea is derived from Cooke (1983), already quoted in
chapter two, where he states that local government (he
actually uses the words "local state") is a representation of
the variations of local class relations. Although the range
and type of industrial incentives on offer in each of the
areas is broadly the same, there is some variation in the
approach and degree of commitment to the "hard sell", which
the authorities still deem necessary. One reason why Corby
should institute such an overtly commercial campaign, to the
extent of attracting a number of visits from cabinet
ministers, as well as becoming the first English enterprise
zone,	 is	 that	 it has a much shorter history of
industrialization (less than 50 years of steelmaking) . 	 The
inertia of Labourism had not had time to develop fully,
despite the fact that many of the migrant workers came from
traditionally militant Scottish regions- the impression is
that many wished to eradicate certain aspects (but not
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cultural ones) of their Scottish past. Although by no means
typical, Corby was a New Town and relict features of this
ethos remain. Hartlepool, with its mid-nineteenth century
heavy industrialization, 	 had a much longer and more
established tradition of socialist (previously Liberal)
activity which represented itself, whilst the town embraced
the enterprise culture (receiving enterprise zone and setting
up an enterprise agency), in a less dramatic industrial
presentation effort than Corby. It must be remembered that
in Hartlepool the steel closure was just one out of many
large scale closures and cutbacks that had the effect of
further demoralising an already "shell-shocked" community.
Blaenau Gwent's industrial history and socialisation was the
longest of the three. It was part of one of Cooke's "radical
regions" in the early nineteenth century (it is a moot point
as to whether it has remained so until now) with
participation in the Merthyr Riots (1831) and the Chartist
movement of the following decade. Aneurin Bevan was MP in
the 1930's and was succeeded by Michael Foot, both members
enjoyed the largest Labour majorities in the Commons. Nearly
two hundred years of working class culture has left its mark.
There are high expectations of the state (whether it be local
or central government) for the replacement of lost
employment.	 These are exemplified by the Borough Council's
takeover of the MSC Skiliceritre which was faced with closure
in	 1982.	 Control of the Business Advisory Centre is
rigorously maintained by the local authority, which is
reluctant to devolve any decision- making to an enterprise
agency or trust. However, the scale of the problem has
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resulted in a very pro-business attitude: the chairman of the
industrial development committee has executive authority and
virtually a full-time job. Thus, although the effects and
outward appearances of the reindustrialization programmes may
seem very similar in each of the three areas the mode of
delivery and perception behind them depends upon somewhat
different class backgrounds.
What must not be overlooked is that the eighteen steel
closure areas are competing against
	
each other	 (the
Association of Steel Closure Area Authorities has no real
unifying influence), against all the other assisted areas,
against all the other areas which constitute the 400
(approximately) enterprise agencies and trusts in Britain and
against a small selection of places where there is no need to
promote industry;	 to say nothing of international
competition.	 At the moment the place market is a buyers one
(and likely to remain so for the forseeable 	 future).
Competition is fierce and the price exacted (from local
labour and diminishing local financia. resources) is high.
7.3.2 BSC Industry - the Palliative
Ever since the mid-nineteen seventies' the British Steel
Corporation has been regarded as socially progressive in
management circles. It is assumed that the creation of
BSC(I) stemmed from an earnest and deep- seated social
concern about the effects of its massive closure campaign at
the time. In the Development Strategy to the Early Eighties
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(BSC, 1972- as revealed by Bryer et al, 1982) a more cynical
side to the strategy is shown up:
"the Corporation can, with Ministerial approval, itself
develop, participate in or invest in new non-steel projects
which would create job opportunities, and it has it in mind
that it should take all reasonable opportunity of doing so.
It can also redevelop its redundant sites, or lease or sell
them to industrial developers, in such a way as to promote
job creation. At the most optimistic estimate, however, such
BSC initiatives are unlikely to make any significant
contribution towards replacing lost steel job opportunities,
though they might have a significant presentational value in
dealing with employees and the trade unions."
The public face of BSC's social policy was drafted in
somewhat different terms two years later (1975) when the
Chairman, Sir Montague Finniston, presented a paper on
Manpower Reduction and Social Responsiblity- The BSC
Experience, to the June meeting of the National Economic
Development Organisat ion:
"ESC has never disregarded social consequences in formulating
proposals; indeed claims to be in the van of British
industrial practise in the matter of humane social policies.
The importance of social policy and manpower planning was
recognised from the first statutory organisation report in
1967 - published within a week of vesting date where it was
stated that the aim of long term profit maximisation must be
persued consistently with ensuring the 'socially responsible
utilisation of human resources.'"
The rationale behind the position as presented to the Board
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meeting of 31st July 1975 was made clear in a memorandum
written by board memeber Ron Smith; this meeting approved the
establishment of BSC (Industry) Ltd to put the ideas into
practise. Sections 1 and 2 read as follows (and date the
piece very specifically as it is committed to a return to
full employment)
"1.	 It	 is the Government's responsibility to create
economic, social and industrial conditions in the country
which will provide full employment as the ebb and flow of
markets and technology compel individual companies to make
adjustments to their labour forces. It is its particular
responsibility to do this in areas of high unemployment and
in areas where high unemployment can be foreseen.
2. Nevertheless, the Corporation, as a. socially responsible
employer, has accepted that it should augment the efforts
being made by Government to replace some 40,000 jobs which
will be lost in the closure areas over the next 5-6 years as
it progresses with its rationalisation programme. 	 It has
done so partly spurred by the need to secure the co-operation
of trade unions, employees, and their communities as it makes
changes in the size, technology and productivity of its
plants, thus encouraging the Government to give consistent
support to the development strategy which is critical to the
long term viability of the Corporation and to stable
employment in the industry."
Section 16 of this memorandum put forward the assumption that
BSC(I)'s purpose would be achieved in "about 10 years", an
approximation that was not overgenerous, given the increasing
scale of the problem and multiplicity of areas affected.
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Although not working on the same scale as prior to the 1984
reorganisation, BSC(I) is still in existence but limited its
public reporting in 1987 to three nebulous paragraphs in the
BSC annual report. The first reads as follows:
"BSC Industry continues to play an important role in helping
to create jobs in the areas of the country most affected by
the restructuring of the Corporation, providing support for
new, expanding and incoming businesses. The total number of
job commitments the Company has helped to create since 1975
now exceeds 60,000."
Previous reports refer to "forecasts of additional job
opportunities" from firms that have been helped to start-up,
expand or relocate but always at the broadest possible level,
with no definition of actual jobs created, where created and
no indication of failures or closures that might halt the
cumulatively rising totals.
7.3.3 Confusion and Contradiction
Work by a number of authors, but particluarly Lovering
(1985, 1987), has emphasised that the state's commitment to
industrial regeneration (as represented by regional policy)
has not only decreased but has never matched other
expenditure with spatial implications. In particular defence
related expenditure is concentrated in the generally more
prosperous southern parts of Britain. 	 Much of this
expenditure is devoted to advanced technology industries with
few civilian spin-offs. It is imagined, that if it were
possible	 to	 calculate	 the	 precise	 costs	 of
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reindustrialization (no cost per job analysis has been
attempted here but the overwhelming problems in obtaining
figures, defining costs and discerning the actual number of
jobs created, are recognised) and add to it the other costs
of infra-structure, social security and health provision in
the effected regions, the totals would still be less than
regionally impacting defence budgets.
Even between and within the various state agencies
involved with reindustrialization there are contradictions
and areas of conflict. For example, the various business
advisory agencies (WDA, enterprise agencies, Small Firms'
Service) regard the sustenance of company viability as their
primary aim.	 Local authorities regard the creation of
additional jobs as their primary aim. These two aims are not
necessarily compatible because of the phenomenon of jobless
growth, whereby firms may expand productivity, output and
profits but, by using different management and manufacturing
techniques, actually employ no more (and often fewer) people.
Another example of such contradictions is that of the MSC's
YTS schemes: it is probable that more permanent (with
potentially better pay and conditions) jobs would have been
created in firms using YTS had there not been what is in
effect a government subsidy to employ cheap labour.
The description of the state as confused comes from the
idea that the state acts in response to the needs of the
moment, with only limited concern for the long term
implications of its actions. Clear theoretical visions of
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the overall aims and intentions of state policy can only be
made when the •contradictions are analysed, and the most
important elements of the functions of state are revealed.
From this standpoint it becomes clear that a cynical view of
the motivations for reindustrialization can prevail. The
state is not genuinely interested in a return to full
employment (or in the case of the steel closure areas
bringing their levels of unemployment down to the national
average), it only has to appear to have that intention. The
major concern of the state, in this instance, is the care and
support of capital. 	 Hence the question mark about the
"confusion"; the state is only apparantly confused, acting as
it does, as a palliative to defuse pressures that might arise
within civil society.
Underlying all the contradictions within and between
various state agencies is the tension between local and
central government.	 In contemporary Britain, it has become
apparent that the central authority no longer trusts local
authorities to carry out many of the functions previously
regarded as their province. Control of rates had already
been achieved through the mechanisms of "ratecapping" before
their proposed abolition and the introduction of the domestic
poll tax. The proposed reform of the business rating system
(with the fixing of a national business	 rate)	 is
demonstrative of the centralising tendencies. There has been
considerable opposition to these measures from the CBI
because they will probably involve rate increases in southern
counties coupled with decreases further north. The potential
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for a national redistribution of industry is very real- only
time will tells
Increased central government control of local authorities
has, if anything, increased their corporatist inclination to
cooperate with central power. In reality many authorities
have had little option but to fall in line with the
Thatcherite "there is no alternative" viewpoint. 	 They (in
the words	 of Eddie Morley- Hartlepool's Industrial
Development Officer) "are beggars who cannot afford to be
choosers".	 There	 is	 no	 room for manoeuvre, either
financially or ideologically.
7.4 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY- PAWN OR PRIME MOVER?
The indications seem to suggest that British capital is
reluctant or unable to reindustrialize the deindustrialized
areas of Britain, but this depends very much upon the
perception of reindustrialization. If reindustrialization is
defined in employment creation terms, then the recent
performance of British industry (as judged by the cumulative
totals released in the 1984 Census of Employment) has been
very poor.	 However, if reindustrialization is defined in
terms of increasing industrial efficiency, the latest DTI
figures on output and productivity give cause for guarded
optimism. This study has focussed on the employment, rather
than the technological, implications of reindustrialization,
because they tend to form the basis of the overt aims and
intentions of such policies. It is possible to suggest that
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manufacturing industry is increasingly becoming a pawn of the
capitalist state as it is being urged to take 	 on
responsibility (financial and managerial) for activities
which were previously undertaken by the state. 	 Prominent
amongst such activities are education, training and social
responsibility. Industry is increasingly being urged to pay
for state services, eg the new inner city technical colleges,
in a fashion very similar to the deconcentration of power
from central to local government. It is government policy to
seek to reduce state intervention, but it may do this in ways
contrary to the immediate interests of capital (the rates
legislation has already been mentioned in this context
above).
Many of the industrialists encountered during this study
held the view that the incentives associated with
reindustrializatjori tended to be beneficial to new companies
but of less value to older, more established firms (an
opinion vindicated by the questionnaire re5ults).	 Attitudes
towards the incentives varied according to the size,
character and duration of establishment of firms in the
areas.	 The larger firms tended also to be the older ones.
In the view of the DTI, this exercise has been predominantly
concerned with small firms because the departmental
definition of "small" is anything below 200 employees. Those
attempting to regenerate industry operate on a different
scale: anything over fifty employees is a "large" firm, firms
bringing over two hundred jobs can , virtually dictate their
own terms and are assured of every possible assistance. Most
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firms responding to the questionnaire in the steel closure
areas studied; employed fewer than twenty, indicating that
even according to local administrators, reindustrialization
has been concerned with very small firms. The largest firm
encountered had 1,200 employees and was exceptional; only two
others had over 500 workers.
Recent interview evidence from a more established firm
throws some light on the reasoning behind capital's support
of enterprise agenies and willingness to enter into certain
partnership arrangements with local authorities. 	 After
mentioning the annual mayor's visit to the factory and
admitting to personal friendships with the Industrial
Development Officer and the Chairman of the Industrial
Development Committee,	 the personnel officer with a
multinational firm, admitted the following about his company
and the Borough Council:
"we have that sort of relationship- we don't ask them for
anything at all- I wish I wasn't on tape when I'm saying
this- but there comes a time when we may need one or two
favours- if we wanted just about anything within the power of
the local authority we would get it- because we've always
been very decent, open and reasonable- we've extremely good
relations at that sort of level."
"The one thing that would threaten us is that if a major
competitor were to threaten to come to Hartlepool, we would
hope that we would have enough muscle to get the Council to
get them to relocate elsewhere," (26.8.87).
This, presumably, is why some firms are prepared to get
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involved, the above firm has donated five hundred pounds per
annum for three years to the local enterprise agency but
considers it worthwhile investment for the informal access to
decision making processes this represents.
The DTI currently divides its efforts between providing
assistance for: inward investment (preferrably from abroad),
existing firms and the development of entrepreneurial
activities. For most firms in steel closure areas this means
access to regional development grants and little else.
Unless the multinational firms have specialist requirements
steel closure areas do not appear to be particularly
attractive. The New Town image is of greater value. 	 A DTI
spokesman said that "Nissan came to Washington rather than
Sunderland, a New Town rather than a traditional heavy
industry area." Although the problems of branch plants in
areas far from headquarters have long been recognised
(suseptibility to closure in times of recession being the
most obvious) there has been no progress towards their
solution.	 The short term benefits in terms of immediate
employment (rather than the more dubious potential growth of
indigenous	 firms)	 take preference.	 One of the most
disruptive examples of short term branch plant locations was
that of Laing's in Hartlepool. This oil platform and rig
construction company operated in Hartlepool from 1974 until
1978 and employed up to 2,000 people but had the effect of
"spoiling" the local labour market by poaching skilled men
from the local heavy engineering companies by offering "wages
that would look good even today" (a Hartlepool personnel
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officer 1987)
Laing Construction was just one of many of the new firms
that have exploited the situation in steel closure areas for
short periods, then either withdrawn from the areas or failed
altogether. Other examples include: from Hartlepool, GEC,
Buxted Chickens, M & M Oil (or THC Fabricators), Alladin
Industries and Smart and Brown; from Corby, 	 Commodore
Business Machines, Wonderworld (who never really arrived but
recieved substantial finacial assistance for feasibility
studies) and Smiths Crisps; from Blaenau Gwent, Merryweather
Firefighting Equipment, Tabac Industries, Envelope Company of
Wales and Crown Devonshire. These are, or were, substantial
companies and cannot be written off as inevitable "lameducks"
that the administrators indicate are bound to occur. It is
very difficult to obtain up-to-date and precise information
about failure rates of companies in specific areas, because
of delays in registration and deregistration at Companies
House (Storey et al 1987), and the reluctance of enterprise
agency and industrial development section staff to keep
records of such negative images.	 It is obvious from
attempting to use the industrialists lists that in each area
there has been a high turnover of new firms as well as
failures amongst the more established businesses.	 It can
reasonably be argued that far from regenerating the
industrial bases of such areas the high failure rate of
recently establishing firms actually endorses the view that
these localities are marginal to the needs of capital.
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Storey et al (1987) show how susceptible small firms are
to closure (over 50% cease trading within three years of
foundation) and, more importantly, how very few will achieve
substantial growth through general subsidies for trading
rather than for the retention of profitability.	 This work
does much to undermine the premises upon which the
government's entrepreneurial policies are based. In only a
few cases do small firms utilise the subsidies available to
reinvest in their businesses, and in even fewer cases does
this investment result in increased employment (7% of the new
firms from Storey's sample account for nearly half the jobs).
The exhortations	 for ex-steelworkers	 (or miners or
shipbuilders etc) to set up their own firms to generate
employment are seen to ring hollow because "the fast growth
companies are owned by professional directors rather than
being family firms or 'one man bands'" (Storey et al 1987,
p.165).	 Personal encounters with small firm directors
endorse such viewpoints; many of these "entrepreneurs" are
not growth oriented, the firms are used as means of
subsistence.	 The Storey et al study identifies a number of
"leakages" of the subsidies paid to small firms by the state
which counter any job creation potential; profits revert to
the directors to enhance personal consumption, profits are
clawed back in higher taxation and a significant amount of
the profit is used to repay loans in order to avoid future
risks (due to the unavailability of venture capital in
Britain bank secured loans or home mortgages are common
sources of funding for small firms)
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The intention of this section has been to establish that
the firms affected by reindustrialization tend to be small
and have a high risk of failure. The next section will
examine some of the	 employment	 implications	 of
reindustrialization programmes.
7.5 EMPLOYMENT- THE PROBLEM REMAINS
This study has not been able to produce accurate balance
sheets of jobs created and lost in the three areas because of
data availability problems (most notably the continued
absence of the 1984 census of employment data). Factors such
as migration (again, most of the official figures are
estimates based upon 1981 data), Restart and training schemes
cloud the issue. What is clear is that reindustrialization
programmes have not achieved the aim of replacing the job
opportunities	 lost through steel closure. 	 Insufficient
numbers of jobs have been generated.	 Levels of long term
unemployment remain high, but they, like all unemployment
figures since 1979, must be treated with extreme caution, due
to the changes in accounting practise and definition that
have occured. Even in Corby where 10,000 steel related jobs
were lost and it is claimed that 10,000 (Civic News July
1987) more have been "created" there remain serious problems
of high levels of long term unemployment and total
unemployment well above the national average. The job
"creation" claims of reindustrialization programmes suggest
that the relationship between employment and unemployment is
more complex than being merely reciprocal as government
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policy would seem to indicate. Increases in numbers employed
do not appear to involve a similar reduction in nuitthers
unemployed.	 The cumulative effects of people commuting from
other areas, the feminisation of the labour market and key
workers brought in nominally as specialists, are not enough
to mask the fact that there has been no attempt to target or
select (admittedly difficult with so little to deal with)
appropriate employment for these areas.
Equally as important as the numerical failure of
reindustrialization has been its qualitative failure to
provide employment offering comparable skill, wage and
condition levels suitable for ex-steelworkers. 	 There are
comparatively more jobs for women and young workers than for
the older ex-steelworkers. Flexibility of labour at the new
factories extends to part- time and temporary contract
working and the development of multi-skilling.	 This is
exemplary of advantage of the high unemployment situation
being taken to reorganise labour processes. 	 The Factories'
Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive has its
slender resources stretched beyond manageable levels, so the
removal of certain legal obligations to provide minimum
safety standards (as is currently proposed by government) on
small firms should be of assistance to the Executive but not
to the workers involved. The new companies are also not slow
to recognise the opportunity presented by a disillusioned
labour market, in order to take control of worker
representation.	 Where trade unions are recognised it is
often on a single union basis, with restrictions.	 Works
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councils under the tutelage of management are becoming the
accepted norm.•
7.6 THE PAUCITY AND POTENTIAL OF THE ALTERNATIVES
As mentioned previously reindustrialization programmes can
be viewed as part of a continuum of conventional economic
rejuvenation measures.	 It is not proposed to discuss here
the narrow range of other conventional measures adopted to
supplement the generation of new industries; these include
the various training schemes,	 tourism and retailing
development and other types of inner city "initiatives".
These measures can be viewed as supplemental and they offer
little expectation of major success for steel closure areas
wishing to replace lost employment.
The alternatives with perhaps the greatest potential are
the most radical and, if derived from the Left, have least
chance of being properly supported.	 Most radical of all
would have been a concerted effort to keep the steel works
operational and for them to remain the focal point of the
steel towns. This begs the question of what would have
happened if the steelworks had remained open? Although it is
always dangerous to speculate the answer probably lies in
Michael Foot's "lingering death" concept (as expressed at the
time of the Ebbw Vale closure in 1975). Even if BSC had not
closed the various works they may well have been starved of
investment in order to minimise profitability and provide
grounds for future shutdown. Retention of a large number of
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steel works would have caused the government problems with
the European Community, the prime mover of the capacity
reductions. Even the Italian government which had managed to
ignore ECSC directives for a number of years (Eurostat, 1983)
has subsequently had to make reductions in steel making
capacity. Because of the de facto clearance of the steel
sites and the plans to privatise BSC, a return to steel
production in most of the areas is unlikely ever to be
realised.	 Attempts to suggest alternative uses for
steelmaking plant immediately prior to closure were bound to
fail because of the non- transferability of production
processes.
An alternative with fundamental implications far beyond
steel closure areas, would be a thorough reappraisal of the
work ethic.	 This would involve a reorganisation of society
on a social rather than economic basis- or a different
definition of "economic" to that inherent in capitalist
property relations (unlikely to be welcomed by the Thatcher
administration). The intention would be to remove the stigma
of unemployment and evaluate people on their contribution to
society rather than the nature of their employment. Implicit
within such a set of ideas would be a more equitable
distribution of national wealth involving the attainment of
benefit levels high enough to recognise the persistence of
unemployment and the special needs of recipients. Work of
all types would be valued, including domestic labour and
community service. As a corollary, leisure activities would
receive comprehensive state support to allow use by all who
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wish to.
Some of the ideas of a new work ethic have evolved in
third sector activities, but they have received little
support from central government and limited assistance from
local authorities as temporary measures, with the return to
conventional economics the major priority. 	 Even if the
community led, sustainable rather than viable, work culture
were to be accepted it would be a long term project and could
not possibly be expected to affect major social change
instantaneously.	 There would be severe problems overcoming
the present marginal position of such quasi-charitable
activities.	 The incorporation of cooperative development
into mainstream local initiatives is an example of official
sanctioning of previously denigrated ideals, but also of the
limited and specialised job creation potential of the third
sector.
Perhaps the best example of a comprehensive strategy
involving the development of the third sector (ie promotion
of activities based on socially useful rather than
economically viable criteria) was presented by the Greater
London Council's (GLC) London Industrial Strategy (1985).
This substantial (633 page) document was a product of the
GLC's Popular Planning Unit. It offered specific strategies
for 23 different sectors of the capital's economy, but is
most valuable for the theoretical framework it addresses and
the implication that something tangible could be achieved
given a sympathetic administration.
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A legacy of the London strategy, and similar views held
elsewhere, has been the Enterprise Boards (eg GLEE), not to
be confused with Enterprise Agencies which tend to adopt
current Tory Party policy. 	 Enterprise Boards continue to
develop new forms of ownership	 (such as	 industrial
cooperatives and new public and municipal enterprises) in
some of the conurbations of the West Midlands, Lancashire,
West Yorkshire as well as Greater London. The GLEE intended
to develop an interactive local government role in the
private economy as an "alternative investment institution"
(GLC, 1985) .
	 This involved rescue packages, increasing
social control, enterprise planning (meaning the inclusion of
trades unionists and covering a broad range of subjects from
equal opportunities to investment strategies), "alternative"
property development and sectoral reconstruction.
The London Industrial Strategy includes the following
summary (S.1.176) of its main interventionist features:
-an emphasis on long term strategic production planning of
industries;
-a concern that restructuring in all sectors of the economy
should be carried out in the interests of those who work in
the industry and use its products;
-a commitment to the development and application of human-
centred technology;
-a strategic concern with improving the conditions and hours
of work in the domestic economy, and with improved means of
integrating domestic work with other parts of the economy in
order to improve the living and working conditions of women;
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-a priority to extending social control over the public
economy through increasing political, trade union and user
control;
-a commitment to popular involvement in all aspects of
strategic policy making (popular planning) and in the
operation of enterprises (enterprise planning) (GLC, 1985)
The implementational feasibility of such intentions is a
matter for some speculation.
This thesis does not offer the scope for a fully rounded
critique of third sector initiatives as means of employment
(or occupation) generation. All that can be attempted is a
summary of the recent research in this field which might be
applicable	 for	 steel closure areas, and include some
references to the small number of examples encountered during
this research.	 It is easy to be too dismissive about
community and cooperative activities given the lack of
funding they receive and their generally small scale of
operations.
Community Business Ventures (CBV's) are important elements
of third sector strategies.	 Murgatroyd and Smith (1984)
characterised them as conforming to the following set of
features:
1. the primary objective of the venture is to create
permanent jobs for local people through viable, income
generating activity;
2. control of the venture will remain in local hands through
a suitable legal structure;
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3. the venture will undertake a range of trading activities,
with an emphasis on services and products to meet particular
local needs and on socially useful production;
4. the profits resulting from any activity will not be
distributed to individual members but will be reinvested to
create more jobs or applied to other local purposes.
Co- operatives are the best known examples of CBV's. The
empirical research for this thesis only encountered one co-
op actually trading (a small clothing co-op in Corby) . Lowe
(1987) concludes that "despite their inherant dangers (a
tendency towards self- exploitation in pay and conditions)
co- operatives can and do provide the "panecea" that some
people are looking for in terms of providing an alternative
to unemployment and a different approach to employment in the
1980's." Other examples of community enterprise- Consett
Music Projects and the 1-lartlepool Enterprise Trust are
examined in chapter 6 (section 5 and 4 respectively).
Many of the ideas alluded to in the preceeding paragraphs
of this section would be anathema to the present government
(and probably to any Labour alternative) because they
represent a potential electoral catastrophe. The fact is
that over eighty per cent of the nation's working population
is in work and would (especialy judging by the 1987 general
election results) take a very dim view of any measures to
dilute their status.	 This would occur, despite what the
American's call the "disappearing middle" (of skilled "blue
collar") jobs and the emergence of a two tier labour market
with a small number of highly paid professional workers on
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the top tier and a large mass of unskilled low paid workers
below (Industrial Union Society, 1985) . Thatcherism is a
crusade for	 individual,	 not	 collective,	 achievement.
Ideologically it allows for no state intervention in domestic
economic regeneration that does not promote individual,
entrepreneurial enterprise. 	 It would certainly oppose any
system of values which might suggest that capitalism has
nothing to offer the unemployed in marginal areas.
The introduction of job sharing and early retirement
schemes can at best be only an insufficient response to the
totality of the employment	 crisis.	 Very specific
preconditions are required for such schemes to have even a
minimal impact on unemployment. The major requirement being
the actual and continued presence of job opportunities to
split and retire early from.
If the British government was really serious about
industrial development there are a number of OECD member
states whose industrial performance would merit serious
consideration of imitation in terms of their assistance to
industry. The Japanese industry ministry (MITI) and the West
German Lande provide small businesses with long term
financial security. 	 The impression derived from this study
of British small businesses is that short term battles for
survival prevail. There appears to be no such thing as true
venture capital in Britain, because of the necessity of loan
guarantees several times the value of the loan in question.
Storey et al (1987) call for a "hands on" approach by the
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state to small businesses, this would appear to have been
successful	 elsewhere.	 However there are problems in
successfully implementing their ideas on selecting fast
growth firms for investment because their mathematical
modelling techniques at best leave room for 25% error. There
may be room for a more supportive general environment for
industry which goes beyond the sponsoring of engineering and
business studies courses at the expense of basic research,
humanities and social science. Implicit in this would be a
major reconcentration of resources for employment generation
from local to central government (including a significant
enhancement) .	 The legacy of previous rounds of state
intervention is too damaging to be rectified by local
authorities, acting alone.	 Central government should take
responsibility for all the implications of its policy
decisions.
7.7 WHAT IF THERE WERE NO CONVENTIONAL REINDUSTRIALIZATION?
Speculation as to what would have happened if no
reindustrialization measures had been implemented serves to
evaluate the worth of the interventions. It is tempting to
suggest that very little would be different.	 In Hartlepool
65% of firms answering question 16 of the questionnaire
declared that they would have established in the town
regardless of the incentives. 	 However, in both Corby and
Blaenau Gwent only 38% said that they would have established
there without the incentives. The Corby and Blaenau Gwent
responses are probably more indicative because they are from
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a larger and therefore more representative sample.	 The
implication is that 60% of the mobile firms would not have
been attracted to steel closure areas in the absence of
reindustrialization programmes. Thus unemployment would have
been even higher and those promoting the programmes justified
in the belief that their efforts were better than nothing.
An alternative perspective might be that it would be better
in the long term to do without such marginal firms that
depended upon incentives. The labourmarkets and lives of
workers would not then be disrupted by firms "taking the
money and running".
The considerable amount of public expenditure on
reindustrialization could have been be redirected to other
uses.	 Money saved on advertising, enterprise agencies,
promotion and competing in the place market could be spent on
giving more support to established employers, developing
leisure and welfare or, more radically, developing the third
sector.	 However, given the parlous state of local authority
finances the money saved would probably be used for the most
pressing revenue requirement of the moment.
It has been suggested that	 reindustrialization was
intended to assist in the pacification of any working class
militancy in the steel closure areas. It is doubtful whether
any direct action on the scale of the Longwy disturbances in
France would have developed in the relatively passive British
steel closure areas. The principal reason for this assertion
was the level of redundancy settlements made to steelworkers.
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At the time of closure they showed little interest in
reindustrialization,	 much more in make up pay and
qualification for early retirement.
The "what if no reindustrialization?" question is almost
impossible to answer.	 The conventional economic measures
have come be seen as palliatives rather than as a panecea.
Would the level of migration away from steel closure areas
have been affected in the absence of the measures? I doubt
it because there is widely experienced dissatisfaction
(therefore an incentive to leave the areas) with both the
quality and number of employment opportunities available.
Perhaps the timing of out- migration would have been
different- people may have been willing to leave much sooner
given little hope of conventional employment. Without the
pressure for conventional regeneration the third sector might
have been given the financial and ideological room to
flourish. There may even have been more radical attempts to
establish socially useful and community based production as
envisaged by the GLC. It is difficult to see how the efforts
to reindustrialize can be justified by attempting to guess
what might have happened in their absence.	 The qualitative
achievements (eg the deterioration in pay, conditions and the
likelihood of finding secure employment) certainly do not
justify the programmes.	 Only Corby can claim any real
quantitative success (which may be more a function of
location than reindustrialization); the other study areas can
not. A prudent view of this situation would be that the
absence of conventional measures could not have materially
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worsened conditions for the majority of people in steel
closure areas.'
7.8	 THE PROSPECTS- POOR
The chances are that the much vaunted "upturn" in the
economy will have little impact on the steel closure areas
and similar localities and regions elsewhere. Recent reports
(Financial Times, 1987b) suggest that the age of high mass
unemployment is here for the forseeable future. The British
non-oil manufacturing sector has yet to return to
productivity levels achieved in 1979 and the recovery of
employment levels is much further behind.
The prospects for steel closure areas and large swathes of
Britain tend towards the pessimistic. 	 High technology
industry is in a national state of decline and has locational
tendencies towards New Town or smaller outer metropolitan
south eastern locations. There are very few entrepreneurs
amongst ex-steelworkers, and even fewer of the professional
directors identified by Storey et al (1987) as being most
likely to manage fast growth small firms. The potential for
local service employment is often limited by resistant image
problems and existing overprovision. Retailing (through the
development of out of town centres) may also suffer from
overprovision.	 Increased dependence on MSC shemes is a
distinct probability.
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Competition in the place market is unlikely to diminish as
more enterprise agencies are created. As amongst the least
attractive areas to industry (and the first to enter the
current competitive fray) the steel closure areas will appear
less inviting as the momentum of the enterprise agency
movement takes in more and more areas. Steel closure areas
with enterprise zones in the first round of designation will
become increasingly unattractive to investment as the 1991
termination approaches. Whilst manufacturing profitability
has increased on a national basis it has been noted (by the
DTI, 1986) that the last regions to participate in the
recovery tend to be the hardest hit (especially the North
East).
Whilst the ex-steel localities have not become "ghost
towns" in the accepted US interpretation, they are pale
shadows of their former selves, with poor services and social
conditions (to take what may appear a trivial example- none
of the three- Hartlepool, Corby and Blaenau Gwerit- now
supports a single cinema) . The prospects for the next 5
years of the Thatcher majority remain bleak. These places,
and many like them, have not died, but rather seriously
wilted. Whilst not displaying much that could be described
as optimistic: life goes on. Adaptations to the continuence
of high levels of long term unemployment have and continue to
be made,	 because there really is no alternative.
Difficulties with the council house transfer scheme and the
inflated private housing market in the more prosperous areas
make it so.
	 The North East has seen major developments in
- 333 -
community ventures, such as the Consett Music Projects (which
started as theprovision of recording studio space and has
progressed to music promotion and a record label), Hartlepool
People (the provision of hobby and skill development
activities for the unemployed) and the Cleveland Council of
Churches Unemployment Project (which has developed a
community enterprise centre and enterprise trust for
community business ventures). The most probable option that
reiridustrialization provides,	 is	 not	 the rebirth of
communities but, through its failure, their gradual decline
into passive obscurity.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
APPENDICES
8.1	 APPENDIX 1- QUESTIONNAIRE
FIRMS' QUESTIONNAIRE	 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
1. Please indicate the legal status of your firm:
(please tick)
plc
private company
cooperative
subsidiary (name parent)
other (please specify)
2. Please indicate the structure of your organisation:
multi-national corporation
multi-plant firm within U.K.
single plant firm
other (please specify)
3. What functions are located on this site? (please tick)
Headquarters
Research and Development
Branch Office
Office Services
Sales/Marketing
Raw Material Processing
Component Production
Component Assembly
Final Product Assembly
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Warehousing
Retailing
Other (please specify)
4. When	 were	 you	 established	 on	 this
site?	 Year	 Month
5. 1-lave you moved from another location? If so, please
state where)
6. What is your product or service (on this site)?
7. Who are your major suppliers and where are they located?
	
Company	 Location
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
8. Where are the main markets for your products located?
(please tick)
This Borough/District
This County
Neighbouring Counties
This Region
Rest of the U.K.
European Community
Elsewhere (please specify)
9. Please indicate your usual distribution network (tick)
direct to customers
direct to retailers
to warehouses
to other manufacturers
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to another division of your company
10. What is the total employment of your firm, at this site,
at specified date?
Please give numbers of: full-time }male
female
part-time }male
female
temporary }male
} female
How have the figures for total employment changed over the
past 12 months?
Please tick: remained stable
increased
decreased
11. Previous Occupations (immediately prior to joining your
workforce)
How many of your workforce were:
steelworkers (or ex-steelworkers)
other unemployed
housewives
school leavers male
female
under 25 years male
female
On MSC schemes (YOPS, YTS, CP) male
female
12. Did you, or do you still, receive financial aid (loans,
grants etc) or advice (eg business plans) from any of the
following agencies? Please tick in the appropriate columns.
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Agency	 Financial Aid	 Advice
Banks
BSC (Industry)
Borough/District Council
Chamber of Commerce
Commission for New Towns
County Council
English Estates
Local Enterprise Agency/Business advisory centre
European Coal and Steel Community
European Investment Bank
European Social Fund
Dept. of Employment
Dept. of Environment
Dept. of Trade and Industry
Industrial and Commercial Finance Corp.
Manpower Services Commission
Small Firms Service
Welsh Development Agency
Welsh Office
Other (please specify)
(NB The blend of agencies used in each guestionnaire was
appropriate to the area.)
13. Please tick the type of financial assistance accepted:
Cash Grants: Regional Development Grants
Regional Selective Assistance
National Selective Assistance
i) Sectoral
ii) Support for innovation
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iii) Non-sectoral (major projects)
Enterprise Allowance Scheme
Local Authority Grants
Low Interest Loans: European Coal and Steel Community
European Investment Bank
Local Authority Loans (Mortgages)
Small firm loan guarantee
BSC(I) Loans
Other (please specify)
Advance Factory Units: welsh Development Agency
English Estates
Commission for New Towns
Local Authority
Other (please specify)
Business Expansion Scheme (Equity Investment)
Venture Capital (please specify source)
Other (please specify)
14. Please indicate the type of advice utilised (please
tick)
Advice where to locate - within the U.K.
- within the region
- in the local area
- which site?
Financial package selection
Business plans: strategies for firm - creation
- growth
- survival
Other (please specify)
15. Please identify, by ordering from 1 to 3, the three most
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important	 reasons	 for	 your	 location	 in
Hartlepool/Corby/Blaenau Gwent.
Financial Incentives
Site Availability
Labour availability
Local Market
Communications
Personal reasons
Advice from - agencies
- other professionals
Other (please specify)
16. Would you have established here if the package of advice
and incentives was not available?
17. Have the incentives on offer increased the number of
people you employ?
18. Has the assistance available been crucial for the
survival of your business?
19. If you have any further comments to make on the issues
raised please do so below:
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8.2	 APPENDIX 2- 'INTERVIEWEES
8.3	 1-IARTLEPOOL
Hartlepool Borough Council Industrial Development Officers:
Eddie Morley
Robert Jackson
Hartlepool Enterprise Agency:
Alan Humble
Cleveland County Council Economic Development Unit:
Derek Gunby
Hartlepool New Development Support (HANDS)
Ron Preece
English Estates:
David Rhodes
DTI, Newcastle:
Ken Johnson
DoE, Newcastle:
Alistair Balls
BSC(I) Workshops:
Barbera Elsdon
BSC 44 inch Pipemill:
R. Walsh (personnel manager)
Michael Kay (contract worker, Chairman Hartlepool PLP)
Ex-steelworkers:
Ray Waller (Councillor: Cleveland and Hartlepool)
Maurice Boddy (Borough Councillor)
Kevin Lester
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Charles Smith
MSC Skilicentre, Billingham:
Bob Creighton
Lloyds British (Billirigham):
Peter Crawford
P.B.Whitford (UK) Ltd. (Select Venture Management Ltd):
Martin Dawson
Cleveland Cooperative Development Agency:
Pete Smith
Cleveland Council of Churches Unemployment Project:
Tony Mason
Hartlepool Community Workers' Forum:
Sue Vicente
flartlepool People:
Chris Hart
Teesside Industrial Mission (}iartlepool chaplain):
Rev Chris Beales
Industrialists:
Lab Systems Furniture:
JD Denham
PMA Textiles
R Taylour (Manaaging Director)
W Wilson (Personnnel Manager)
R Lauder & Co:
Robert Lauder
Reed Corrugated Cases:
Ken Gardener (Hartlepool Personnel Assoc)
Tolaram Polymers:
Stephen Hatton
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Factory workers:
Isocom:
Carol Lester
"Mr Chris"
Carol Cranny
Hartlepool Labour Party:
Mike Owen
8.4	 COREY
Corby District Council:
Duncan Flail (Chief Executive)
S Williams (Planning)
Corby Industrial Development Centre:
Fred McClenaghan
Ray Jackson
Tony Martin-Walker (training)
Northamptonshire Enterprise Agency:
David Mann (ex-Hartlepool New Jobs Team)
Nothamptonshire Chamber of Commerce:
Simon Sperryn
Northamptonshire County Council Planning Dept:
D.Ozier
Commission for New Towns:
Graham Lloyd 2n1> DTI, Nottingham:
Martin Briggs
Wilson's Industrial Estate Agents:
Graham Stanton
Corby Library:
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Michael Sharman
BSC(I) Workshops:
Geoff Bent
BSC Tubes Division:
Mr Brown (Personnel Manager)
Bob Farrow (Personnel)
Tony McGrath (Press Officer)
Ex- steelworkers:
Jim Thomson (ex Chairman District Council)
Tom McIntosh (District Councillor)
Phil Sawford
Industrialists:
Falcon Crest Products:
M Renault
Fentone Music:
H Fenton
Fresh Fruit Juice Manufacturing Co:
David Child
Hamlet Circuits:
Ann Beardmore (Personnel)
David Girvan (Production Manager)
Seamless Tubes Ltd:
Dick Sharp (Plant Manager)
Angus McIntyre (Personnel)
Tony McKee (Quality Assurance)
Brian Bruce (Planning)
Ron Collins (Engineering)
John Clark (Heat Treatment)
Ian Mackay (Consultant Engineer)
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Dennis Baker (ISTC)
Kevin Mycroft <Wednesfield TI Group)
Jim Scott (Plant Supervisor)
Trades' Council:
Bob Douglas (Secretary)
NUPE (local organiser):
Peter Weston
Tim Healy NUJ (Evening Telegraph)
John Holmes (T&GWU)
8.5 BLAENAU GWENT
Blaenau Gwent Borough Council:
Peter Law (Chairman Industrial Development Committee)
Ged McHugh (Planning)
Keith Thomas (Technical Services, Local Historian)
Blaenau Gwent Business Advisory Service:
Preston Powell
Gwent County Council:
Rob Halford (Industrial Development)
Welsh Development Agency:
Vince Tidswell (Management Advisor)
Martin Francis (Local Office)
Welsh Office, Cardiff:
Stephen Williams
BSC(I) Workshops:
Ray Davies
British Coal (Enterprise)
Tony Fox
- 345 -
BSC (Tinpiate)
Glyn Prosser
Ex- steelworkers:
Gerald P Jenkins
Peter Dyke
Barry Price
Industrialists:
A & F Plastics Ltd:
Mr Lewandowski
English Grains (Wales) Ltd:
Jim Holmes
T & GWU (Local Officer)
Geoff Jacob
8.6 APPENDIX 3- AREA SELECTION DATA
TPPDIX 3 : PRE SELEXION
ThflL cnjs
	 (areal units 1978TIA for co1u 1-4
BSC(I) areas for columns 5-9)
1 : 1971 % of total vrkforce nployed in metal manufacture
2 : 1981 % of total vorkforce	 1oyed in metal manufacture
3 : 1981 oc ober uniiployment rate male
4 : 1984 October unloyment rate male
5 : BSC(I) assisted new jobs March 1983
6 : Projected new jobs to March 1986
7 : BSC(I) loans (pounds 000's)
8 : Cost per 1983 job (pounds) by loans to firms
9 : Response Grading (qualitative) range 0-10
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8.7 APPENDIX 4- SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE MATERIAL
PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS HARTLEPOOL
	
All Firms (77) 	 Pre-1975(27) Post-].975(50)
Exsteelworkers	 330	 265	 65
Other unemployed	 753	 265	 388
Housewives	 128	 67	 61
Schoolleavers	 399	 275	 124
Under 25's	 913	 649	 264
MSC schemes	 155	 79	 76
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APPENDIX 4 (Cntd.)
PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS COREY
All Firms(112) Pre-1979(22)
Ex-steelworkers	 1516	 268
Other unemployed	 1269	 205
Housewives	 583	 140
Schoolleavers M	 111	 40
Schoolleavers F
	
118	 85
Under 25's M	 550	 72
Under 25's F	 436	 113
MSC Schemes M
	
45	 17
MSC Schemes F	 53	 29
Post-1979 (90)
1248
1064
443
71
33
478
323
28
24
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APPENDIX 4 (Contd)
PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS BLAENAU GWENT
All Firms(90)	 Pre-1975 (12)
Ex-steelworkers	 535	 55
Other unemployed	 865	 194
Housewives	 205	 74
Schoolleavers M
	
79	 20
Schoolleavers F
	
18	 2
Under 25's M	 438	 64
Under 25's F
	 322	 214
MSC Schemes M	 136	 14
MSC Schemes F
	 53	 11
Post-1975 (78)
480
671
131
59
16
374
108
122
42
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